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INTRODUCTION 
Some potential health consequences of exposure to toxic sub-
stances in the workplace have been recognized for centuries. The 
health effects of other, newer substances, however, are just beginning 
to be understood. Recent developments in occupational medicine 
have established causal links between various substances and specific 
diseases. Furthermore, epidemiological studies and sophisticated 
laboratory procedures have identified factors (such as age, sex, 
ethnicity, genetic factors, allergies, and smoking and drinking habits) 
which, in addition to past workplace exposures and present medical 
condition, indicate that an individual may be predisposed to specific 
occupational diseases. 
The conclusiveness and predictive value of current medical evi-
dence varies widely. Nevertheless, some employers have begun to 
use information about an individual's statistical predisposition to oc-
cupational disease in making employment decisions concerning hir-
ing, firing, promotion, work assignment and other matters. Such 
policies, even where noninvidious and arguably essential, raise nu-
merous and perplexing medical, legal, and ethical issues. Where em-
ployers use unreliable criteria, extensive screening unfairly denies 
employment opportunities to entire classes of people. Even where 
the evidence supports a finding of increased risk, medical screening 
by employers threatens to create two classes of workers, one contain-
ing disease-resistant employees, the other containing potentially pro-
ductive but unemployable individuals who have genetic or other 
subclinical anomalies. 
The gaps in our medical knowledge make it difficult to respond 
to this prospect. Our national labor policy faces two potentially in-
consistent goals: making job opportunities available to those persons 
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capable of doing the work, while preventing job-related diseases. It 
is imperative that, in attempting to reconcile these policies, employ-
ers, workers, unions and governments work from a position of 
knowledge. 
This Article attempts to compile the latest information available 
concerning this difficult problem. Part I reviews the scientific litera-
ture, explaining the biological basis of increased risk of occupational 
disease. Part II explores the efforts of various employers to incorpo-
rate this research into their personnel practices. Part III surveys the 
legal response to these practices. Employees may challenge medical 
screening on a variety of theories, most of which were not designed 
to deal with the problem of susceptibility to occupational disease. 
Not surprisingly, none of the approaches offers an entirely satisfac-
tory response to the problem. This Article offers no clear answers. 
Indeed, scientific advances may soon render today's solutions inap-
propriate. Rather, the Article concludes with an effort to summarize 
the questions any future policy must answer. 
I. THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF INCREASED RISK 
Every human being is genetically unique. A compilation of 
about two dozen polymorphisms1 of blood types, red cell enzymes, 
blood plasma proteins, and leukocyte histocompatibility types2 dem-
onstrates that any two persons, except for identical twins, will have 
only a one in three billion chance of having the same profile for even 
this short list of biochemical markers.3 
A person's environment also plays an important role in the total 
I. A polymorphism is the occurrence of several different forms within the same species. 
DORLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1234 (25th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as 
DO\l,LAND'S). 
2. Leukocyte is a generalized term for white blood cell. E. CALABRESE, POLLUTANTS AND 
HIGH R1sK GROUPS 203 (1978). Histocompatibility is a state of immunologic similarity or 
identity of tissues between a donor and recipient to permit a successful transplantation. 
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 649 (4th unabr. Lawyer's ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as 
STEDMAN'S). 
3. Omenn & Motulsky, Eco-Genetics: Variation in Susceptibility to Environmental Agents, in 
GENETIC ISSUES IN Pusuc HEALTH AND MEDICINE 84 (B. Cohen, A. Lilienfeld & P. Huang 
eds. 1978). 
The term "eco-genetics" refers to studies of genetically determined differences among indi-
viduals in their susceptibility to physical, chemical, and biological agents in the environment. 
Id. at 83. Again, "environment" is broadly defined to include physical, chemical, infectious, 
atmospheric, and climatic agents, as well as food substances. Motulsky, iefra note 4, at 376. 
This relatively new field deals with why harmful environmental agents affect only a certain 
proportion of the people exposed and why individuals differ in their adaptation to their envi-
ronment. F. VOGEL & A. MOTULSKY, HUMAN GENETICS 259 (1979). The field ofeco-genetics 
rests upon a central working hypothesis: that an individual's response to an environmental 
agent depends upon internal biochemical makeup. Motulsky, iefra note 4. It is now well 
settled that all exposed individuals do not respond alike, nor do all these differences result 
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development of the individual. Genes provide the potential; the ulti-
mate expression is greatly influenced by the environmental condi-
tions in which they operate.4 Human individuality results from the 
potentialities of heredity working together with the possibilities of 
the environment.5 
Human individuality is an important element in the etiologr of 
disease. At one time, controversy existed about whether genetics or 
environment - "nature or nurture" - was more important.7 To-
day, however, it is widely recognized that both factors play an im-
portant role. Few, if any, diseases can be understood by reference to 
either genetic or environmental factors alone. 8 
Recent studies reveal a greater diversity among individuals than 
previously believed.9 The enormous amount of genetic variability in 
human populations creates many degrees of toxin-specific sensitiv-
ity.10 Each genotype11 responds differently to environmental varia-
tions.12 Disease results only under certain genotype-environmental 
combinations. 13 Moreover, illness in an individual results from a 
from different levels of exposure. Cooper, Health Surveillance Programs in Industry, 3 PATTY'S 
INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE AND TOXICOLOGY 595, 601 (1979). 
The term "hypersusceptibility" is defined as "[i]nordinate response to an infective, chemi-
cal, or other agent." STEDMAN's, supra note 2, at 674. The term has not been used in this 
Article to avoid equating a hypersusceptible person with an ill or defective person. "Sensi-
tive," "predisposed," and "high-risk" have been used instead. Sensitivity may result from a 
variety of factors, such as preexisting diseases, or personal habits combined with occupational 
exposure to create synergistic effects - ie., acting together to enhance the effect of another 
force or agent. DoRLAND'S, supra note 1, at 1529. Sensitivity can also result from inborn 
errors of metabolism that interfere with detoxification of chemicals or augment their toxic 
effects. See Cooper, supra. 
4. A. WINCHESTER, HUMAN GENETICS 165 (1975); Motulsky, Ecogenetics: Genetic Varia-
tion in Susceptibility to Environmental Agents, in Human Genetics, 1977 PROC. OF THE FIFTH 
INTL. CONG. OF HUMAN GENETICS 376, 377. 
5. A. SCHEINFELD, HEREDITY IN HUMANS 4 (1972). See also note 8 iefra. 
6. Etiology is the study or theory of the factors that cause disease and the method of their 
introduction to the host. DoRLAND's, supra note 1, at 550. 
7. E.g., Harris, Nature and Nurture, 297 NEW ENG. J. MED. 399 (1977). 
8. A. EMERY, HEREDITY, DISEASE AND MAN - GENETICS IN MEDICINE 112 (1968); I. 
POTTER, HEREDITY AND DISEASE 23 (1968); J. STANSBURY, J. WYNGARDEN & D. FREDRICK-
SON, THE METABOLIC BASIS OF INHERITED DISEASE 3 (4th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as J. 
STANSBURY). "Environmental factors" has been given a rather broad definition to include 
everything from intra-uterine life to old age. It includes physical and social conditions, food, 
bacteria and viruses encountered, and medical care, both prophylactic and therapeutic. Har-
ris, supra note 7, at 399. 
9. L. CABALLE-SFORZA, ELEMENTS OF HUMAN GENETICS 52 (1973). 
10. Velazquez, The Genetic Concept of Disease, 31 REVISTA DE INVESTIGACION CLINICA 
No. I (Enero-Marzo 1979). 
11. Genotype refers to the genetic constitution of an individual, either with respect to gene 
combination at one specified locus or any specific combination ofloci. STEDMAN's, supra note 
2, at 577. 
12. Velazquez, supra note 10. 
13. Id. 
1384 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:1379 
multitude of prior chance circumstances. Thus, causal circumstances 
differ from one individual to another, even when the manifestations 
of their illnesses are indistinguishable. 14 Seemingly minor differences 
in diet or in physical or chemical environment determine the reac-
tion of a person to a given microbial or genetic stimulus.15 
As the list of factors known to be capable of inducing human 
disease lengthened, it became clear that a particular disease manifes-
tation could have more than one causal antecedent. 16 Furthermore, 
the human environment and gene pool constantly fluctuate. 17 The 
dramatic increase in environmental pollutants will continue to in-
crease the number of genetically susceptible targets. 18 Thus, the con-
cept of varied susceptibility is likely to take on even greater 
significance in the study of disease causation. The same principle of 
wide-ranging individual susceptibility to disease applies with equal 
force to occupational disease. 19 Research has revealed a number of 
factors that contribute to susceptibility to occupational disease. Ge-
netics, considered in Part A, plays a leading role. Part B examines 
several categories of nonoccupational environmental factors that 
also contribute to individual susceptibility. Finally, Part C examines 
the contribution of occupational factors to the etiology of these 
diseases. 
A. Genetic-Based Increased Risk 
1. Biochemical Genetic Factors 
A number of inborn errors of metabolism and organ-specific ge-
netic conditions have been associated with an increased risk of ill-
ness when the host is exposed to toxic substances or other 
environmental hazards in the workplace. The most widely recog-
nized genetic conditions are discussed below. 
14. MULTIPLE FACTORS IN THE CAUSATION OF ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED DISEASE I 
(D. Lee & P. Kotin eds. 1972). 
15. Id at 2. 
16. Id at 1. 
17. Id at 3. 
18. Brewer, Human Ecology, An Expanding Role far the Human Geneticist, 23 AM, J, 
HUMAN GENETICS 92 (1971). This prediction is based on studies of genetic variability and 
phannacogenetics, the study of the effects of genetic variation on human response to drugs, 
Motulsky, supra note 4, at 376. 
19. An increasing number of diseases have been discovered to be occupationally related. 
For example, the Office of Technology Assessment estimates that 60 to 90 percent of all can-
cers are related to occupational and environmental exposure. OFFICE OF TECHNOLO0Y AS-
SESSMENT, U.S. CON0RESS, TECHNOLO0IES FOR DETERMININ0 CANCER RISKS FROM THE 
ENVIRONMENT 3 (1981) [hereinafter cited as CANCER RISKS]. "Environment" is broadly de-
fined along the lines set out in note 8 supra. 
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a. Sickle cell Sickle cell anemia is an inherited blood disorder 
in which the red blood cells become crescent shaped.20 Individuals 
with sickle cell anemia are genetically homozygous, having inherited 
sickle cell genes from both parents.21 The term sickle cell trait (or 
sickle gene carrier) refers to a heterozygous individual who has in-
herited one normal hemoglobin gene and one sickle cell gene.22 The 
occupational significance of sickle cell trait is subject to much debate 
in the scientific community. 
At least forty-six clinical conditions have been associated with 
sickle cell trait. 23 The most relevant to the occupational setting are 
splenic infarctions in pressurized aircraft and sudden death during 
vigorous exercise at high altitudes. This led the armed forces to deny 
persons with sickle cell trait entry into flight and diving occupations 
because of the increased risk of deficient oxygenation of the blood. 24 
Some scientists suggest that sickle cell trait should be considered 
when jobs involve arduous work in places with relatively limited ox-
ygen, such as aircraft,25 or the risk of accidental deoxygenation, such 
as mine rescue work.26 Other scientists suggest that individuals with 
sickle cell trait may be more susceptible to the action of hemolytic 
agents. They recommend avoiding exposure to anemia producers 
(such as benzene, lead, and cadmium), methemoglobin formers 
(such as aromatic amino and nitro compounds), and blood enzyme 
tension reducers (such as carbon monoxide and cyanide).27 At least 
one chemical company implemented this recommendation.28 
Many other scientists consider sickle cell trait a benign condition 
20. Sickle cell anemia results in a clogging of the blood vessels and an impeding of the 
proper flow of oxygen to all parts of the body. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION 
AND WELFARE, PROTOCOL FOR SICKLE CELL EDUCATION 17 (1976). The disease usually 
causes cardiovascular abnormalities and extreme fatigue. Lindsay, Meshel & Patterson, Car-
diovascular Man[festations of Sickle Cell .Disease, 133 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 643 (1974). 
Consequently, persons suffering from sickle cell anemia are often overtly disabled and may 
have limited employment opportunities. Id; Cooper, Indicators of Susceptibility to Industrial 
Chemicals, 15 J. OccuP. MED. 355,356 (1973). 
21. Konetey-Ahula, The Sickle Cell .Diseases, 133 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 611 (1974). 
22. Id. at 612. 
23. Sears, The Morbidity of Sickle-Cell Trait: Review of the Literature, 64 AM. J. MED. 
1021, 1030 (1978). 
24. Uddin, Dickson & Brodine, Screening of Military Recruits for Hemoglobin Variants, 
227 J. A.M.A. 1405 (1974). See Holden,A/r Force Challenged on Sickle Trait Policy, 211 Sci-
ENCE 257 (1981). 
25. Reinhardt, Chemical Hypersusceptibllity, 20 J. OccuP. MED. 319,320 (1978). 
26. Lehman & Huntsman, The Hemogloblnopathies, in THE METABOLIC BASIS OF INHER-
ITED DISEASE 1398, 1404 (3d ed. 1972). 
27. Stokinger & Scheel, Hypersusceptlbillty and Genetic Problems In Occupational Medicine 
-A Consensus Report, 15 J. OCCUP. MED. 564, 572 (1973). 
28. Reinhardt, supra note 25, at 320 (DuPont). 
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with minimal risk under most circumstances.29 Furthermore, no 
studies or data exist to support the theory that individuals with sickle 
cell trait may be at increased risk from hemolytic chemicals.Jo 
b. G-6-PD deficiency. Glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase (G-
6-PD) deficiency is a biochemical genetic condition involving red 
blood cells. G-6-PD is the first enzyme in the energy-generating pro-
cess; a deficiency in this enzyme interferes with the oxidation of 
glucose.JI 
G-6-PD deficiency was recognized as early as 1926 during de-
tailed study of a drug-sensitivity reaction to hemolytic antimalarial 
drugs.J2 Dozens of industrial chemicals have chemical structures 
and toxicologic properties similar to those of the antimalarial 
drugs.JJ Theoretically, these chemicals can cause clinically signifi-
cant hemolytic anemia in G-6-PD deficient workers. 
Chemicals suspected of presenting risks to G-6-PD deficient 
workers include some common household and prescription drugs, 
several dye intermediates, aromatic nitro and amino compounds, ar-
sine and related metal hydrides, and lead and its compounds.J4 
Ozone,J5 copper,J6 and sodium nitriteJ7 may also promote hemolytic 
anemia in G-6-PD deficient individuals. Despite in vitro and case 
studies, little epidemiologic evidence exists to prove that G-6-PD de-
ficient individuals are more sensitive to industrial chemicals.JS 
29. See Petrakis, Sickle-Cell Disease, 2 LANCET 1368, 1369 (1974). Several studies of ath-
letes and military personnel support this view. See Lehman & Huntsman, supra note 26; 
Diggs & Flowers, High School Athletes with Sickle-Cell Trait, (HbAS), 68 J. NATL. MED. 
AssN. 492 (1976); Horberg & Uddin, Sickle-Cell Trait and Glucose-6-Phosphate Dehydrogenase 
Deficiency: Effects on Health and Military Performance in Black Navy Enlistees, 141 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 1485 (1981); Murphy, Sickle-Cell Hemoglobin (HbAS) in Black Football Pla;•· 
ers, 225 J. A.M.A. 981 (1973). 
30. See Stokinger & Scheel, supra note 27; see also Cooper, supra note 20; Omenn, Predic-
tive Indent!fication of Hypersusceptible Individuals, 24 J. OCCUP. MED. 369, 372 (1982). 
31. E. CALABRESE, supra note 2, at 45 (1978); Omenn & Motulsky, supra note 3, at 85. 
32. Cooper, supra note 20, at 355-56; Stokinger & Mountain, Tests for Hypersusceptibilit;• to 
Hemolytic Chemicals, 6 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 495 (1963). 
33. E. CALABRESE, supra note 2; Stokinger & Mountain, supra note 32. 
34. Stokinger & Scheel, supra note 27. 
35. See Calabrese, Kajola & Camow, Ozone: A Possible Cause of Hemolytic Anemia in G-
6-PD Deficient Individuals, 2 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 709 (1977). 
36. See Calabrese, Moore & Ho, Low G-6-PD Activity in Human and Sheep Red Blood Cells 
and Susceptibility to Copper Induced Oxidative Damage, 21 ENVTL, RESEARCH 366 (1980). 
37. See Calabrese, Moore & Ho, Low Erythrocyte G-6-PD Activity and Susceptibility to Ni-
trite-Induced Methemoglobin Formation, 26 BULL. ENVTL. CONTAMINANT TOXICOLOGY 837 
(1980). 
38. Moreover, several factors complicate the compilation of this evidence. First, it is not 
known whether individuals will hyper-react following exposures below current OSHA levels 
or whether higher doses are required. Second, many other factors, such as preexisting organic 
disease, medications, viral and bacterial infections, and nutritional status, may interact with 
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c. SAT deficiency. AlphaI-antitrypsin is a serum protein that 
protects the lung from proteolytic enzymes.39 Research has demon-
strated that individuals with an inherited deficiency of serum alphaI-
antitrypsin (SAT deficiency) are predisposed to alveolar destruction, 
even in the absence of chronic bronchitis, and to the development of 
pulmonary emphysema.40 
In homozygotes, SAT activity may be only ten to fifteen percent 
of normal;4 I in heterozygotes SAT activity may be sixty percent of 
normal.42 Approximately eighty percent of homozygotes develop 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD).43 Only one individ-
ual in 4000 to 8000 displays the homozygous trait,44 but there are an 
estimated seven million heterozygotes in the United States (about 3% 
of the population).45 
Heterozygotes run increased risk of COPD, especially if they 
smoke or work in dusty environments. Although there are conflict-
ing studies,46 most researchers believe that SAT deficiency increases 
the risk of COPD for individuals exposed to a variety of respiratory 
irritants.47 Despite an "increased risk," however, ninety percent of 
SAT heterozygotes will not develop COPD.48 Other factors are also 
important to the etiology of COPD.49 
environmental exposures to produce health effects in G-6-PD deficient individuals. These in-
teractions may be additive or synergistic. Third, over 100 variant forms of G-6-PD deficiency 
have been identified and the reactions of these different subgroups to environmental factors 
varies greatly. 
39. E. CALABRESE, supra note 2, at 55. 
40. Id. 
41. Cooper, supra note 20, at 356. 
42. Id. 
43. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, THE ROLE OF GENETIC TEST· 
ING IN THE PREVENTION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 93 (1983) [hereinafter cited as GENETIC 
TESTING]. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. See Lebowitz, Knudson, Morse & Annet, Closing Volumes and Flow Volume Abnor-
malities in Alpha1 Anfl~rypsin Phenotype Groups in a Community Population, 117 AM. Rev. 
RESPIRATORY DISEASE 179 (1978). 
47. See Evans & Bognocki, Alpha1 Antitrypsin .Deficiency and Susceptibility to Lung .Dis-
ease, 29 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 57 (1979); Mittman, The PiMZ Phenotype: Is It A 
Sign!ficant Risk Factor far the .Development of Chronic Obstructive Lung .Disease?, 118 AM. 
Rev. RESPIRATORY DISEASE 649 (1978); see also Omenn & Motulsky, supra note 3, at 90. 
48. Mittman, supra note 47. This suggests that screening programs for SAT heterozygotes 
would be unwarranted. See notes 77-78, 289-92 infra and accompanying text. 
49. Mittman, supra note 47. Interestingly, and for as yet unexplained reasons, oral contra-
ceptives have been shown to increase SAT levels. Laurrell & Eriksson, The Electrophoretic 
A/pha1 Antilrypsin .Deficiency, 15 SCANDINAVIAN J. CLINICAL LABORATORY INVESTIGATION 
132 (1963). 
Other less common diseases may increase an individual's sensitivity to various occupa-
tional environments. Acatalasemia and hypocatalasemia are red blood cell deficiencies which 
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2. HLA System 
The human leukocyte antigen (HLA) system is a complex array 
of cellular surface proteins found on chromosome number six in 
every human cell. so Recent biomedical studies reveal that various 
HLA's display striking statistical associations with many human dis-
eases. 51 Essentially, white·blood cells use the HLA system in identi-
fying foreign substances in the body and alerting the body's immune 
system to destroy these foreign cells. 52 
Although the precise relationship between HLA and disease has 
yet to be discovered, the ninety-two known HLA antigens serve as 
genetic markers for more than eighty diseases, and tens more are 
discovered every year.53 Some of these diseases, such as hypersensi-
tivity pneumonitis, bladder cancer, asbestosis, farmer's lung, silico-
sis, pneumoconiosis, and G-6-PD deficiency may be related to 
occupational exposures.54 Consequently, HLA typing may take on 
increasing importance in identifying high-risk workers.55 Even the 
most accurate HLA test, however, cannot effectively analyze asymp-
tomatic populations.56 
B. Nonoccupational Environmental Factors 
1. Increased Risk Based on Innate Characteristics 
a. Age. The incidence of cancer increases with age. 57 Some ev-
can be aggravated by oxidizing agents. See E. CALABRESE, supra note 2, at 49. Persons with 
cystic .fibrosis or cystic .fibrosis trait may be predisposed to COPD from exposure to respiratory 
irritants such as ozone, sulphur dioxide, particulate sulphates, and heavy metals. Id. at 72. 
Wilson's disease, characterized by excess copper in the liver, brain, cornea, and kidney, is 
aggravated by additional exposure to copper. J. STANSBURY, supra note 8, at 1103. Leber's 
optic atrophy, a rare inherited eye disease, is affected by exposure to several neurotoxic agents 
in cigarette smoke and cyanide. E. CALABRESE, supra note 2, at 83. 
50. See Carpenter, Raum, Glass & Schur, Ordering of Genes for HLA Antigens and Com• 
plement Components on the Human 6th Chromosome, in HLA AND MALIGNANCY (G. Murphy 
ed. 1977); Payne, The HLA Complex: Genetics and Implications in the Immune Response, in 
HLA AND DISEASE (J. Dausset & A. Suejgaard eds. 1977). 
51. See W. BRAUN, HLA AND DISEASE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW (1979), 
52. Z. liARSANYI & R. HUTTON, GENETIC PROPHECY 59 (1981). 
53. Id at 58, 62-63; see W. BRAUN, supra note 51 (listing 186 disease associations). 
54. See w. BRAUN, supra note 51, at 31, 80, 103-04, 127; z. HARSANYI & R. HUTTON, 
supra note 52, at 64-67. 
55. HLA and biochemical genetic markers are not mutually exclusive and, in fact, may be 
related. HLA is a cellular genetic marker; the inborn metabolic errors or biochemical genetic 
markers are one type of manifestation of a genetic anomaly. At least in the case of one such 
marker, G-6-PD deficiency, there is some evidence of a specific HLA association. W. BRAUN, 
supra note 51, at 127. 
56. Khan & Khan, IJiagnostic Value of HLA-B27 Testing in Ankylosing Spond_plitls and 
Reiter's Syndrome, 96 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 70 (1982). 
57. P. TIMIRAS, DEVELOPMENTAL PHYSIOLOGY AND AGING 473 (1972). 
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idence suggests that from puberty onward the functioning of the 
body's cell-mediated immunity progressively deteriorates. Therefore, 
older workers with a degenerative cell-mediated immunologic ca-
pacity may be more sensitive to industrial carcinogens.58 Some epi-
demiological studies reveal that workers exposed to carcinogens at a 
later age are more likely to develop cancer than younger workers 
exposed at the same levels for the same length of time.59 
Degenerative changes in other organ systems also may predis-
pose older workers to harmful effects of toxic exposures. For exam-
ple, after the age of fifty renal fluoride clearance decreases, meaning 
that higher fluoride levels are retained by the body. Thus, workers 
over fifty might be at increased risk from fluoride exposure. 60 
b. Race and ethnicity. Race and ethnicity may affect suscepti-
bility to illness in two ways. First, certain innate racial characteris-
tics are possessed by substantially all members of the race. Second, 
certain genetic markers of susceptibility to illness may be more 
prominent in some racial or ethnic groups than in others.61 
The most obvious racial difference is skin color. Dark skin more 
effectively prevents penetration of ultraviolet radiation. 62 Therefore, 
the incidence of malignant melanoma is much higher among Cauca-
sians than non-Caucasians.63 
Another racial difference involves lung capacity. The normal 
lung volumes (vital capacity and forced expiratory volume) for 
blacks are lower, relative to body size, than for whites. 64 This is be-
cause, generally speaking, blacks have smaller thoraxes relative to 
58. See E. CALABRESE, supra note 2, at 165. 
59. Doll, Cancer and Aging: The Epidemiologic Evidence, 5 ONCOLOGY 1970 - TENTH 
INTERNATlONAL CANCER CONGRESS 1-28 (1971); Case, Hooker & McDonald, Tumors of the 
Urinary Bladder in Workmen Engaged in the Manufacture and Use of Certain .Dyestuff In-
tennediates in the British Chemical Industry, 11 BRIT. J. INDUS. MED 75 (1954). But see Hoo-
ver & Cole, Temporal Aspects of Occupational Bladder Carcinogenesis, 288 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1041 (1973); Kahn, The .Dom Study of Smoking f!nd Mortality Among U.S. Veterans: Report on 
Eight and One-Ha!f Years of Observation, 19 N.C.I. MoNOG. 1 (1966). See generally Whitte-
more, The Age Distribution of Human Cancer far Carcinogenic Exposures of Varying Intensity, 
106 AM. J, EPIDEMlOLOGY 418 (1977). 
60. See E. CALABRESE, supra note 2, at 31. 
61. Occupational illness rates for different racial and ethnic groups also may vary widely 
because of employment patterns, with certain groups being over-represented in hazardous in-
dustries. See generally Davis, The Impact of Workplace Health and Safety on Black Workers: 
Assessment and Prognosis, 31 LAB. LJ. 723 (1980); 11 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 134-35 (1981). 
62. E. CALABRESE, supra note 2, at 85. 
63. Allison & Wong, Skin Cancer: Some Ethnic Dt!ferences, in ENVIRONMENTS OF MAN 
69 (J. Bresler ed. 1968); E. CALABRESE, supra note 2, at 87; Crombie, Racial .D{/ferences in 
Melanoma Incidence, 40 BRIT. J. CANCER 185 (1979). 
64. Stebbins, A Survey of Respiratory .Disease Among New York City Postal and Transit 
Workers, 6 ENVTL. REsEARCH 147, 153 (1973); see Oscherwitz, Edlavitch, Baker & Jarboe, 
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total body weight. Among whites, individuals with low vital capaci-
ties have been found to have increased rates of cardiovascular dis-
ease. 65 Blacks, however, appear to have lower morbidity and 
mortality rates due to COPD, chronic bronchitis and emphysema.66 
Associations between lung volume and health status remain uncer-
tain, but OSHA's cotton dust standard provides that, to account for 
thorax size differential, pulmonary function tests "for blacks shall be 
multiplied by 0.85 to adjust for ethnic differences."67 
Some genetic markers appear much more frequently in certain 
racial and ethnic groups than in others. Virtually all racial and eth-
nic groups are predisposed to some illness based on one or more 
genetic traits. Sickle cell anemia and sickle cell trait are found al-
most exclusively in persons from equatorial Africa, parts of India, 
the Middle East, and the Mediterranean. 68 Seven to thirteen percent 
of American blacks have sickle cell trait.69 It is usually not found in 
other racial groups. 70 
G-6-PD deficiency is a sex-linked trait, occurring homozygously 
only in males.71 G-6-PD deficiency is found primarily in blacks 
from Central Africa, populations around the Mediterranean, East 
Indians, some Orientals, Oceanians, and Filipinos. 72 The condition 
affects over 100 million males worldwide.73 Approximately 0.1 per-
cent of white American males,74 sixteen percent of black American 
males,75 and perhaps sixty percent of Kurdish Jews76 have G-6-PD 
deficiency. 
SAT deficiency77 is observed most frequently among persons 
Differences in Pulmonary Functions in Various Racial Groups, 96 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 319 
(1972). 
65. PuBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, 
FRAMINGHAM HEART STUDY: HABITS AND CORONARY HEART DISEASE (1966). 
66. Stebbins, supra note 64. 
67. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (h)(3)(iii) (1982). 
68. E. CALABRESE, supra note 2, at 43. 
69. Id. 
70. E. GARDNER, PRINCIPLES OF GENETICS 390 (1972). 
71. Cooper, supra note 20, at 356. 
72. Cooper, supra note 20, at 356; see note 487 infra and accompanying text. G-6-PD 
deficiency affects virtually all racial groups to some extent. J. STANSBURY, supra note 8, at 
1375. 
73. K. MUENSCH, THE GENETIC BASIS FOR HUMAN DISEASE 41 (1979). 
74. Stokinger & Mountain, supra note 32; text at note 487 infra. 
75. E. BEUTLER, HEMOLOYTIC ANEMIA IN DISORDERS OF RED CELL METABOLISM 52 
(1978); text at note 487 infra. 
76. Stokinger & Mountain, Progress in Detecting the Worker Hypersusceptible lo Industrial 
Chemicals, 9 J. OccuP. MED. 537, 539 (1967). 
77. See notes 39-49 supra and accompanying text. 
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with northern European ancestry. The following table illustrates the 
ethnic prevalences of this condition. 
Group 
Irish 
Russian and Central Europe 
German 
English 
French and Belgian 
Italian 
Jewish 
American Negro 
Mexican-American 
American Indian 
TABLE 178 
Percentage of 
Subjects Affected 
9.0 
7.9 
7.0 
6.6 
4.7 
0 
2.6 
1.4 
1.3 
0 
Number 
Tested 
194 
63 
63 
151 
64 
53 
114 
70 
76 
37 
Several other biochemical genetic conditions predominate in cer-
tain racial and ethnic groups. For example, NADH dehydrogenase 
deficiency, a red blood disorder, is most common in Alaskan Es-
kimos and lndians,79 Navajo lndians,80 and Puerto Ricans.81 
Tyrosinemia and porphyria, two other blood disorders, have a high 
degree of prevalence among French Canadians82 and South Afri-
cans83 respectively. Wilson's disease84 most often affects Eastern Eu-
ropean Jews and Sicilians. 85 
c. Sex and reproduction. 
(i) Nonreproductive sex d!!Jerences. Aside from obvious external 
sexual characteristics, there are other biological differences between 
males and females. For example, males generally have greater iso-
78. E. CALABRESE,supra note 2, at 57 (citing Mittman & Lieberman, Screeningfar Alphar 
Antitrypsin Deficiency, in GENETIC POLYMORPHISM AND THE DISEASES IN MAN 191 (1973)). 
79. Scott & Hoskins, Hereditary Methemog/obinemia in Alaskan Eskimos and Indians, 13 
BLOOD 795 (1958). 
80. Balsam, Hardy & Scott, Hereditary Methemoglobinemia IJue to Diaphorase Deficiency in 
Navajo Indians, 65 J. PEDIATRICS 928 (1964). 
81. Hsieh & Joffe, Electrophoretic and Functional Variants of NADH Me/hemoglobin 
Reduclase in Hereditary Methemoglobinemia, 50 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 196 (1971); 
Schwartz, Parass, Ross, DiPillo & Rizek, Unstable Variant of NADH Methemoglobin Reductase 
in Puerto Ricans with Hereditary Methemoglobinemia, 51 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1594 
(1972). 
82. E. CALABRESE, supra note 2, at 66. 
83. Id at 190. 
84. See note 49 supra. 
85. E. CALABRESE, supra note 2, at 75. 
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metric muscle strength, especially upper limb strength, 86 and seem to 
tolerate heat better than women.87 Epidemiological data collected 
on older workers show a tendency for female workers to suffer from 
chronic debilitating diseases while male workers suffer from more 
life-threatening diseases.88 
With respect to occupational hazards, the evidence does not es-
tablish sex-related sensitivities to particular toxic substances.89 Such 
findings, however, are theoretically possible. Males face an in-
creased risk of liver cancer, regardless of social, racial, occupational, 
cultural and geographical factors.90 Similar findings exist for skin 
cancer and lung cancer.91 Although the physiological basis for these 
differences is not clear, it may involve metaboijc and enzymatic ac-
tions in the detoxification of carcinogenic substances. 
(ii) Preconception hazards. At birth, the female has an estimated 
700,000 to 2,000,000 primary oocytes in her ovaries.92 By the begin-
ning of puberty she has only 40,000. Of these, only about 400 oo-
cytes will ever undergo development and be expelled during the 
ovulatory phase of the menstrual cycle.93 The oocytes reaching ma-
turity later in life have been dormant for forty years or more. Dur-
ing this dormant period they are exposed, either directly or 
indirectly, to various potentially harmful conditions, some of which 
may have a cumulative effect on the oocyte. Studies show a correla-
tion between increased maternal age and the incidence of off spring 
with chromosomal abnormalities.94 
86. See W. GANONG, REVIEW OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 328 (8th ed. 1977); American 
Industrial Hygiene Association, Guide to Manual Lifting, 31 AM. INDUS. HYGIENE ASSN, J, 511 
(1970); Chaffin, Herrin, Keyserling & Foulke, Pre-employment Strength Testing: An Update 
Position, 20 J. OccuP. MED. 403 (1978). 
87. Messite & Bond, Occupational Health Considerations for Women at Work, in DEVELOP· 
MENTS IN OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 53 (C. Zenz ed. 1980). 
88. V. HUNT, WORK AND THE HEALTH OF WOMEN 31 (1979). 
89. See Messite & Bond, supra note 87, at 48-51 (reviewing literature on lead and benzene 
and concluding that there is inadequate evidence of sex-based susceptibility). 
90. Ferguson, Toxicological Problems Related to the Employment of Women, in HEALTH OF 
WOMEN WHO WORK 41 (M. McKiever ed. 1965); Toh, Physiological and Biochemical Reviews 
of Sex .Differences and Carcinogenesis with Particular Reference lo the Liver, 18 ADVANCES IN 
CANCER RESEARCH 209 (1973). 
91. Haenszel & Taeuber, Lung Cancer Mortality as Related to Residence and Smoking His-
tories, 32 J. NATL. CANCER INST. 803 (1968); Toh, supra note 90. 
92. K. MOORE, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN 17 (3d ed. 1982), 
93. Id 
94. J. LANGMAN, MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 9 (4th ed. 1981). Radiation exposures, for ex-
ample, are known to have a cumulative effect, thereby increasing the frequency of germ cell 
mutation in older women. Strobino, Klein & Stein, Chemical and Physical Exposure of Parents: 
Effects on Human Reproduction and Offspring, I EARLY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 371 (1978):see 
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By contrast, the male produces germ cells (sperm) from puberty 
onward. He produces a new supply of sperm every seventy-four 
days.95 Although this continuous decontamination process elimi-
nates the danger of cumulative exposure to the sperm itself, exposure 
to mutagens may cause permanent damage to the germinal epithe-
lium, resulting in the perpetual production of genetically damaged 
sperm (mutagenesis) or other defects (e.g., decreased motility, abnor-
mal shape, reduced number). In addition, the rapid cell division 
during the process of sperm production (spermatogenesis) increases 
the risk of mutagenesis.96 Male germ cells are very sensitive to the 
mutagenic effects of ionizing radiation.97 
Exposure of the male or female to mutagens prior to conception 
can result in congenital defects, developmental problems, and other 
mutations in the offspring.98 Genetically abnormal fetuses are about 
100 times more likely to be spontaneously aborted than normal fe-
tuses.99 In addition, because the off~pring inherits the genetic defect 
itself, rather than merely the effects of the defect, it may pass on the 
genetic defect to future generations.100 
Finally, workplace exposure to toxic substances can cause dimin-
ished reproductive capacity through the loss of libido, impotence, in-
fertility and sterility. For example, dibromochloropropane (DBCP) 
can cause sterility by lowering the sperm count.101 Other substances 
known to result in diminished reproductive capacity or gametotoxic-
ity include lead 102 and chloroprene.103 
Hunt, The Reproductive System - Sensitivity Through the L!fe Cycle, 3 ANNALS AM. CoNF. 
GOVTL. INDUS. HYGIENISTS. 
95. W. GANONG, supra note 86, at 325. 
96. Conibear, Women As a High Risk Population, SOCIETY FOR OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL HEALTH: PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE ON WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE 
168, 170 (1976). Mutagenesis is the alteration of the genetic material of a living cell. 
97. Hunt, Occupational Radiation Exposure of Women Workers, 7 PREVENTIVE MED. 294, 
304 (1978). 
98. Strobino, Klein & Stein, supra note 94, at 388. 
99. Kline, Surveillance of Spontaneous Abortions, 106 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 345 (1977); 
Manson, Human and Laboratory Test Systems Available for .Detection of Reproductive Failure, 
7 PREVENTIVE MED. 322, 326 (1978). 
100. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, HEALTH HAzARDS OF THE HUMAN ENVIRON-
MENT 214 (1972), cited in A. HRICKO & M. BRUNT, WORKING FOR YOUR LIFE: A WOMAN'S 
GUIDE TO Joa HEALTH HAZARDS B-5 (1976); see also Wagoner, Infante & Brown, Genetic 
Effects Associated with Industrial Chemicals, SOCIETY FOR OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMEN-
TAL HEALTH: PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE ON WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE 100 (1976). 
Such effects, however, have been positively reported only in rodents. See Carter, Lyon & 
Phillips, Genetic Hazard of Ionizing Radiation, 182 NATURE 409 (1958). 
101. Whorton, Krauss, Marshall & Milby, Infertility in Male Pesticide Workers, 2 LANCET 
1259 (1977). 
102. Preamble to OSHA Lead Standard, 43 Fed. Reg. 54,388-89 (1978); Thomas & Bro-
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(iii) Post-conception hazards. While pregnancy represents a sig-
nifi.cant alteration in the hormonal and chemical profile of a woman, 
this altered state apparently does not enhance her susceptibility to 
environmental and occupational hazards.104 Consequently, post-con-
ception hazards should be analyzed in terms of their possible effects 
on the fetus. 
During the period of gestation the fetus faces three types of 
hazards. First, embryofetotoxins affect the conceptus during all 
stages of gestation. They may induce death, structural malforma-
tions, metabolic or physiological dysfunction, growth retardation, or 
psychological and behavioral alteration.105 Second, teratogens act on 
the dividing cells of the growing fetus, causing structural or func-
tional defects, such as limb deformities or organic defects. 106 Third, 
transplacental carcinogens can cross the placenta and cause cancer 
in the fetus or child.107 
Prenatal human development involves three stages: I) pre-differ-
entiation stage, from fertilization to the end of the first week; 2) em-
bryonic stage, from the second to the eighth week; and 3) fetal stage, 
from the ninth week until birth.108 The stage of development is very 
important in determining the susceptibility of the embryo or fetus to 
in utero insults. 109 
During the first week following fertilization, even before placen-
tal implantation, embryotoxic agents absorbed by the mother can 
reach the freelying blastocyst very rapidly. The clearance rate from 
the blastocyst of maternally transmitted substances is very low. 110 
gan, Some Actions of Lead on the Sperm and Upon the Male Reproductive System, AM, J. 
INDUS. MED. (1982). 
103. Infante, Ch/oroprene: Adverse Effects on Reproduction, PROCEEDINGS OF WORKSHOP 
ON METHODOLOGY FOR AsSESSING REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS IN THE WORKPLACE 87, 89 
(1980). 
104. Messite & Bond, Reproductive Toxicology and Occupational Exposure, in DEVELOP• 
MENTS IN OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 61 (C. Zenz ed. 1980). 
105. Karrh, Carmody, Clyne, Gould, Portela-Cubria, Smith & Freifeld, Guidance for the 
Evaluation, Risk Assessment and Control of Chemical Embryo-Fetotoxins, 23 J. Occur. MED, 
397 (1981). 
106. Manson, supra note 99, at 325. 
107. See Welch, Barnes, Robboy & Herbst, Transplacenta/ Carcinogenesis: Prenatal JJ/eth• 
ylstilbestrol (JJES) Exposure, Clear Cell Carcinoma and Related Anomalies of the Genital Traci 
in Young Females, SOCIETY FOR OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH: PROCEED• 
INGS OF CONFERENCE ON WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE 47-50 (1976); see also notes 125-27 
infra. 
108. J. LANGMAN, supra note 94, at 115. 
109. Wilson, Experimental Studies on Congenital Malformations, 10 J. CHRONIC DISEASE 
111 (1959). 
110. Lutwak-Mann, JJrugs and the Blastocyst, in FETAL PHARMACOLOGY (L. Boreus ed. 
1973), cited in Messite & Bond, supra note 104, at 61. 
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The embryonic stage is the time of greatest susceptibility to environ-
mental infiuences.111 This stage is also known as the time of organo-
genesis because most of the major organ systems are being formed. 
Each organ appears to be most susceptible during its early stages of 
differentiation.112 Pregnancy cannot even be detected by conven-
tional methods until well into the period of organogenesis. 113 The 
fetal stage generally involves lower susceptibility than the embryonic 
stage, but still greater susceptibility than the adult or child. 114 Those 
structures that continue to differentiate during the fetal stage, such as 
the cerebellum, cerebral cortex, and some urogenital structures, are 
most susceptible. I 1s 
Three additional points relating to post-conception hazards de-
serve mention. First, teratogens usually reach the fetus via maternal 
exposure and transmission through the placental membrane, 116 al-
though it is theoretically possible that paternal exposure to ter-
atogens can be transmitted to the fetus during intercourse via semen 
absorbed through the vaginal mucosa. 117 Second, the fetus is suscep-
tible to embryofetotoxic and teratogenic substances at exposure 
levels well below those harmful to either parent.118 Third, numerous 
substances have reproductive effects. Many of them, like arsenic, as-
bestos, benzene, formaldehyde, lead, mercury and vinyl chloride, are 
common to numerous industries. Literally millions of workers are 
exposed.119 Only a small percentage of the chemicals used in Ameri-
Ill. J. LANGMAN, supra note 94, at 115. 
112. Different organs are susceptible at different times. Id 
113. New techniques, however, can detect pregnancy as early as the ninth day. See Mar-
shall, Ha=ond, Ross, Jacobson, Rayford & Odell, Plasma and Urinary Chorionic Gonado-
lropin During Early Human Pregnancy, 32 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 760 (1968). 
114. Messite & Bond, supra note 104, at 62. 
115. Langman & Welch, Excess Vitamin A and the Development of the Cerebral Cortex, 131 
J. COMP. NEUROLOGY 15 (1967); Webster, Shimada & Langman, Effect of Fluorodeoxyuridine, 
Colcemid and Bromodeoxyuridine on Developing Neocortex of the Mouse, 137 AM. J. ANATOMY 
67 (1973). 
116. See generally J. BOYD & W. HAMILTON, THE HUMAN PLACENTA (1970). 
117. Manson & Simon, Influence of Environmental Agents on Male Reproductive Failure, 
WORK AND THE HEALTH OF WOMEN 171 (1979). 
118. Matsumoto, Goyo & Takeuchi, Fetal Minamala Disease: A Neuropathological Study 
of 1wo Cases of Intrauterine Intox!ftcation By a Methylmercury Compound, 24 J. NEUROPA-
THOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY 563 (1965); Warshaw, Employee Health Services far 
Women Workers, 1 PREVENTIVE MED. 385, 387 (1978); see Preamble to OSHA Lead Stan-
dard, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,959-66 (1978). 
119. See Clyne, Fetotoxicity and the Fertile Female Employees, in WOMEN, WORK AND 
HEALTH 202-03 (1980); Messite & Bond, supra note 104, at 64-69. Maternal alcoholism, Han-
son,Reproductive Hazards from Prenatal Alcohol Use: The Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, 1980 PRO-
CEEDINGS OF WORKSHOP ON METHODOLOGY FOR AsSESSING REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS IN 
THE WORKPLACE 7, and cigarette smoking, Haas & Schottenfeld, Risks to the Offspring From 
Parental Occupational Exposures, 21 J. OccuP. MED. 607, 608-09 (1979), frequently cause 
birth defects. 
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can industry have been tested for their reproductive effects. 12° Fi-
nally, the same substances are frequently mutagenic, teratogenic and 
carcinogenic. 121 
(iv) Offspring risks based on parental exposures. Most congenital 
deformities from parental exposures manifest themselves by the time 
of birth. Although in utero exposure to toxic agents may cause sub-
sequent offspring disease, the current evidence is inadequate to sup-
port a broad hypothesis of such causal relationships. 122 In utero, the 
mother's ability to detoxify certain agents protects the fetus. The in-
fant may, however, be born with the agent in its tissues, and lose at 
birth the protection of the mother's enzymes or other metabolic 
mechanisms needed for detoxification. Therefore, a substance that 
does not harm the fetus in utero may well poison the infant. 123 In-
deed, the effects of some fetotoxins may first appear years after 
birth.124 
The best documented example of the delayed e.ff ect of an in utero 
insult involves diethylstilbestrol (DES), a synthetic estrogen com-
monly used in the 1940s and 1950s to prevent spontaneous abortion. 
Female offspring (sixteen to twenty-two years of age) exposed to 
DES in utero have an increased incidence of carcinomas of the va-
gina and cervix, 125 as well as various reproductive dysfunctions. 126 
Males exposed to DES in utero have an increased incidence of mal-
formations of the testes and abnormal sperm. 127 
Several recent studies have investigated the correlation between 
parental (usually paternal) occupation and early childhood death 
due to various neoplasms. These studies have focused on hydrocar-
bon-related occupations, 128 lead-related occupations, 129 and sol-
120. Manson, supra note 99, at 323. 
121. Stellman, The Effects oJ Toxic Agents on Reproduction, OccuP. HEALTH & SAFETY, 
Apr. 1979, at 36, 40. 
122. See Hornstein, Crowe & Gruppo, Adrenal Carcinoma in Child with History of Fetal 
Alcohol Snydrome, 2 LANCET 1292 (1977). 
123. Clyne, supra note 119, at 200. 
124. Prenatal exposure to lead, for example, may cause learning disabilities when the child 
is several years old. Id 
125. Greenwald, Barlow, Nasca & Burnett, Vaginal Cancer After Maternal Treatment With 
Synthetic Estrogens, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 390 (1971); Herbst, Ulfelder & Posknazer,Adeno• 
carcinoma of the Vagina, 284 NEW ENG. J. MED. 878 (1971). 
126. Berger & Goldstein, Impaired Reproductive Performance in DES-Exposed Women, 55 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 25 (1980); Rosenfeld & Bronson, Reproductive Problems in the 
DES-Exposed Female, 55 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 453 (1980). 
127. Bill, Schumacher & Bibbo, Pathological Semen and Anatomical Abnormalities oJ the 
Genital Tract in Human Male Subjects Exposed to Diethysti/bestrol in Utero, 117 J. UROLOGY 
477 (1977). 
128. Compare Fabia & Thuy, Occupation oJ Father At Time oJ Birth oJ Children Dying oJ 
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vents used in the aircraft industry. 130 Despite some apparent 
correlations, the studies are inconclusive at best. 131 
d. Familial. Cancer and other diseases often display familial 
tendencies. 132 The risk of the same neoplasm developing in a close 
relative of a cancer patient is about two133 or three134 times that for 
the general population. Some particular cancers, such as breast can-
cer and colorectal cancer, present even greater familial risk. 135 Al-
though there is little data available on familial risk for specific 
occupational diseases, OSHA's health standards require family 
histories.136 
2. Behavior-Based Increased Risk 
Many choices people make can affect their susceptibility to occu-
pational disease. This subsection considers some of the most impor-
tant sources of risk. 
a. Geography. Geography has a direct bearing on the statistical 
likelihood of contracting disease. Malignant melanoma, caused by 
Malignant Diseases, 28 BRlT. J. PREVENTlVE & SOClAL MED. 98 (1974), with Hakulinen, 
Salonen & Teppo, Cancer in the Offspring of Fathers in Hydrocarbon-Related Occupations, 30 
BRIT. J. PREVENTIVE & SOClAL MED. 138 (1976), and Zack, Cannon & Loyd, Cancer in Chil-
dren of Parents Exposed to Hydrocarbon-Related Industries and Occupations, 111 AM. J. EPIDE-
MIOLOGY 329 (1980). 
129. Kantor, McCrea-Cumen & Meigs, Occupations of Fathers of Patients with Wilms' Tu-
mor, 33 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUN. HEALTH 253 (1979). 
130. Peters, Preston-Martin & Yu, Brain Tumors in Children and Occupational Exposure of 
Parents, 213 SCIENCE 235 (1981). 
131. Gold, Diener & Szklo, Parental Occupations and Cancer in Children, 24 J. OccuP. 
MED. 578 (1982). 
132. Anderson, Familial Susceptibility, in PERSONS AT HlGH RISK OF CANCER 39 (1975). 
133. Id 
134. Fraumeni, Clinical Patterns of Familial Cancer, in GENETICS OF HUMAN CANCER 225 
(J. Mulvihill, R. Miller, J. Fraumeni, Jr. eds. 1977). 
135. Id; see Mulvihill, Congenital and Genetic Diseases, in PERSONS AT HIGH RISK OF 
CANCER 25 (1975); King, Go, Elston, Lynch & Petrakis, Allele Increasing Susceptibility to 
Human Breast Cancer May be Linked lo Glutamate-Pyruvate Transaminase Locus, 208 Sci-
ENCE 406 (1980). 
136. See note 270 infra and accompanying text. There are, however, some dangers in us-
ing a family history. 
It does not take a sociologist to know that the parents of coke oven workers were 
probably not surgeons and corporate executives, but were probably coke oven workers or 
similar people themselves. 
Family history, which do (fie] not take into account the exposures of the family, will 
lead us down another primrose path of dalliance towards selecting out workers on a preju-
dicial basis on their socio-economic status. 
Genetic Screening and the Handling of High-Risk Groups in the Work Place: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1981) (statement of Jeanne Stellman) [hereinafter cited as Genetic 
Screening Hearings]. 
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ultraviolet radiation, increases with decreasing latitude (in North 
America) and increasing altitude. 137 Urban and industrialized areas, 
particularly near petrochemical, metal mining, smelting, or asbestos 
plants, have much higher rates of cancer. 138 These findings may re-
sult from air and water pollution as much as occupational expo-
sures.139 Therefore, at least theoretically, a new employee who grew 
up in New Jersey (the state with the highest cancer rate) would be 
more likely to develop bladder cancer than an employee who grew 
up in Kentucky or Utah.140 
b. .Diet. The relationship between diet and the etiology of vari-
ous diseases, particularly cancer, has received widespread attention. 
Altering dietary practices may reduce cancer by as much as thirty-
five percent.141 
There has been increased research recently on the associations 
between diet and occupational disease. 142 We have long known that 
G-6-PD deficiency induces hemolytic anemia when people with the 
Mediterranean variant of the trait eat fava beans. 143 In addition, it 
has been theorized that workers exposed to vinyl chloride can pro-
tect themselves by eating onions, garlic, brussel sprouts, cabbage, 
broccoli, and turnips. 144 Undoubtedly, new discoveries and new the-
137. Hoover, Mason, McKay & Fraumeni, Geographic Pallerns of Cancer Mortality in t/1e 
l/nited States, in PERSONS AT HIGH RISK OF CANCER 349-51 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Geo• 
graphic Pallerns]; Crombie, Variation of Melanoma Incidence with Latitude in North America 
and Europe, 40 BRIT. J. CANCER 774 (1979). 
138. S. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER 488 (1979). 
139. Id. 
140. See id.; Geographic Pallerns, supra note 137, at 357. Could such a hypothesis lead an 
employer whose employees were exposed to benzidine or some other bladder cancer-causing 
substance to refuse to hire applicants who grew up in New Jersey? See Part II infra. 
141. CANCER RISKS,supra note 19, at 77 (citing Doll & Peto, The Causes of Cancer: Quan-
titative Estimates of Avoidable Risks of Cancer in llnited Stales Today, 66 J. NATL. CANCER 
INST. I 191 (1981)). Cancer risk can be reduced by eliminating the consumption of food con-
taining powerful carcinogens like aflatoxins, nitrosamines, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocar-
bons. Berg, .Diel, in PERSONS AT HIGH RISK OF CANCER 202-07 (1975). Food dyes, chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides, artificial sweeteners, salt and other food additives also increase can-
cer risk. Although the data are less clear, some studies have found that persons with high fat, 
high cholesterol, low fiber diets seem more at risk of certain cancers; persons with diets con-
taining fresh fruits and vegetables, vitamins, and nutrients seem less at risk of certain cancers. 
See CANCER RISKS, supra note 19, at 78-80; Graham & Mettlin, Fiber and Other Constituents 
of Vegetables in Cancer Epidemiology, in NUTRITION AND CANCER (1981); Kritchevsky & 
Klurfeld, Fat and Cancer, in NUTRITION AND CANCER (1981); MacLure & MacMahon, An 
Epidemiologic Perspective of Environmental Carcinogenesis, 2 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 19, 23-26 
(1980). 
142. See E. CALABRESE, NUTRITION AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH (1981); Petering, 
Murthy & Cerklewski, Role of Nutrition in Heavy Metal Toxicity, in BIOCHEMICAL EFFECTS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTANTS (1977). 
143. See z. HARSANYI & R. HUTTON, supra note 52, at 11-15. 
144. Severo,Federal Mandate for Gene Tests .Disturbs U.S. Job Safety Official, N.Y. Times, 
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ories are on the horizon. 
c. Tobacco. Cigarette smoking is the largest single preventable 
cause ofillness and premature death in the United States.145 Smok-
ing also has important effects on the health of workers exposed to 
toxic substances.146 The National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health (NIOSH) has identified six mechanisms by which smok-
ing interacts with occupational exposures.147 First, certain toxic 
agents in the workplace, such as carbon monoxide and cadmium, are 
also present in tobacco or smoke, thereby increasing the exposures. 
Second, workplace chemicals may be pyrolyzed into more harmful 
agents: the temperature of a burning cigarette may reach 1,600 de-
grees Fahrenheit. Third, tobacco products serve as vectors by be-
coming contaminated with workplace agents, like lead and 
pesticides. This facilitates entry by inhalation, ingestion or skin ab-
sorption. Fourth, there may be additive effects from smoking and 
exposures to substances such as chlorine, cotton dust and coal dust. 
Fifth, the effects may be synergistic between smoking and asbestos, 
gold mine and rubber industry exposures. Sixth, smoking increases 
accident rates through loss of attention, preoccupation of the hand, 
irritation of the eyes, coughing, and fi.res. 148 
Feb. 6, 1980, at Al, col. 1, Al7 col. 1 (citing Dr. Herbert E. Stokinger). The reported literature 
involving cruciferous vegetables suggests that they may exert a protective effect against colon 
and possible other cancers by inducing aryl hydrocarbon hydroxylase activity in the intestinal 
epithelia. MacLure & MacMahon, supra note 141, at 24. Vinyl chloride, however, is mostly 
associated with angiosarcoma, a rare cancer of the liver. 
145. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WEL-
FARE, HEALTHY PEOPLE: THE SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON HEALTH PROMOTION AND 
DISEASE PREVENTION 121 (1979). An estimated 320,000 premature deaths each year are at-
tributable to smoking, and ten million Americans suffer from debilitating illnesses caused by 
smoking. Id. at 122. The number of cigarettes smoked per day, the degree of inhalation, and 
the age at which the individual began smoking are important factors in the mortality rates of 
smokers. Hammond, Tobacco, in PERSONS AT HIGH RISK OF CANCER 134 (1975). 
146. Risks associated with pipe and cigar smoking, as well as tobacco chewing and snuff, 
have also been noted, but are not nearly as great nor is their use as prevalent as cigarette 
smoking. See Hammond, supra note 145, at 13 I, 134-35. "Involuntary" smoking also creates 
hazards in the workplace to nonsmokers. See Kent & Cenci, Smoking and the Workplace: 
Tobacco Smoke Health Hazards to the Involuntary Smoker, 24 J. OccuP. MED. 469 (1982). 
147. Blackwell, French & Stein, Adverse Health Effects of Smoking and the Occupational 
Environment, 40 AM. INDUS. HYGIENE AssN. J. A38 (1979), cited in Omenn, Predictive Ident!fi-
cation of Hypersusceptible Individuals, 24 J. Occup. MED. 369, 373 (1982). 
148. Several studies demonstrate the effects of cigarette smoking on asbestos workers. See, 
e.g. , Pearle, Smoking and Duration of Asbestos Exposure in the Production of Functional and 
Roentgenographic Abnormalities in Shipyard Workers, 24 J. OcCUP. MED. 37 (1982); Weiss, 
Levin & Goodman, Pleural Plaques and Cigarette Smoking in Asbestos Workers in Relation to 
Smoking and Type of Exposure, 201. OccuP. MED. 341 (1978). A study of the death rate from 
lung cancer, standardized for age, revealed that nonsmoking blue collar workers die at a rate 
of 11.3 per 100,000 man years, while blue collar smokers die at a rate of 122.6. For asbestos 
workers the rates are even more startling: 58.4 for nonsmokers, and 601.6 for smokers. I. 
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d. Alcohol The consumption of alcoholic beverages causes cir-
rhosis and other diseases, perhaps including cancer. 149 There has 
been little research on the effects of alcohol consumption on persons 
with exposures to industrial toxins. One in vitro study, however, 
found that alcohol increased the carcinogenic effects of vinyl chlo-
ride vapors. 150 Other synergistic effects have been observed with al-
cohol and dimethyl formamide (DMF)151 and ethylene dibromide 
(EDB).1s2 
e.. Medical drugs and radiation. A number of drugs have been 
associated with cancer and other diseases in humans. 153 The syn-
thetic estrogen, diethylstilbestrol (DES), causes cancer in both the 
women who took DES and in their offspring about twenty years 
later. 154 Of the most widely taken drugs, oral contraceptives have 
been studied in the greatest detail. Although inconclusive, studies 
associate oral contraceptives with liver and breast cancer. 155 Little 
information exists on the effects of medical drugs on occupational 
exposures, but some pf OSHA's carcinogen standards require that 
the examining physician inquire into whether the worker is taking 
steroids or cytotoxic agents. 156 
There is increasing concern about the amount of unnecessary and 
unproductive use of medical and dental x-rays in the United 
States. 157 Ionizing radiation causes leukemia, birth defects, lung 
cancer, liver cancer, bone cancer, sterility and other severe health 
SELIKOFF, DISABILITY COMPENSATION FOR ASBESTOS-ASSOCIATED DISEASE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 333, 335 (1982) (report to the U.S. Department of Labor). 
Asbestosis and cancer of the lung, esophagus, larynx, buccal cavity, and pharynx are influ-
enced by smoking. Pleural mesothelioma, peritoneal mesothelioma, and cancer of stomach, 
colon-rectum, and kidney are not influenced by smoking. I. SELIKOFF, supra, at 335. 
149. See Vitale, Broitman & Gottlieb, Alcohol and Carcinogenesis, in NUTRITION AND 
CANCER: ETIOLOGY AND TREATMENT (1981). Most of the research suggests that alcohol in-
creases cancer risk by acting as a cocarcinogen, enhancing the carcinogenic effect of other 
agents. Rothman,A/cohol, in PERSONS AT HIGH RISK OF CANCER 140 (1975), See CANCER 
RJsKs,supra note 19, at 73-76. Cancer of the mouth, throat, esophagus, larynx, and liver have 
been associated with alcohol consumption. Rothman, supra, at 140-45. There is also some 
evidence of increased risk of cancer of the stomach, rectum, prostate, pancreas, large intestine, 
lung, kidney, bladder, and breast. Id.; CANCER RJsKS, supra note 19, at 73-76. 
150. 9 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 998 (1980). 
151. Lyle, Case History: Alcohol Interaction with a Workplace Chemical, 31 Occup, 
HEALTH 265 (1979). 
152. Godard,A/coho/ and Occupation, in ALCOHOL PROBLEMS IN EMPLOYMENT (1981), 
153. See Hoover & Fraumeni, Drugs, in PERSONS AT HIGH RISK OF CANCER (1975), 
154. CANCER RISKS, supra note 19, at 95. 
155. Id. at 101. 
156. See note 270 infra and accompanying text. Steroids and cytotoxic drugs have been 
shown to cause bladder and liver cancer. Hoover & Fraumeni, supra note 153, at 187. 
157. CANCER RISKS, supra note 19, at 98-99; s. EPSTEIN, supra note 138, at 485-86. 
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problems. 158 Because radiation exposure is cumulative over one's 
lifetime, excessive nonoccupational irradiation could predispose in-
dividuals working with radiation to illness.159 
f. L!festyle. A variety of miscellaneous lifestyle factors - in-
cluding sleeping habits,160 cosmetics,161 and food containers162 may 
also influence susceptibility to disease. For example, persons with 
G-6-PD deficiency may increase their risk by drinking chlorinated 
water, having copper plumbing163 or living in urban areas with high 
levels of ozone.164 
An individual's psychological makeup may play an important 
part in the individual's ability to function in a particular job. For 
example, a person with acrophobia would be a poor steeplejack; a 
person with hydrophobia would be a poor sailor; a person with 
claustrophobia would be a poor coal miner. Other examples of indi-
viduals psychologically unsuited for a particular job are less obvious 
and more difficult to detect, but might be important in determining 
an increased risk of occupational illness. Some examples illustrate a 
few of the ways in which psychological and personality factors may 
be used in screening individuals for increased risk of occupational 
illness. 
First, increasing evidence indicates that an individual's overall 
mental state of health may be an important factor in the develop-
ment of diseases like coronary heart disease and cancer.165 While 
there are no studies on the precise question of whether psychologi-
cally disturbed persons are more prone to occupationally-related dis-
eases, such a finding is theoretically possible. 
Second, the occupational environment generates many kinds of 
158. Jablon, Radiation, in PERSONS AT HIGH RISK OF CANCER (1975). 
159. A variety of job classifications, including radiation workers, uranium miners, and tel-
evision tube makers, involve exposure to radiation. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, 
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES - A GUIDE TO THEIR RECOGNITION 471-72 (1977) [hereinafter 
cited as NIOSH GUIDE). The OSHA standard for ionizing radiation appears at 29 C.F.R . 
. § 1910.96 (1982). 
160. See E. CALABRESE, supra note 2, at 26-30. 
161. See MacLure & MacMahon, supra note 141, at 27-28. 
162. See Klein, Namer & Harper, Earthenware Containers as a Source of Fatal Lead 
Poisoning: Case Study and Public Health Consideration, 283 NEW ENG. J. MED. 669 (1970); 
Kleinfeld, Lead Intoxication From an Unexpected Source, 24 J. OccuP. MED. 146 (1982). 
163. z. HARSANYI & R. HUTTON, supra note 52, at 116. 
164. E. CALABRESE, supra note 2, at 48-49. 
165. See A. VANDER, NUTRITION, STRESS AND TOXIC CHEMICALS 195-252 (1981); Macek, 
Of Mind and Morbidity: Can Stress and Grief Depress Immunity?, 248 J. A.M.A. 405 (1982). 
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stresses.166 Recent studies have focused on personality factors that 
would predispose individuals to diseases, such as coronary heart dis-
ease, when confronted with workplace stress. 167 Personality and be-
havioral patterns, therefore, might be used to keep high-risk persons 
out of stressful j obs.16B 
Third, when wearing a respirator, some individuals exposed to 
stressful conditions in the workplace (including elevated carbon di-
oxide, heat and altitude) react in a panic-like manner known ashy-
perventilation syndrome. 169 The symptoms of hyperventilation 
syndrome range from breathlessness and trembling to convul-
sions.170 The individual is in danger from the external environment 
as well as his or her own physiological reaction. Hyperventilation 
syndrome is associated with certain personality types detectable by 
various tests. 171 
3. Overall Health Factors and Increased Risk 
An important factor in determining susceptibility to occupational 
illness is the individual's present state of health and general physical 
condition. This may involve inborn (e.g., height, shape of spine) and 
acquired (e.g., prior nonoccupational illness) conditions. As with 
other indices of susceptibility, the predictive value of each of the 
considerations varies greatly. 
a. Musculoskeletal. An individual's musculoskeletal system has 
been used by industry in attempting to identify those asymptomatic 
individuals predisposed to back injuries from jobs requiring manual 
lifting and exertion. Little scientific evidence, however, supports the 
commonly used skeletal screening techniques. 
Body weight and stature are two anthropometric172 attributes 
often used to predict an individual's risk of injury during manual 
166. Poor working conditions, shift work and physical danger are among the factors lead-
ing to occupational stress. Davidson & Cooper, A Model of Occupational Stress, 23 J. Occur. 
MED. 564,570 (198l);see La Dou, Occupational Stress, in DEVELOPMENTS IN OCCUPATIONAL 
MEDICINE 197 (C. Zenz ed. 1980). 
167. See Chesney, Sevelius, Black, Ward, Swan & Rosenman, Work Environment, Type A 
Behavior, and Coronary Heart .Disease Risk Factors, 23 J. Occur. MED. 551 (1981). 
168. Id. at 555. 
169. Morgan, Psychological Problems Associated with the Wear of Industrial Respirators, 
INTERNATIONAL RESPIRATOR RESEARCH WORKSHOP, at 27, 36 (Morgantown, West Virginia, 
Sept. 8-11, 1980). 
170. Id. at 42. 
171. Id. at 25-36. 
172. Anthropometry is a field of anthropology dealing with the measurement of the human 
body to determine differences in classes of people and individuals. See NATIONAL SAFETY 
CoUNCIL, FUNDAMENTALS OF INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE 1165-66 (2d ed. 1979). 
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labor. Despite a number of studies and theories, research does not 
support the notion that either fat or thin or tall or short people run a 
significantly higher risk of low-back injury.173 "In brief, the selec-
tion of people for materials handling jobs based on their anthropom-
etry is not well justified in terms of reducing low-back pain incidence 
rates." 174 
Radiological screening, specifically the low-back x-ray, is the 
most prevalent form of skeletal analysis for susceptibility to future 
back injury. Although precise figures are unavailable, between 
150,000 and 1.2 million preemployment low-back x-rays are given 
each year. 175 Despite widespread use, scientific literature has thor-
oughly discredited the low-back x-ray as a basis for employment 
screening. 176 The test is simply inaccurate; it screens out too many 
healthy people who will never suffer from back injury, 177 while fail-
ing to detect those presymptomatic persons actually at risk. 178 More-
over, the x-rays themselves are expensive179 and present hazards 
from radiation exposure.180 
173. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, WORK PRACTICES GUIDE FOR MANUAL LIFTING 18 
(1981) [hereinafter cited as WORK PRACTICES GUIDE]; accord Quiet & Hadler, .Diagnosis and 
Treatment of Backache, 8 SEMINARS IN ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM 261, 277 (1979) (no rela-
tionship between lower back pain and muscular build, lower limb form and function, scoliosis, 
lordosis, kyphosis, or lumbosacral angle). 
174. WORK PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 173, at 18. 
175. Connors, Summary, in SUMMARY REPORT AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE 
ON Low BACK X-RAYS IN PRE-EMPLOYMENT PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS (Tucson, Arizona, 
Jan. 11-14, 1973) (hereinafter cited as SUMMARY], cited in Rockey, Fantel & Omenn, .Discrimi-
natory Aspects of Pre-Employment Screening: Low-Back X-ray Examinations in the Railroad 
Industry, 5 AM. J. L. & MED. 197, 203 (1979). 
176. See, e.g., Anderson, Occupational Aspects of Low Back Pain, 6 CLINICS IN RHEU-
MATIC DISEASES 17, 28-29 (1980); Gibson, Martin & Terry, Incidence of Low Back Pain and 
Pre-Placemen/ X-ray Screening, 22 J. OccuP. MED. 514 (1980); Quiet & Hadler, supra note 
173, at 278-79; Rockey, Fantel & Omenn,supra note 175; Snook, Campanelli & Hart,A Study 
of Three Preventive Approaches lo Low Back Injury, 20 J. OccuP. MED. 478 (1978); WORK 
PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 173, at 92-94. 
177. Compare Ford, Orthopedic Considerations, in SUMMARY, supra note 175, at 33, 39-40 
(Missouri Pacific Railroad rejected 40% of applicants on basis of x-rays), with Kosiak, Aurelius 
& Hartfiel, The Low Back Problem, 10 J. OccuP. MED. 588 (1968) (29% of applicants disquali-
fied on the basis of x-rays). See also Rockey, Fantel & Omenn, supra note 175, at 206. 
178. See, e.g., Rowe, Low Back Pain in Industry 11 J. OccUP. MED. 161 (1964) (only 10% 
of subjects subsequently developing back pain could have been identified at screening); Red-
field, Tlte Low Back X-ray as a Pre-employment Screening Tool in the Forest Products Industry, 
13 J. Occup, MED. 219 (1971) (injury rate for workers screened to be at high risk actually was 
much lower than those screened to be at low risk). Indeed, the American Occupational Medi-
cal Association has concluded that "lumbar spine x-ray examinations should not be used as a 
screening procedure for back problems, but rather as a special diagnostic procedure available 
to the physician on appropriate indications for study." WoRK PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 
173, at 93. 
179. At an average of $50, preemployment x-ray examinations cost between $7.5 million 
and $60 million per year. Connors, supra note 175. 
180. Low-back x-rays present a substantial risk of gonadal irradiation. Gonadal shielding 
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Other forms of musculoskeletal analyses involve strength test-
ing, 181 aerobic capacity testing, 182 and work-motion profiles. 183 Al-
though these tests eventually may be validated, they still are 
considered experimental. 184 
b. Prior illness. An individual's prior nonoccupational illness 
also may establish an increased risk of, or cause an earlier expression 
of, occupational disease following exposure to toxic substances or 
other workplace hazards. For example, individuals with a history of 
ischemic heart disease, such as angina pectoris and myocardial in-
farction, have an increased risk of serious cardiovascular illness 
when exposed to dinitrotoluene, 185 carbon dioxide, 186 methylene 
chloride, 187 nitroglycerine188 and carbon disulphide. 189 
Illnesses of other organ systems also may create additional work-
place risk factors. A congenital hearing loss or the use of ototoxic 
drugs190 makes an individual more susceptible to occupational noise 
exposure.191 A history of Raynaud's disease192 predisposes a worker 
often is neglected for men and is difficult to accomplish for women. There is also the risk of 
fetal irradiation (which doubles the risk of childhood leukemia) during an early, unsuspected 
pregnancy. See Rockey, Fantel & Omenn, supra note 175, at 203-04. 
181. See Hogan, The State of the Art of Strength Testing, in WOMEN, WORK AND HEALTH: 
CHALLENGES TO CORPORATE POLICY 75 (1980); NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PREEMPLOY· 
MENT STRENGTH TESTING (1977); WORK PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 173, at 95-96. 
182. See WORK PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 173, at 96-98. 
183. See Althouse, Revealing a True Profile of Musculoskeletal Abilitites, Occup, HEALTH 
& SAFETY, May 1980, at 25. 
184. See Hogan, supra note 181, at 92; WORK PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 173, at 98, 
185. Dinitrotoluene (DNT) can cause methemoglobinemia by decreasing the oxygen-car• 
rying capacity of the blood. See NIOSH GUIDE, supra note 159, at 279. 
186. Carbon dioxide intoxification can lead to carboxy hemoglobinemia, a form of oxygen 
deficiency. NIOSH GUIDE, supra note 159, at 416. 
187. Methylene chloride exposure can lead to carboxy hemoglobinemia, a form of oxygen 
deficiency. Id. at 210. 
188. Dynamite workers with a history of coronary artery disease, when exposed to nitro• 
glycerine have an increased risk of coronary artery spasm. See Hogstedt & Anderson, A Co-
hort Study of Mortality Among l)ynamite Workers, 21 J, Occup, Meo. 553 (1979); Hogstedt & 
Axelson, Nitroglycerine-Nitroglycol Exposure and the Mortality in Cardio-Cerebrovascular 1)/s-
eases Among l)ynamite Workers, 19 J. Occup, MED. 675 (1977); Lund, Haggendal & Johnson, 
Withdrawal Symptoms in Workers Exposed to Nitroglycerine, 25 BRIT, J. INDUS, Meo, 136 
(1968). 
189. Carbon disulphide increases the risk of cardiac death by accelerating the arthroscler• 
otic process. See Hemberg, Partanen, Nordman & Sumari, Coronary Hearl l)isease Among 
Workers Exposed lo Carbon l)isulphide, 27 BRIT. J. INDUS, MED. 313 (1970); Tiller, Schilling 
& Morris, Occupational Toxic Factor in Mortality from Coronary Heart l)isease, 4 BRIT, MED, 
J. 407 (1968); Tolonen, Hemberg, Nurminen & Tutola, A Follow-up Study of Coronary Hearl 
l)isease in Viscose Rayon Workers Exposed to Carbon l)isulphide, 32 BRIT, J, INDUS, Meo. I 
(1975). 
190. Ototoxic means having a toxic action upon the ear. STEDMAN's, supra note 2, at 1008, 
191. See Sataloff, Occupational Hearing Loss, 15 J. OcCUP. MED, 360 (1973). 
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exposed to segmental vibration, such as a chain saw operator, to 
"white finger" syndrome.193 A diabetic with a subclinical peripheral 
neuropathy would be sensitive to neurotoxic chemicals, such as 
tricresyl ortho-isomer (TOCP), 194 arsenic, 195 and lead. 196 Although 
relatively few studies exist on the combined effects of prior illness 
and toxic exposures, medical recommendations are frequently made 
on the assumption that the two risk factors have an additive effect. 197 
c. Clinical findings. A physical examination cannot usually give 
an etiologic diagnosis of a medical condition, except for gross organ 
failure or dysfunction, such as yellow jaundice, an abdominal mass, 
or cyanosis. The exact etiology often requires confirmatory bio-
chemical or microscopic analyses. 198 Dermatologic and musculo-
skeletal examinations, however, are exceptions to the general rule 
and are quite useful in assessing a medical condition.199 Thus, indi-
viduals found to have eczema, psoriasis or neurodermatitis on physi-
cal assessment have lost some of their natural protective skin 
barrier.200 When exposed to irritant chemicals, such as solvents, 
acids and alkalis, their dermatitic response will frequently be more 
rapid and severe.201 
C. Occupationally-Based Increased Risk 
1. Toxic Exposures 
A worker's prior occupational exposures may significantly affect 
his or her sensitivity to further occupational exposures. Many forms 
of occupational cancer involve long latency periods - as long as 
192. Raynaud's disease is a primary or idiopathic vascular disorder characterized by bilat-
eral attacks of Raynaud's phenomenon. DoRLAND's, supra note 1, at 392. 
193. See Okada, Yamashita, Nogano, Ikeda, Yachi & Shibata, Studies on the Diagnosis and 
Pathogenesis of Raynaud's Phenomenon of Occupational Origin, 28 BRIT. J. INDUS. MED. 353 
(1971); Taylor, Pearson, Kell & Keighley, Vibration Syndrome in Forestry Commission Chain 
Saw Operators, 28 B_RIT. J. INDUS. MED. 83 (1971); U.S. DEPI'. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, VIBRATION WHITE FINGER DISEASE IN U.S. WORKERS USING PNEUMATIC CHIP-
PING AND GRINDING HAND TOOLS, VOL. I: EPIDEMIOLOGY (NIOSH Tech. Rep. 1982). 
194. See NIOSH GUIDE, supra note 159, at 304. 
195. Id. at 325. 
196. Id at 363. 
197. See NIOSH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, A GUIDE TO 
THE WORK-RELATEDNESS OF DISEASE 13-17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NIOSH WORK-
RELATEDNESS]. 
198. See T. HARRISON, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 4 (8th ed. 1977). 
199. T. FITZPATRICK, DERMATOLOGY IN GENERAL MEDICINE 13 (1971). 
200. Id. at 1061-69. 
201. Id 
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thirty-five years - before the disease is clinically evident.202 Conse-
quently, employers may consider an individual with previous toxic 
exposures a bad risk. 
A prior exposure to a carcinogen also may combine with a later 
exposure ( even tp a different agent) to produce an effect that neither 
alone would have produced. For example, the incidence of leukemia 
among radiation-exposed survivors at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was 
greater among those exposed to benzene years after the radiation 
exposure. 203 
Simultaneous exposure to different toxic substances occurs in 
many industrial settings. The physiological effects of combined ex-
posures may, in some instances, exceed the additive effects of the 
single agents alone.204 This synergistic relationship exists among 
several commonly occurring exposures. The relationship between 
smoking and asbestos has already been discussed.205 Ethanol com-
bined with trichloroethylene enhances acute central nervous system 
effects and increases the likelihood of chronic liver disease and liver 
cancer.206 Sulfur dioxide and sodium chloride aerosol in a high hu-
midity environment may produce increased pulmonary resistance in 
workers, although either component alone may not.207 In rare cases, 
an antagonistic reaction may occur in which the combined effect ac-
tually will be less severe than that observed with exposure to only 
one of the contaminants.2os 
2. Hypersensitivity 
Hypersensitivity is a special condition of certain persons whose 
immune systems overreact to a foreign agent.209 For an agent to pro-
duce such a reaction, an individual must have been sensitized to the 
202. See Bridbord, Wagner & Blejer, Chemical Carcinogens, in NIOSH GUIDE, supra note 
159, at 443; Selikoff, Cancer Risk of Asbestos Exposure, in ORIGINS OF HUMAN CANCER 1765-
84 (1977); PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WEL· 
FARE, AsBESTOS: AN INFORMATION RESOURCE 29 (1978); Greenberg & Lloyd-Davis, 
Mesothelioma Register 1967-1968, 31 BRIT. J. INDUS. MED. 91 (1974). 
203. Ishimaru, Okada & Tomeiyasu, Occupation Factors in the Epidemiology of Leukemia 
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 93 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 157 (1971), 
204. Cowles,Medica/ Effects of Combined Industrial Exposure, 21 J. OccuP. MED, 413,414 
(1979); Freundt, Mixed Exposures to Chemical Hazards, OcCUP, HEALTH & SAFETY, Aug. 
1982, at 10. 
205. See note 148 supra. 
206. Cowles, supra note 204. 
207. McJilton, Role of Relative Humidity in the Synergistic Effect of A Sulfur IJioxide-Aero-
so/ Mixture in the Lung, 182 SCIENCE 503 (1973). 
208. See Buell,SomeBiochemica/AspectsofCadmium Toxicology, 17 J, OccUP, MED, 189 
(1975). 
209. DoRI.AND's, supra note l, at 635. 
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agent by a prior exposure. Therefore, the process of sensitization to 
industrial chemicals usually begins after the individual is employed 
and exposed to the work environment. A hypersensitive individual 
may suffer adverse reactions at exposure levels far below those which 
the average person tolerates without ill effect. Clinical symptoms re-
sulting from a sensitivity reaction range from mild skin irritations to 
anaphylactic shock and even death. Many common industrial 
agents are potential sensitizers, including formaldehyde, cotton dust, 
nickel, and epoxy resins.210 
Skin reactions are a common occupational problem. Dermatitis 
accounts for one half of all reported cases of occupational disease.2II 
Perhaps twenty percent of occupational dermatitis results from hy-
persensitive reactions to allergenic materials.2I2 Hypersensitivity re-
sponses of the respiratory system, however, are of particular concern 
because these may threaten the worker's life. 
Toluene diisocyanate (TOI) is one potentially serious respiratory 
sensitizer. TOI is a liquid used in the manufacture of polyurethane. 
An estimated 50,000 to 100,000 workers in the United States are ex-
posed to TOI; as many as five percent of these develop adverse re-
spiratory symptoms.213 In some instances, a worker exposed to low 
levels of TDI for several weeks with minimal or no respiratory 
symptoms may suddenly develop an acute asthmatic attack. Once 
sensitized to TDI, any further exposure poses extreme danger; even 
an exposure well below the recommended standard can produce a 
severe asthmatic attack and may cause death. Although the acute 
effects may be reversible, continued exposure of affected workers can 
result in chronic broncho-pulmonary problems.214 
Scientists are trying to develop methods for detecting hypersensi-
tivity to isocyanates before exposure, but the tests are still experi-
mental.215 Despite considerable controversy over the predictive 
210. Baer, 17ze Most Common Contact Allergens, 108 ARCHIVES OF DERMATOLOGY 74 
(1973). 
211. Adams, High-Risk Dermatoses, 23 J. OcCUP. MED. 829 (1981). 
212. Birmingham, Dermatoses, in NIOSH GUIDE, supra note 159, at 81. 
213. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, CRITERIA FOR A 
RECOMMENDED STANDARD - OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO TOLUENE DIISOCYANATE 
(1969). The following four patterns of respiratory response may occur: 1) chemical bronchitis; 
2) an asthma-like condition occurring in sensitized workers at low exposure levels; 3) acute 
decrease in ventilatory capacity in one work shift; and 4) chronic decrease in pulmonary func-
tion in those with prolonged exposure. Schleuter, Response of the Lung to Inhaled Antigens, 51 
AM. J. MED. 476 (1974). 
214. NIOSH WORK-RELATEDNESS, supra note 197, at 60. 
215. Karol, Survey of Industrial Workers for Antibodies to Toluene Diisocyanate, 23 J. Oc-
CUP. MED. 741 (1981). 
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value of existing tests, some companies use immunologic screening 
to detect individuals hypersensitive to isocyanates.216 
3. Cytogenetic and Noncytogenetic Monitoring 
Cytogenetics is the study of numerical and structural chromo-
some aberrations.217 These aberrations may occur naturally or may 
be induced by exposure to environmental agents known as clas-
togens. In general, clastogenic agents are also mutagenic and car-
cinogenic. Indeed, certain specific chromosome aberrations have 
been linked to specific cancers. Thus, some scientists theorize that 
chromosomal aberrations are the cellular precursors of cancer. If so, 
cytogenetic monitoring of workers exposed to carcinogens may indi-
cate increased risk.21s 
Recent studies associate occupational exposures to several 
hazards and elevated frequencies of chromosome aberrations.219 
Nevertheless, the literature is often contradictory and the associa-
tions, even when found, are indirect. Today cytogenetics can, at 
best, establish relationships between chromosome aberrations and 
cancers for populations as a whole; no tests can predict individual 
risk of cancer.220 These limitations have led most experts to agree 
that cytogenetic monitoring is, for now, an experimental research 
tool that should not be used in setting exposure levels or in screening 
workers.221 
Unlike cytogenetic monitoring, which looks for damage to the 
gross structure of chromosomes (the cellular structures containing 
the genetic material DNA), noncytogenetic monitoring looks for 
damage to the actual molecular structure of DNA. The DNA dam-
age is caused by mutagens and therefore the noncytogenetic moni-
toring attempts to detect the presence of mutagens or the DNA 
damage caused by mutagens.222 Noncytogenetic techniques are also 
216. See Stokinger & Scheel, supra note 27, at 571. 
217. Dabney, The Role of Human Genetic Monitoring in the Workplace, 23 J. Occur. Meo. 
626 (1981). 
218. See Killian & Picciano, Cytogenetic Surveillance of Industrial Populations, in CHEMI· 
CAL MUTAGENS: PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOR THEIR DETECTION 321 (1976); Purchase, 
Chromosomal Analysis of Exposed Populations: A Review of Industrial Problems, in 
MUTAGEN-INDUCED CHROMOSOME DAMAGE IN MAN 258 (1978); see also Burner & Aase, 
Genetic Risks and Environmental Surveillance: Epidemiological Aspects of Monitoring Industrial 
Populations for Environmental Mutagens, 24 J. Occur. Meo. 305 (1982). See generally Harn-
den, Cytogenetics of Human Neoplasis, in GENETICS OF HUMAN CANCER (1977). 
219. Dabney, supra note 217, at 628-30 (ionizing radiation, arsenic, benzene, 
epichlorohydrin, cadmium/lead/zinc, organic solvents, ethylene oxide, and vinyl chloride). 
220. GENETIC TESTING, supra note 43, at 74. 
221. Id. at 74-75; Dabney, supra note 217, at 626, 630-31. 
222. GENETIC TESTING, supra note 43, at 75. 
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still in the developmental stage. 
II. MEDICAL SCREENING AND COMPANY PRACTICES 
A. Company Medical Programs 
Except as required by the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA)223 or federal contract,224 employers have no duty to provide 
employees with medical services.225 In general, the extent to which 
employers provide these services depends upon the nature of the in-
dustry and the size of the employer. For example, 80.2% of employ-
ees in the primary metal industries receive periodic medical 
examinations, while only 5% of contract construction workers re-
ceive these examinations.226 Only 12.2% of employees working in 
small plants (8-249 workers) receive periodic medical examinations, 
but 65.4% of employees working in large plants (500 or more work-
ers) receive such examinations.227 
Occupational physicians generally agree about the components 
of a sound occupational health program.228 Most employer medical 
programs, however, are not directed and staffed by trained occupa-
tional physicians.229 Of the estimated 10,000 physicians in the 
United States practicing occupational medicine, only 800 are certi-
223. See Part 11-B-4 i,!fra. 
224. See, e.g., Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1976). 
225. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Union Pac. R.R., 621 F.2d 902, 909 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 11 IO (1981); Lanni v. Wyer, 219 F.2d 701, 703 (2d Cir. 1955); Kloman v. Doctors 
Hosp., 76 A.2d 782, 784 (D.C. 1950); Dornak v. Lafayette Gen. Hosp., 368 So. 2d I 185, I 186 
(La. App. 1979); Baur v. Mesta Mach. Co., 195 Pa. Super. 22, 32, 168 A.2d 591, 597, rev'd on 
other grounds, 40S Pa. 617, 176 A.2d 684 (1961). 
226. 3 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, NATIONAL OCCUPA-
TIONAL HAZARD SURVEY, (Survey Analysis and Supplemental Tables) 80-83 table II (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as NOHS]. 
227. Id. 
228. According to the American Medical Association's statement, Scope, Objectives and 
Functions of Occupational Health Programs, industrial health care should: 
I. Protect employees against health and safety hazards in their work situation. 
2. Insofar as practical and feasible, protect the general environment of the co=unity. 
3. Facilitate the placement of workers according to their physical, mental and emotional 
capabilities in work which they can perform with an acceptable degree of efficiency 
and without endangering their own health and safety or that of others. 
4. Assure adequate medical care and. rehabilitation of the occupationally ill and injured. 
5. Encourage and assist in measures for personal health maintenance, including the ac-
quisition of a personal physician whenever possible. · 
Howe, Organization and Operation of an Occupational Health Program, 17 J. OccuP. MED. 
362, 362 (1975). 
229. The following table is based on data from the NOHS: 
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fled by the American Board of Preventive Medicine.230 Moreover, 
large industrial companies employ the majority of occupational phy-
sicians, while smaller businesses either hire part-time consultants, 
use nurses or clinics, or have no occupational medical program at 
all,231 
The lack of adequately trained occupational physicians can result 
in failure to diagnose, misdiagnosis, and the use of harmful medical 
techniques.232 Untrained, inexperienced or part-time physicians 
may not adequately supervise medical screening programs. These 
physicians might overrely on laboratory screening procedures, which 
are easier and less time consuming than a thorough history and 
clinical evaluation. In addition, these physicians may not accurately 
evaluate the scientific limitations on the predictive value of screening 
procedures. 
Even the most knowledgeable and dedicated occupational physi-
cians may face ethical dilemmas caused by their conflicting loyal-
ties. 233 Economic concerns of employers, unfortunately, may 
outweigh the health concerns of the patient-employees.234 In the 
context of employee selection, management may pressure physicians 
to develop increasingly extensive medical screening techniques235 
Table Finding Plants Employees 
4 Have a formally 
established health 
unit 4.0o/o 31.5% 
5 Have a health unit 
with a physician in 
charge 1.2% 15.0% 
8 Employ a physician 
full-time 0.7% 11.4% 
NOHS, supra note 226, at 30, table VIIIA (Summary of NOHS Estimates). 
230. Levy, The Teaching of Occupational Health in American Medical Schools, 44 J. Meo. 
EDUC. 18, 21 (1980). 
231. N. ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE 440 (1976}; see Kehoe, The American Ph)'Sl-
cian in Occupational Medicine and Hygiene, 27 ARCH. ENVTL. HEALTH 236 (1973). 
232. Bingham, What's Our Government Doing to Protect Our Health?, in WORK AND 
HEALTH INSEPARABLE IN THE SO's 72 (U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services 1980). See 
generally Keene, The Credibility of Occupational Medicine, 16 J. OccuP. Meo. 309 (1974). 
233. See Bundy, How Do We Assure that the Worker's Health is the Occupational Physi-
cian's Primary Concern?, 18 J. OccuP. Meo. 671 (1976}; Dinman, The Loyalty of the Occupa-
tional Phjsician, 54 BULL. N.Y. AcAD. MED. 729 (1978); Whose "Agent" is the Occupational 
Physician?, 30 ARCH. ENVTL. HEALTH 412 (1975). 
234. Most industrial physicians identify strongly with management for sociological and 
financial reasons, and some may forget that the ethical guidelines for the medical profes-
sion are more restrictive than for businessmen. Failure to recognize and adhere to medi-
cal ethical standards can only downgrade those who so stray, and that may be part of the 
non-recognition problem that the occupational medicine specialty experiences today. 
Morton, Are Medical Ethical Practices Sufficient in Industrial Medicine?, 15 J. OccuP. Meo. 
860 (1973); see Hilker, If Hippocrates Were Alive, 54 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. Meo. 764 (1978), 
235. See Roberts, The Question of Ethical Standards in Occupational Medical Praclice, 14 J, 
OccuP. MED. 632 (1972). 
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and to supply personnel departments with medical data for employ-
ment decisionmaking.236 
B. Employer Medical Screening and Surveillance 
1. Medical Questionnaires 
Most employers regularly record health information about new 
employees.237 In certain industries, virtually all new employees have 
health information recorded by their employers. 238 Employment ap-
plications rarely request detailed medical information, but fre-
quently a physical examination is a condition of employment.239 
Some application forms specifically ask for consent to a physical ex-
amination.240 Although some companies inform applicants and em-
ployees about the possible use of information supplied on the 
medical questionnaire, most employers do not.241 
Applicants fill out medical questionnaires at the time of, or in 
lieu of, a preemployment physical examination.242 Some question-
naires are quite detailed.243 Most questionnaires contain checklists 
of medical conditions, including nervous conditions, drug and alco-
hol use, ''women's problems," surgery, respiratory trouble, urinary 
trouble and hearing and vision problems.244 
Even the most routine medical questionnaires ask about ex-
tremely personal matters, such as the medical history of family mem-
bers, medication taken, hobbies, sleeping habits, workers' 
236. See Collings, Medical Co,ifidentiality in the Work Environment, 20 J. OccuP. MED. 
461 (1978). For a discussion of the legal issues raised by intracompany disclosure of medical 
records, see Part III-E infra. 
237. In small plants (8 to 249 workers), 60.6% of employees have health information re-
corded, in medium-sized plants (250 to 500 workers), 82.0% of employees have health informa-
tion recorded, and in large plants (over 500 workers) 97.9% of employees have health 
information recorded. NOHS, supra note 226, at 73, table 9. 
238. Id. at 74. 
239. REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, app. 3, at 11 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as PRIVACY PROTECTION]. 
240. Id. 
241. Id at 40-41. Some employers have the applicant or employee sign a general waiver 
for the employer to use the information as it deems necessary. Id. at 12. 
242. See Voelz & Spickard, Preemployment Medical Evaluation by Questionnaire, 14 J. Oc-
CUP. MED. 18 (1972) (suggesting use of questionnaire in lieu of examination). 
243. For example, Exxon Corporation has a twenty-five-page, 185-item questionnaire that 
applicants and employees are required to complete before submitting to a compulsory physical 
examination. PRIVACY PROTECTION, supra note 239, app. 3, at 12. See generally Symposium, 
Medical Information Systems Roundtable, 24 J. OccuP. MED. 794 (1982). 
244. PRIVACY PROTECTION,supra note 239, app. 3, at l2;see Voelz & Spickard,supra note 
242, at 21-22. 
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compensation claims filed, insurance records and military records.245 
A "community and home environmental profile" may ask questions 
about plumbing, rodents, and home repairs.246 Some employers ask 
about homosexuality, venereal disease, and fertility.247 
2. Preemployment/Preplacement Medical Exams 
The preemployment medical examination long has been a virtual 
institution in American industry.248 Widely used, its object "appar-
ently was to select only physical and mental paragons"249 and to ex-
clude individuals with medical, psychological or "other" 
problems.250 Today, these examinations are called preplacement ex-
aminations, ostensibly because employers refuse to hire only the 
most seriously disabled persons. The examination purportedly 
matches the employee with the most suitable job.251 
Preplacement medical examinations are widely used. The 
avowed purposes of the exams are (1) to protect the employee from 
assignment to a job which might be harmful; (2) to protect the em-
ployer from unfit workers; and (3) to correct remediable physical de-
fects.252 The examination also serves an essential function in health 
surveillance by providing an historical record of previous exposures, 
a composite of the employee's state of health before work, and a 
baseline for comparison with later health observations.253 
245. PRIVACY PROTECTION, supra note 239, app. 3, at 12; see Finucane, General Foods 
Medical and Environmental Health Systems (MEHS), 24 J. OCCUP. MED. 794 (1982). 
246. ARIZONA CENTER FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, THE OCCUPATIONAL 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY, app. B. (1980). 
247. For a discussion of the privacy law issues raised by medical questionnaires, see Part 
III-E i,ifra. 
248. Preemployment examinations, established by law in England as early as the first in-
dustrial revolution, received a major impetus in the United States around 1900 when the first 
workmen's compensation laws were passed. Schussler, Kaminer, Power & Pomper, The 
Preplacement Examination, 17 J. OccuP. MED. 254 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Preplacement 
Examination J. 
249. W. SHEPARD, THE ROLE OF THE PHYSICIAN IN INDUSTRY 16 (1976). 
250. Physicians were sometimes expected to find medical reasons for disqualifying "trou-
blemakers" such as union sympathizers. Id. at 16-17. 
251. Id. at 17. Although only 19.2% of employees in small plants (8-249 workers) are 
required to undergo a preplacement examination, 48.9% of employees in medium-sized plants 
(250-500 workers) and 83.3% of employees in large plants (over 500 workers) are required to 
undergo examination. NOHS, supra note 226, at 77, table IO (number and percent of plants 
and employees in plants which require preplacement physical examinations of employees). 
Furthermore, in several industries, such as petroleum and coal products (93.5%), primary 
metal industries (92.4%), and transportation equipment (90.8%), preplacement medical exami-
nations are even more prevalent. Id. at 78. Individuals who refuse to cooperate with the 
examination are rejected. See Campione, The Pre-employment Examination: An Evaluation, 
41 INDUS. MED. 27, 29 (1972); notes 595-96 i,ifra and accompanying text. 
252. W. SHEPARD, supra note 249, at 17. 
253. Cooper, supra note 3, at 596. 
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Procedures for conducting a preplacement examination vary, but 
many employers use a three-step process. First, the physician as-
sesses the job requirements.254 Second, the individual applicant or 
employee gives a complete medical and work history255 and under-
goes a physical examination256 and any laboratory or testing proce-
dures.257 Third, the individual's medical profile is compared with 
the job requirements.258 
3. Laboratory Testing Procedures 
Many employers have ongoing medical surveillance programs 
that include laboratory testing procedures. Common procedures in-
clude blood tests, urine analyses, pulmonary function tests and chest 
x-rays. As with other aspects of employer-provided medical services, 
the frequency with which laboratory tests are performed depends on 
the size and nature of the company.259 Beyond these routine proce-
dures, most companies are extremely reluctant to divulge what tests 
they perform and how they use the results, particularly with regard 
to such controversial tests as biochemical genetic screening. Never-
theless, some scientists urge that, in appropriate circumstances,260 ge-
254. This ''job analysis" includes a review of the job description, the essential tasks per-
formed, and the working environment in order to develop the job-related critical medical re-
quirements. See Hogan & Bernacki, .Developing Joh-Related Preplacement Medical 
Examinations, 23 J. OccuP. MED. 469 (1981). 
255. This would either supplement or replace the questionnaires discussed in Part 11-B-l 
supra. 
256. The physical examination is quite similar to an "annual checkup" given by a family 
physician. Among other things, it includes an examination of the eyes, ears, nose, throat, 
heart, lungs, reflexes, blood pressure, and other co=on procedures. See W. SHEPARD, supra 
note 249, at 22-27. 
257. See Part 11-B-3 infra. 
258. See W. SHEPARD,supra note 249, at l9;Preplacement Examination,supra note 248, at 
255-56. Some employers use more detailed work restriction codes, indicating specific em-
ployee restrictions. PRIVACY PROTECTION, supra note 239, app. 3, at 82. 
259. 14.7% of all employees receive periodic blood tests, but they are given to 55.4% of 
employees in the primary metal industries and 51.4% of employees working in ordnance and 
accessories. NOHS, supra note 226, at 93-94, table 14 (number and percent of plants and 
employees in plants which provide periodic blood tests for employees). Urine tests are per-
formed on 14.4% of all employees, but 46.7% of employees working with petroleum and coal 
products. Id. at 97-93, table 15 (number and percent of plants and employees in plants which 
provide periodic urine tests for employees). Pulmonary function tests are given to 13.5% of all 
employees, but 68.5% of employees in petroleum and coal products and 54.8% of employees in 
primary metal industries. Id. at 101-02, table 16 (number and percent of plants and employees 
in plants which provide periodic pulmonary function tests for employees). Chest x-rays are 
given to 24.9% of all employees, but 76.3% of employees in petroleum and coal products and 
74.7% of employees in primary metal industries. Id. at 105-06, table 17 (number of plants and 
employees in plants which provide periodic chest x-rays for employees). 
260. Genetic screening should be conducted when the screened-for genetic defect: (I) has a 
relatively high occurrence in the worker population; (2) concerns pollutants usually encoun-
tered in industry; (3) is compatible with an apparently normal life until industrial exposure 
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netic screening procedures should be used.261 
In 1982 the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) conducted 
an anonymous survey of the "Fortune 500" companies, the fifty larg-
est private utilities, and eleven major labor unions.262 Of the 366 
(65.2%) organizations responding, six (1.6%) then used biochemical 
or cytogenetic tests, seventeen (4.6%) had used the tests in the past 
twelve years and fifty-nine (16.1%) anticipated using or would possi-
bly use the tests in the next five years.263 Sickle cell testing was most 
prevalent, followed by G-6-PD, alphai-antitrypsin deficiency, un-
specified immune system markers and cytogenetic testing for chro-
mosomal aberrations.264 
Some consider the number of companies either using or expres-
sing an interest in genetic screening "surprising,"265 but, if anything, 
the survey probably underreported the extent of industry activity in 
this area. The highly sensitive nature of the issue266 and the attempt 
of one trade association to discourage corporate participation in the 
study,267 suggest that genetic screening may be even more prevalent 
now than reported, and seems likely to increase in the future.268 
4. OSHA-Mandated Medical Surveillance 
OSHA's twenty-one health standards regulating toxic substances 
require a variety of medical procedures. In general, employers must 
conduct preplacement examinations, the physician must furnish em-
ployers with the physician's statement of suitability for employment 
in the regulated area, the employer must conduct periodic (usually 
annual) examinations, and in some instances the employer must con-
duct examinations at termination of employment. The failure to 
conduct these required medical examinations may lead to the issu-
occurs; and (4) can be detected by an inexpensive test which can be relatively simply applied to 
the screening of large numbers of people. Stokinger & Scheel, supra note 27. 
261. Specifically, employers have been encouraged to screen for alpha1-antitrypsin defi-
ciency, G-6-PD deficiency, carbon disulfide sensitivity, reagenic antibodies to allergenic chem-
icals, and sickle cell trait. Id. at 572. 
262. GENETIC TESTING, supra note 43, at 33. 
263. Id. at 34. 
264. Id. at 36. 
265. See Severo, 59 Top U.S. Companies .Plan Genetic Screening, N.Y. Times, June 23, 
1982, at A9, col 4 (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr., Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Investigations and Oversight, House Committee on Science and Technology). 
266. Id 
261. Id. 
268. With the costs of some tests as low as two to five cents per test, E. CALABRESE, supra 
note 2, at 153 (sickle cell), and virtually no legal restraints, see Part III infra, companies might 
be tempted to experiment with these procedures. Other procedures, such as HLA typing, are 
more expensive. Z. HARSANYI & R. HUTTON, supra note 52, at 77. 
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ance of OSHA citations and penalties.269 Table II contains a sum-
mary of the specific requirements. 
TABLE II 
MEDICAL PROCEDURES REQUIRED BY OSHA 
29 C.F.R. § 
1910.1001 
1910.1003-.1016 
1910.1017 
1910.1025 
1910.1029 
1910.1043 
1910.1044 
Substance Primary Health 
Risks 
Asbestos 1. Asbestosis 
2. Mesothelioma 
3. Lung disorders 
13 Carcinogens270 1. Bladder cancer 
2. Bronchiogenic 
cancer 
3. Lung cancer 
4. Stomach cancer 
5. Skin cancer 
6. Liver cancer 
7. Kidney cancer 
8. Pulmonary edema 
9. Central necrosis 
Vinyl Chloride 1. Angiosarcoma 
2. Lung cancer 
Inorganic lead 1. Central nervous 
system disorders 
Coke oven 1. Lung cancer 
emissions 2. Kidney cancer 
3. Skin cancer 
Cotton dust 1. Byssinosis 
DBCP271 1. Sterility 
Required Medical Procedures 
1. Pulmonary function tests 
2. Chest x-rays 
1. Complete medical 
history, including 
genetic and 
environmental 
factors 
2. Consideration of 
reduced immunological 
competence of 
employees, those undergoing 
treatment with steroids 
or cytotoxic agents, 
pregnancy and 
cigarette smoking 
1. Complete physical exam 
2. Liver studies 
1. Complete medical 
history and exam 
2. Detailed blood studies 
1. Complete history 
2. Chest x-ray 
3. Pulmonary function tests 
4. Sputum cytology 
5. Urine cytology 
1. Complete medical history 
2. Standardized respiratory 
questionnaire 
3. Pulmonary function tests 
1. Complete medical and 
reproductive history 
2. Examination of genito-
urinary tract 
269. See, e.g., General Engr. & Machine Works, 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1936, 1981 O.S.H. 
DEc. (CCH) ~ 25,402 (1981); Research Cottrell, Inc., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1489, 1981 O.S.H. 
DEC, (CCH) ~ 25,284 (1981). 
270. 4-Nitrobiphenyl (§ 1910.1003); Alpha-Napthylamine (§ 1910.1004); Methyl 
chloromethyl ether (§ 1910.1006); 3, 3'-Dichlorobenzidine (and its salts) (§ 1910-1007); bis-
Chloromethyl ether(§ 1910.1008); beta-Napthylamine (§ 1910.1009); Benzedine (§ 1910.1010); 
4-Aminodiphenyl (§ 1910.1011); Ethyleneimine (§ 1910.1012); beta-Propiolactone 
(§ 1910.1013); 2-Acetylaminofluorene (§ 1910.1014); 4-Dimethylaminoazobenzene 
(§ 1910.1015); N-Nitrosodimethylamine (§ 1910.1016). 
271. 1, 2-dibromo-3-chloropropane. 
1416 
1910.1045 Aery lonitrile 
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I. Asphyxia 
3. Serum specimen for 
radioimmunoassay 
I. Complete medical history 
and exam, with particular 
attention to peripheral and 
central nervous system, 
gastrointestinal system, skin, 
and thyroid 
2. Chest x-ray 
3. Fecal occult blood screening 
for all workers over 40 years 
age 
5. Medical Records 
As employers collect more medical information about applicants 
and employees, and as technology expands the capability to store, 
retrieve and disseminate the information, a variety of legal, ethical 
and practical problems arise.272 Although employee medical records 
contain various kinds of inf ormation,273 they present a single ques-
tion: What use may be made of the records?274 
Ironically, employees often lack access to their medical records 
and are not informed about occupational health determinations.275 
This is particularly disturbing in the context of employee screening 
for susceptibility to occupational illness. The primary value of these 
elaborate screening measures is their ability to inform workers of the 
risk. If informed, they may make a reasonable judgment about 
whether to accept such risks. Employers contend that employees are 
too unsophisticated to understand their own health measurements 
and records and that giving such data to an individual could cause 
stress.276 
Employers often base personnel actions on medical records,277 
and intracompany disclosure of medical records is widespread.278 
Access to records may extend to third parties through one of the vast 
272. For a discussion of legal issues related to recordkeeping, see Part III-E iefra. 
273. Occupational health records usually contain identification and demographic back-
ground, narrative, objective findings and measurements, opinions, judgments, and recommen-
dations. See Warshaw, Confidentiality Versus the Need to Know, 18 J. Occur. MED, 534, 535 
(1976). 
274. See generally Karrh, The Confidentiality of Occupational Medical JJata, 21 J. Occur. 
MED. 157 (1979); McLean, Management of Occupational Health Records, 18 J. Occur. MED, 
530 (1976). 
275. See note 598 iefra. 
276. See A. FREEDMAN, INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO HEALTH RISKS 17 (1981); Roberts, 
Mandatory v. Voluntary Medical Examinations in Industry, 30 ARCH. ENVTL, HEALTH 205, 207 
(1975). It is hard to imagine that such paternalism is justified and it takes only a little cynicism 
to theorize more self-serving reasons for such policies. 
277. See Part II-C iefra. 
278. See Part III-E iefra. 
May 1983] Occupational Illness 1417 
computerized networks dealing with private medical records.279 At 
the same time, fear of civil liability has discouraged employers from 
using available medical records to conduct mortality and morbidity 
studies that might help discover causal relationships between work-
place exposure and occupational disease. 280 
C. Scient!fic Limitations on Medical Screening 
Despite their widespread use, preemployment medical examina-
tions can be grossly inaccurate in attempting to screen for high-risk 
WQrkers.281 Several studies confirm that employee selection proce-
dures that do not use preemployment physical examinations are as 
accurate in identifying high-risk workers.282 Nevertheless, employer 
practices are unlikely to change in the near future. 283 Some specific 
OSHA standards mandate preplacement examinations. Moreover, 
insurers and management continue to urge physicians to screen out 
workers who are likely to become ill. Many occupational physicians, 
however, would probably agree that the assessment of risk to a given 
applicant or employee, even by the most experienced physician, is 
"no more than an educated guess."284 
Laboratory testing procedures present similar problems. Because 
the results may have important consequences, the test being used 
279. See Note, Privacy in Personal Medical Ieformation: A Diagnosis, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 
394, 395 n.7 (1981); see also Boyer, Computerized Medical Records and the Right to Privacy, 25 
BUFFALO L. REV. 37 (1975); Mironi, The Confidentiality of Personnel Records: A Legal and 
Ethical View, 25 LAB. L.J. 270 (1974); Reinert, Federal Protection of Employment Record Pri-
vacy, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207 (1981). Some employers already have established procedures 
for exchanging medical surveillance records of workers known to have had prior exposures to 
hazardous substances. PRIVACY PROTECTION, supra note 239, app. 3, at 99. For a discussion 
of susceptibility based on prior occupational exposure, see Part 1-C infra. 
280. See Westin, Dilemmas Facing Occupational Health Surveillance, in INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS IN THE CORPORATION 200 (A. Westin & s. Salisbury eds. 1980). 
281. "The routine physical examination itself has serious shortcomings even if supple-
mented to absurd lengths by mass-screening laboratory and x-ray procedures of little value 
and some potential hazard." Hanks, The Physical Examination in Industry: A Critique, 5 
ARCH. ENVTL. HEALTH 365, 366 (1966). Hanks suggests that the bias of occupational physi-
cians in favor of physical examinations relates more to their concern for job security than to 
valid medical reasons. Id. at 370. 
282. See Rodman, The Pre-employment Physical Examination, 1 J. Occup, MED. 608 
(1965); Schneider & McDonagh, Experience Data on University Recruits Hired Without Pre-
employment Examinations, 13 J. OccuP. MED. 363 (1971); Williamson, Eighteen Years Experi-
ence Without Pre-Employment Examinations, 13 J. OccuP. MED. 465 (1971). See generally 
Leckey, Preemployment Examinations - A Pointed Study, 8 J. OccuP. MED. 532 (1966); 
, Michaels, A Plea for Abandonment of the Complete History and Physical Examination, 108 
CAN. MED. ASSN. J. 299 (1973). 
283. See Gibson, Why the Preplacemenl Physical Isn't Out of Date, 43 INTL. J. OccuP. 
HEALTH & SAFETY 31 (1974). 
284. Tabershaw, How is the Acceptability of Risks to the Health of Workers lo be Deter-
mined?, 18 J. OCCUP. MED. 674, 675 (1976). 
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must be accurate. Considerable evidence indicates, however, that 
medical testing procedures are not nearly as accurate as they are 
commonly thought to be. 
The starting point for analyzing the accuracy of a test is its sensi-
tivity and specificity. The sensitivity of a test is a measure of the 
test's accuracy in correctly identifying persons with the tested-for 
condition. It is the percent of persons with the condition who have a 
positive test, or: 
True Positives/(True Positives + False Negatives). 
Therefore, if 100 persons have a condition and the test is able to 
identify ninety of them, the test would be 90% sensitive. 
The specificity of a test is a measure of the test's accuracy in cor-
rectly identifying persons free of a condition. It is the percent of per-
sons free of the condition who have a negative test, or: 
True Negatives/(True Negatives+ False Positives). 
Therefore, if 100 persons are free of a condition and the test is able 
to identify eighty of them, the test would be 80% specific. 
The predictive value (positive) of a test measures the likelihood 
that a positive test result indicates the presence of the condition. It is 
the percent of those persons with a positive test who really have the 
condition, or: 
True Positives/(True Positives + False Positives). 
Using the numbers given above-locating 90 persons with the con-
dition, but falsely finding 20 people who do not - the test would 
have a predictive value of 81.8%. 
One of the least accurate tests in widespread use is the low-back 
x-ray. The following table, representing the test results of 1000 hy-
pothetical workers, is based on the assumption that low-back x-rays 
are 56% sensitive and 78% specific for detecting future low-back pain 
and that 60% of all workers will have low-back pain during their 
work life. 
May 1983) 
Will have positive 
low-back x-ray exam 
Will have negative 
low-back x-ray exam 
Total 
Occupational Illness 
TABLE II1285 
Will not have low-
Will have low-back back pain during 
1419 
pain during lifetime lifetime Totals 
336 (true positives) 88 (false positives) 424 
264 (false negatives) 312 (true negatives) 576 
600 400 1000 
The predictive value of a positive low-back x-ray in estimating 
future lost work time is 336 + 424, or 79%. Even with this reason-
able predictive value, of the 424 persons denied jobs, 88 (21%) will 
never have low-back pain. Moreover, of all workers who have low-
back pain, only half will lose time from work. Table IV reflects this 
fact. 
TABLE IV 
Will never lose 
Will have low-back time from work 
pain and lose time because of low-
from work back pain Totals 
Will have positive 
low-back x-ray exam 168 (true positives) 256 (false positives) 424 
Will have negative 
low-back x-ray exam 132 (false negatives) 444 (true negatives) 576 
Total 300 700 1000 
The predictive value of a positive low-back x-ray in estimating 
future lost work time is 168 + 424 or 40%. Thus, of the 424 persons 
denied jobs, 256 (60%) would not lose time from work. Table Vadds 
the fact that only 5 to 20% of all workers who miss time from work 
will require disc surgery. The table uses the 5% estimate. 
285. Tables 3-5 and the accompanying discussion oflow-back x-rays have been taken from 
Rockey, Fantel & Omenn, supra note 175, at 208-10. 
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Will have positive 
low-back X-ray exam 
Will have negative 
low-back x-ray exam 
Total 
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TABLE V 
Will have disc 
surgery 
Will not have disc 
surgery Totals 
8.4 (true positives) 416 (false positives) 424.4 
6.6 (false negatives) 569 (true negatives) 575.6 
15.0 985 1000 
The predictive value of a positive x-ray in estimating surgery 
rates is 8.4 + 424 (2.9%). Of the 424 persons denied employment, 
416 (98%) would never require back surgery! 
Besides illustrating the inaccuracy of x-ray screening, the preced-
ing tables demonstrate that predictive value depends heavily on the 
percentage of the entire population with the tested-for condition. 
This is known as prevalence.286 Even procedures with high degrees 
of sensitivity and specificity will have relatively low predictive values 
if the prevalence of the condition is low. 
Tables VI and VII assume that a test is both 99% sensitive and 
99% specific, higher than virtually any known medical tests.287 
TABLE VI 
DATA FOR CONDITION WITH 10% PREVALENCE 
positive 
negative 
Total 
1000 with condition 
990 
10 
1,000 
TABLE VII 
9000 without condition 
90 
8,910 
9,000 
DATA FOR CONDITION WITH 1% PREVALENCE 
positive 
negative 
Total 
100 with condition 
99 
99 
198 
9,900 without 
1 
9,801 
9,802 
By merely changing the prevalence rate from 10% to 1 %, the pre-
dictive value decreased from 92% (990 + 1080) to 50% (99 + 198). 
286. R. Galen & s. Gambino, BEYOND NORMALITY: THE PREDICTIVE VALUE AND EFFI· 
CIENCY OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSES 11 (1975). The term "incidence" refers to the frequency of a 
condition occurring within a stated period of time. Id. 
287. See id. at 12-13. 
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The preceding tables demonstrate the lack of scientific credence 
in mass screening of asymptomatic individuals to detect the presence 
of a trait or condition with a low prevalence rate. "Indiscriminate 
use of laboratory tests on subjects selected at random is doomed to 
failure if the prevalence of the disease is low."288 The following ta-
ble lists some of the most commonly screened-for biochemical ge-
netic markers and the prevalence rates in the highest risk groups. 
TABLE VIIl289 
Condition Prevalence 
Sickle cell trait 7-13% 
G-6-PD deficiency 11 % 
Alpha 1-antitrypsin 
deficiency (heterozygotes) 4-9% 
Thalassemia 0.1-8% 
Highest-Risk Group 
in America 
American blacks 
American black males 
Persons of northern 
European Ancestry 
Persons of Italian, Greek, 
and Syrian ancestry and 
blacks. 
Even if it were lawful to do so,290 the screening of only the high-
est risk groups would still be inaccurate because of the low preva-
lence rates. Laboratory testing procedures are only valuable when a 
history or physical examination suggests the need for additional in-
formation.291 Any employment decisions based on mass medical 
screening, therefore, are inherently suspect.292 
D. Personnel Actions as a Result of Medical Determinations 
Employment decisions based on medical assessments are often 
difficult to understand.293 Nevertheless, ample evidence indicates 
that employers refuse to hire applicants for such dubious reasons as 
288. Id. at 18. 
289. Table 8 is based on figures from E. CALABRESE, supra note 2, at 188-90. 
290. See Part III infra. 
291. R. GALEN & S. GAMBINO, supra note 286, at 18, 22; accord Ashenbourg, Routine 
Chest X-Ray Examinations in Occupational Medicine, 24 J. OccuP. MED. 18, 19 (1982). 
292. Another limitation on the usefulness of laboratory testing procedures generally is the 
problem of defining a "normal" test result. See R. GALEN & S. GAMBINO, supra note 286, at 
2-6; Young, How .Does One Interpret a Marginally Abnormal Serum Chemistry Test?, 24 J. 
OcCUP. MED. 104 {1982). · 
293. Although no systematic analysis has been made of how employee physical records 
affect employment decisioqs, the process has been characterized as a "black box" problem. An 
individual can find out what information was available and can know the outcome, but the 
individual may not know what decision processes produced the outcome. PRIVACY PROTEC-
TION, supra note 239, at 226 (citing unpublished memorandum by Michael Baker). 
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obesity, color blindness, arthritis, hypertension, allergies and vari-
cose veins.294 More substantial medical conditions reduce the 
chance of being hired still further. A 1974 poll of industrial physi-
cians attempted to assess whether they would recommend hiring a 
hypothetical thirty-eight-year-old applicant with a history of myo-
cardial infarction, angina, valvular disease, hypertension, diabetes, 
proteinuria, tuberculosis or psychiatric illness.295 The physicians 
seemed more concerned about possible liability for further injury or 
illness than about possible increased compensation rates or loss of 
work time.296 In addition, the nature of the illness outweighed the 
exertion required by the job.297 The study concluded that "even pa-
tients with mild illnesses, which may not increase their morbidity or 
mortality, are being denied work. The criteria used for determining 
employability appear, in some cases, to have little relation to modem 
medical judgment."298 
As employers perform more medical procedures, they are more 
likely to produce abnormal findings.299 High unemployment in in-
dustrial jobs may reinforce increased screening because it allows an 
employer to disqualify "moderate" high-risk workers, knowing that 
it can fill its positions with theoretically lower risk workers. 
Because employees working under a collective bargaining agree-
ment often have ''.just cause" or "reasonableness" clauses in their 
contracts, arbitration decisions can provide information about medi-
cal reassignment and discharge for a class of employees with the 
most protection against unreasonable employer action. The arbitra-
tion cases generally confirm that employees have greater protection 
than applicants, but are still vulnerable to medical judgments. Arbi-
trators generally uphold the employer's prerogative to decide 
whether high-risk employees may remain on the job.300 Personnel 
294. See 103 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 236 (1980) (discussing terms of conciliation agreement 
between Varo Semiconductor, Inc. and Labor Department under which 85 applicants were to 
receive $225,000, and 32 applicants were placed on a preferential hiring list; action based on 
§ 503 of Rehabilitation Act). See generally s. LUSTERMAN, INDUSTRY ROLES IN HEALTH 
CARE 31 (1974) (concluding that medical examinations are used in selection and placement). 
295. Weinstock & Haft, The Effect of Illness on Employment Opportunities, 29 ARCH, 
ENVTL. HEALTH 79 (1974). 
296. Id. at 81. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. at 83; see also Craft, Benecki & Shkop, Who Hires the Seriously Handicapped?, 19 
INDUS. REL. 94 (1980) (study found that seriously handicapped workers are hired mostly by 
small, nonunion firms in the service industry). 
299. See R. GALEN & S. GAMBINO, supra note 286, at 3 ("the more tests performed on a 
healthy subject the more likely is the discovery of an abnormal result"). 
300. See Joy Mfg. Co., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1269 (1980) (Abrams, Arb.) (dermatitis); 
Ormet Corp., 80-1 LAB. ARB. AWARDS (CCH) ~ 8034 (1979) (Seinsheimer, Arb.) (dermatitis) 
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decisions based on unreliable medical evidence, however, will not 
stand.301 Discharges usually are upheld only where no "safe" posi-
tions are available.302 
Although most medical screening programs consist of several 
tests and procedures, some medical criteria lead to the automatic ex-
clusion of the applicant.303 Employers are extremely reluctant to re-
veal these factors, especially regarding genetic screening techniques. 
Anecdotal reports are difficult to confirm. 304 
In two areas of medical screening, employer policies are well 
known. First, most railroads in the United States use low-back x-
rays to screen out applicants believed to be susceptible to lumbo-
sacral back injury.305 Despite the extremely low predictive value of 
low-back x-rays, the railroads consider the practice cost-effective; re-
ducing only a few back injury claims can save the railroads 
thousands of dollars.Jo6 
Second, firms frequently remove fertile women from jobs involv-
ing possible exposure to teratogenic substances.307 This policy, al-
though based on questionable assumptions, has been implemented 
by many of the nation's largest companies.308 As many as 100,000 
note 574 infra, and accompanying text. But see Walworth County, 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1203 
(1974) (Moberly, Arb.) (obesity). 
301. See, e.g., Checker Taxi Co., 57 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 466 (1971) (Duff, Arb.); San Fran-
cisco Retailers Council, 57 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 482 (1971) (Wyckoff, Arb.). 
302. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Tire & Rubber Co., 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1078 (1972) (Simon, 
Arb.) (plant cleaner with ulcers and back injury); Cominco American, Inc., 52 Lab. Arb. 
(BNA) 1152 (1969) (Belcher, Arb.) (miner with emphysema). Where there are safe positions 
an employee's ability to transfer is a matter of contract. Compare West Penn Power Co., 67 
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1085 (1976) (Blue, Arb.) (utility line worker with acrophobia entitled to 
transfer under contract), with Eaton Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 729 (1979) (Porter, Arb.) (jun-
ior inspector with dermatitis not entitled to transfer to another job). 
303. See notes 295-98 supra and accompanying text. 
304. One employer reportedly hires only men over t.l_te age of 50 for work where there is 
exposure to a potent carcinogen with a long latency period. By the time the cancer would 
manifest itself, the men would be dying of old age anyhow. See also Severo, supra note 144 
(quoting Dr. John H. Weisburger, who suggested that hiring older people for carcinogenic 
exposures should be considered). 
305. Rockey, Fantel & Omenn,supra note l75;see Gift, Harris, Gard, Alexander & Potch-
en, Employment-Related Administrative Roentgenograms: Characteristics of Policy Fonnulation 
and Current Practice, 25 J. OccuP. MED. 34 (1983) (discussing nonmedical factors affecting 
use of x-rays). 
306. Rockey, Fantel & Omenn, supra note 175, at 210-11. See Rowe, Are Routine Spine 
Films on Workers in Industry Cost- or Risk-Benefit Effective?, 24 J. OccuP. MED. 41 (1982). 
307. See notes 539-65 infra and accompanying text. 
308. Some of the companies known to have such policies are Allied Chemical, American 
Cyanamid, B. F. Goodrich, Dow Chemical, DuPont, Firestone, General Motors, Goodyear, 
Gulf Oi~ Monsanto, Olin, St. Joe's Minerals, and Sun Oil. Z. HARSANYI & R. HUTTON, supra 
note 52, at 118; Mereson, Women Workers Are Sterilized or They Lose Their Jobs, CIVIL LIB-
ERTIES, July 1982, at 6; Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of 
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jobs already are closed to women.309 
Ill. LEGAL ISSUES 
Exclusionary policies based on screening criteria with low predic-
tive values are certainly unfair. But what about exclusionary policies 
based on tests with presumably higher predictive values? Are they 
discriminatory? For example, scientific authorities and employers 
who defend sickle cell trait screening argue that the racial impacts 
are unfortunate, but incidental. It would be irresponsible, they as-
sert, to permit employees with sickle trait to work in extreme envi-
ronments. Therefore they maintain that exclusionary policies serve 
the best health interests of the employees and the best economic in-
terests of the employer. 310 Opponents of these practices contend that 
exclusionary policies shift the focus from the work environment to 
the genes of the worker, and that they exclude only the traditional 
victims of discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin.311 
In analyzing the legal issues raised by medical screening of em-
ployees, questions outnumber answers for two reasons: many sophis-
ticated medical screening procedures are relatively new, and most 
existing labor laws were enacted to deal with quite different matters, 
such as unionization and employment discrimination. Conse-
quently, existing laws must stretch to their outermost reaches, new 
theories of applicability must develop, or new legislation must be 
enacted. 
A. The Occupational Sefety and Health Act 
Of all federal and state laws, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Tille VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 647-53 
(1981). 
309. See note 541 infra. 
310. See generally Stokinger & Scheel, supra note 27; Stokinger, Historic Aspects of Occu-
pational Health Standards and the Sensitive Worker, 3 ANNALS AM. CONF. GOVT. INDUS, HY-
GIENISTS 65 (1982). 
311. See Severo, Screening of Blacks by DuPont Sharpens Debate on Gene Tests, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 4, 1980, at Al, col. 5, Al3, col. I (race); Genetic Screening Hearings, supra note 
136, at 35-36 (testimony of Jeanne Stellman) (sex). 
To view this debate from a slightly different perspective, consider the following hypotheti-
cal. XYZ Company, a large, multinational corporation headquartered in the United States, 
has an opening for the position of Director of International Operations, a high-paying and 
glamorous job requiring frequent worldwide travel. Many XYZ executives apply for the job. 
Some of the travel involves going to portions of Africa where malaria is rampant. Persons 
with sickle cell trait face a significantly decreased risk of contracting malaria. See Z. HAR• 
SANY! & R. HUTTON, supra note 52, at 149-53. Therefore, XYZ medical department recom-
mends that employees without sickle cell trait be disqualified from the position. Such a policy 
would eliminate some of the black applicants, but all of the white applicants. What is XYZ 
Company likely to do? 
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Act (OSHA)312 most directly affects employer medical practices. 
The Act seeks to implement its purpose, "To assure so far as possible 
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful 
working conditions and to preserve our human resources,"313 among 
other ways: 
(6) by exploring ways to discover diseases, establishing causal connec-
tions between diseases and work in environmental conditions, and con-
ducting other research relating to health problems, in recognition of 
the fact that occupational health standards present problems often dif-
ferent from those involved in occupational safety; 
(7) by providing medical criteria which will assure insofar as practica-
ble that no employee will suffer diminished health, functional capacity, 
or life expectancy as a result of his work experience. 3 14 
OSHA health standards place great reliance on medical examina-
tions and include provisions for medical surveillance, medical re-
moval protection and employee access to medical records. 
Nevertheless, OSHA fails to address two important considerations: 
first, the Labor Department has not developed criteria for defining, 
screening or protecting high-risk employees; second, the Act does not 
regulate how employers may use medical surveillance information. 
1. Protective Standards 
The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygien-
ists (ACGIH) set 450 threshold limit values (TL V s),315 which OSHA 
adopted in 1971 as established federal standards pursuant to section 
6(a).316 These TLVs did not attempt to deal with the problem of 
312. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Under the Act all rulemaking and 
enforcement authority is vested in the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) and is administered by 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), §§ 6-10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 655-659 
(1976 & Supp. V. 1981). The Act authorizes the Secretary to conduct inspections, § 8, 29 
U.S.C. § 657 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), and to issue citations,§ 9, 29 U.S.C. § 658 (1976), against 
employers found to be in violation of the Act's "general duty clause," § 5(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 654(a)(I) (1976), note 357 infra, or specific standards promulgated by the Secretary, § 5(a)(2), 
29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1976). The employer or any employee may challenge a citation by filing 
a notice of contest within 15 working days. § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 659 (1976). The administrative 
adjudicatory function for contested enforcement proceedings is vested in the Occupational 
Safety and Health Review Commission, an independent agency composed of three presiden-
tially-appointed commissioners. § 12, 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Judicial review 
of OSHA rulemaking and Commission adjudication may be obtained in the United States 
Courts of Appeals, §§ 6(f), I l(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(f), 660(a)-(b) (1976 & Supp V 1981). 
313. 29 u.s.c. § 651(b) (1976). 
314. 29 u.s.c. § 651(6)-(7). 
315. A threshold limit value (TLV) represents the maximum time-weighted average con-
centration to which a healthy worker may be exposed for a normal 40-hour week, up to eight 
hours a day, over a working lifetime (40-50 years) without becoming ill. N. TRUEFF, ENVI-
RONMENT AND HEALTH 221 (1980); see Steinberg, A CGIH TL V's and the Sensitive Worker, 3 
ANNALS AM. CONF. GOVT. INDUS. HYGIENISTS, 77 (1982). 
316. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Under§ 6(a) of the Act the Secretary of 
Labor was initially authorized to adopt "established federal standards" and "national consen-
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high-risk workers. Similarly, in setting permissible exposure limits 
(PELs)317 under section 6(b),318 OSHA made no special provisions 
for high-risk workers. Section 6(b)(5)319 provides that, in promulgat-
ing standards regulating toxic substances or harmful physical agents, 
the Secretary must set standards to assure, to the extent feasible, that 
"no employee" will suffer material impairment of health, even if ex-
posed for his or her entire working life.320 As documented earlier in 
this Article, however, all humans vary in their susceptibility to ill-
ness;321 only zero exposure limits could protect all employees from 
the risk of occupational disease.322 In Industrial Union .Department 
v. American Petroleum Institute,323 the plurality opinion rejected 
OSHA's policy of setting the PEL for carcinogens at the lowest feasi-
ble level. Instead, the Secretary must determine that a standard is 
reasonably necessary or appropriate to remedy a significant risk of 
material health impairment.324 A PEL designed to safeguard rela-
sus standards" as the agency's own regulations governing workplace conditions. In doing so, 
the Secretary could bypass the lengthy rulemaking procedures of both § 6(b), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 655(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 3(9), 29 U.S.C. § 652(9) (1976), defines "national consensus 
standard" as "any occupational safety and health standard or modification thereof which 
(!) has been adopted and promulgated by a nationally recognized standards-producing organi-
zation under procedures whereby it can be determined by the Secretary that persons interested 
and affected by the scope of provisions of the standard have reached substantial agreement on 
its adoption, (2) was formulated in a manner which afforded an opportunity for diverse views 
to be considered and (3) has been designated as such a standard by the Secretary, after consul-
tation with other appropriate Federal agencies." Section 3(10), 29 U.S.C. § 652(10) (1976), 
defines "established federal standard" as "any occupational safety and health standard estab-
lished by any agency of the United States and presently in effect, or contained in any Act of 
Congress in force on December 29, 1970." 
This special rulemaking authority, which expired after two years, was included in the Act 
to assure that workers would be protected as soon as possible after the statute's effective date. 
See Beliles, OSHA Occupational Health Standards and the Sensitive Worker, 3 ANNALS OF 
CONF. GOVT. INDUS. HYGlcNISTS 71 (1982). 
317. A permissible exposure limit (PEL) is an employee's permitted exposure to any mate-
rial listed in Table Z-1, Z-2, or Z-3 of the OSHA standard on air contaminants, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1910.1000 (1981). NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, FUNDAMENTALS OF INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE 
1210 (2d ed. 1979). The OSHA Tables include ceiling values (exposure levels that should 
never be exceeded), eight-hour time-weighted averages, see note 315 supra, and acceptable 
maximum peak concentrations and maximum peak durations. 
318. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
319. 29 u.s.c § 655(b)(5). 
320. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (emphasis added). For judicial construction of §6(b)(5), see 
generally American Texile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
321. See Part I supra. 
322. See Ames, Ident!Jj,ing Environmental Chemicals Causing Mutagens and Cancer, 204 
SCIENCE 587 {1979). 
323. 44~ U.S. 607 (1980). 
324. 448 U.S. at 635-37, 652-53. Based on this decision, OSHA is reconsidering its "ge-
neric carcinogen" standard. 
May 1983] Occupational Illness 1427 
tively few sensitive workers might be struck down as not being rea-
sonably necessary or appropriate. 
The Supreme Court's decision inAmerican Textile Manufacturers 
Institute, Inc. v. Donovan 325 presents a second potential stumbling 
block to an "absolute" standard. While rejecting the argument that 
"feasible" in section 6(b)(5) requires or permits cost-benefit analysis, 
the Court held that "feasible" includes both technological and eco-
nomic considerations. 326 A PEL designed to safeguard the health of 
relatively few sensitive workers might be struck down as economi-
cally infeasible. 327 
Despite the limitations on OSHA's authority, some OSHA health 
standards, such as those regulating arsenic,328 lead329 and acryloni-
trile,330 offer protection for sensitive employees by requiring medical 
surveillance for all employees exposed to concentrations above the 
"action level."331 If harmful effects are detected, personal protective 
equipment, administrative controls (such as shift rotation), medical 
removal or other measures may be taken.332 Some other health stan-
dards, such as cotton dust333 and benzene,334 also have addressed, to 
some extent, the problems of sensitive workers. 
At least one such standard has survived judicial scrutiny. In 
325. 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
326. 452 U.S. at 506-22. 
327. According to Assistant Secretary of Labor Thome G. Auchter, every new standard 
must now meet four requirements: (I) it must be addressed to a hazard presenting a significant 
risk to workers; (2) it must be demonstrated that the standard will reduce the risk; (3) the 
standard must be technologically and economically feasible on an industry-wide basis; and 
(4) the standard must be the most efficient, or cost-effective, way to protect workers. See 
Shabecoff, Sefety Agency to Forgo "Cost-Benefit Analysis,'' N.Y. Times, July 13, 1981, at Al 1, 
col. I. 
328. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1018 (1982). 
329. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1982). 
330. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1045 (1982). 
331. An action level is an exposure level below the PEL that initiates an employer's legal 
requirement to conduct medical surveillance, environmental monitoring, or other measures. 
Failure to conduct required preplacement examinations may lead to citation. See General 
Engr. & Machine Works, 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1936, 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) ~ 25,402 (1981); 
Research Cottrell, Inc., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1489, 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) ~ 25,284 (1981) 
(asbestos). 
332. InAmerican Petroleum Institute, the Supreme Court's plurality opinion supported the 
principle of action level medical screening, observing that it "could ensure that workers who 
were unusually susceptible . . . could be removed from exposure before they had suffered any 
permanent damage." 448 U.S. at 658. 
333. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043(h)(2)(iii) (1982) (adjusting pulmonary function scores for 
blacks because of "ethnic differences"). 
334. See Industrial Union Dept., v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 700 (1980) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (standard designed to minimize effects of exposure for "susceptible 
individuals"). 
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United Steelworkers of America v. Marshal/,335 the lead industry ar-
gued that no feasible lead standard could protect fertile women and 
therefore that fertile women should be excluded from the workplace 
or "counseled out" on a case-by-case basis. The D.C. Circuit rejected 
this argument and held: (1) OSHA has statutory authority to protect 
the fetuses of lead-exposed working mothers; (2) lead also poses a 
severe threat to t~e reproductive capacity of male employees; and (3) 
OSHA proved that blood-lead levels contemplated by the standard 
could protect fertile women if supplemented by other provisions of 
the standard, such as medical removal protection. 336 
2. Employer Use of Medical Surveillance Information 
In general, OSHA has not tried to regulate determinations by 
physicians of the medical fitness of employees.337 Moreover, OSHA 
provides little or no guidance to company medical personnel regard-
ing fitness determinations and employment decisionmaking.338 
From a purely medical standpoint, the identification of high-risk 
335. 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). 
336. 647 F.2d at 1256-59 & n.96. 
337. One itotable exception concerns the "multiple physician review" procedure. In Tay-
lor Diving & Salvage Co. v. United States Dept. of Labor, 599 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1979), the 
Fifth Circuit struck down the medical examination provision of the commercial diving stan-
dard. The standard required medical examination of employees who were to be exposed to 
hyperbaric conditions. An employee found unfit by the examining physician selected by the 
employer could seek a second opinion. If the first two physicians disagreed, a third physician, 
selected by the first two physicians, would resolve the issue. The employer bore all costs. 
The Fifth Circuit, citing its decision inAPI, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), ajfd. sub nom. 
Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980), struck down the 
standard. "The employer has no control over the third doctor's fitness standards, so that the 
employer is prevented from setting higher standards for employees than the secondary exam-
ining doctors chose to set." 599 F.2d at 625. Thus, the court not only protected the employer's 
right to screen employees, but also precluded OSHA regulation of the screening procedures. 
In United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 
913 (1981), the D.C. Circuit upheld the multiple physician review procedure of the lead stan-
dard. According to the court, the provision is authorized by § 6(b)(7)'s broad mandate to 
require examinations that can "most effectively determine" a threat to worker health. The 
decision may be limited to the lead standard. Because lead diseases are often difficult to diag-
nose, multiple physician review increases the chances of a correct diagnosis. In addition, com-
pany physicians frequently engage in the unsound and even harmful practice of prophylactic 
chelation to reduce the blood-lead levels of employees. The court distinguished Taylor, where 
employees could force the employer to retain employees considered unfit by its own physician 
and standards. In the lead standard, the multiple physician review procedure only prevented 
excess exposure of "leaded" employees in conjunction with the medical removal protection. 
The employer could still impose more stringent fitness standards. 647 F.2d at 1238-40 & n.76. 
338. OSHA health standards require a wide range of medical histories, specific examina-
tions and laboratory procedures for exposed employees. See notes 269-71 supra and accompa-
nying text; see also OSHA Instruction CPL 2-2.30 (Nov. 14, 1980) (authorization for review of 
medical opinions). Nevertheless, OSHA has not published guidelines about what information 
obtained from a medical history is significant, what clinical symptoms are meaningful, or what 
test measurements indicate increased risk. OSHA standards simply require that these medical 
services be performed. 
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workers is extremely difficult. The most knowledgeable and exper-
ienced occupational physicians frequently differ in their judgments. 
Considering that only 11.4% of employees work in a plant with a 
full-time physician,339 the need for more concrete medical guidance 
is plain. 
From a legal standpoint, OSHA's refusal to speak specifically to 
the question of medical screening leaves everyone in the dark. 
OSHA standards provide that in a preplacement examination the 
physician must consider a wide range of sensitive and controversial 
matters such as fertility, pregnancy, cigarette smoking, alcohol in-
take and genetic factors. 340 The use of any of these factors may have 
serious legal consequences, yet OSHA provides medical, personnel 
or legal departments with no guidelines on how this information 
may or may not be used. 
OSHA's only attempt to regulate the effects on employment of 
medical examinations involves medical removal protection (MRP) 
and rate retention (RR) of previously exposed employees. When a 
periodic medical examination reveals the adverse effects of exposure 
to the toxic substance, the employee is removed from further expo-
sure until it is medically advisable for the employee to return. RR 
requires the maintenance of wage and benefit levels during the pe-
riod of medical removal. Thus, MRP and RR attempt to protect 
employee health without reducing employee benefits, thereby shift-
ing the economic burden to the employer and ultimately to the 
consumer. 
MRP and RR provisions in OSHA health standards have be-
come increasingly stringent. For example, the vinyl chloride stan-
dard provides for MRP, but not RR;341 the asbestos standard 
provides for MRP if respirators are ineffective, but requires RR only 
if a position is available.342 The lead standard contains the most 
sweeping MRP and RR provision.343 Employees whose blood-lead 
levels exceed the specified limit or who show symptoms of lead dis-
ease must be removed until the employees' blood-lead returns to an 
acceptable level and their general health is good. The employer may 
339. 3 NOHS, supra note 226, at 30 (Survey Analysis and Supplemental Tables). 
340. According to OSHA Instruction STD 1-23.4 (Aug. 22, 1980) the term "genetic fac-
tors" does not require genetic testing of any employee and does not require the exclusion of 
otherwise qualified employees from jobs on the basis of genetic testing. 
341. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017(k)(5) (1982). See generally Society of Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 
509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975). 
342. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.100l(d)(2)(iv)(c) (1982). See generally Industrial Union Dept. v. 
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
343. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(k) (1982). 
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transfer employees to a non-lead plant, low-lead area of a plant, or 
may keep them in a high-lead area for a shorter work week. No 
matter how removed, employees retain their earnings rate, seniority 
and benefit levels for up to eighteen months. Upon return they must 
be restored to their original job status. 
In United Steelworkers of America v. Marsha/1,344 the D.C. Cir-
cuit upheld the validity of the MRP and RR provision. The lead 
industry argued that Congress did not intend to mandate MRP and 
RR under OSHA because the Act is silent on this subject,345 while 
the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (CMHSA),346 passed 
the year before OSHA, contained an MRP provision. The court re-
jected this argument, noting that the CMHSA covered a single in-
dustry and was drafted with much greater specificity than OSHA. 347 
The industry next argued that the provision violated section 4(b)(4)'s 
prohibition on OSHA interference with workers' compensation. Al-
though acknowledging the "seriousness" of this argument,348 the 
court noted the limited duration and scope of RR benefits,349 and 
indicated that fewer workers will benefit from this provision as the 
PEL is lowered.35° Finally, the court rejected the argument that 
MRP and RR violate the national labor policy of leaving all sub-
stantive provisions of labor-management relations to collective bar-
gaining. Simply because earnings protection is a mandatory subject 
of bargaining and could be adopted through collective bargaining 
does not mean OSHA has no authority to mandate such a 
program.351 
In American Textile Manefacturers Institute, Inc. v . .Donovan, 352 
the Supreme Court struck down the MRP and RR provision of the 
cotton dust standard as promulgated and remanded it to the Secre-
tary for further consideration. Although the Court did not decide 
whether OSHA has the statutory authority to promulgate any regu-
344. 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). 
345. 647 F.2d at 1232. 
346. Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1976 
& Supp. I 1977)). 
347. 647 F.2d at 1232. 
348. 647 F.2d at 1234-35; see also 641 F.2d at 1319-20 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). 
349. For example, there is no payment for medical expenses. 
350. 647 F.2d at 1236. 
351. 647 F.2d at 1236; cf. Salazar v. Marathon Oil Co., 90 Lab Cas. (CCH) ~ 33,985 (S.D. 
Tex. 1980) (no violation of Equal Pay Act where employer paid long-time male employees at 
higher rates than female employees performing same job where male employees were medi-
cally removed with rate retention from prior job). 
352. 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
May 1983] Occupational Illness 1431 
lation containing MRP and RR, 353 the Court held that OSHA failed 
to publish a statement of reasons354 explaining why the MRP and 
RR provisions were needed to protect worker health and safety.355 
Besides OSHA standards, the Act's general duty clause, section 
S(a)(l), may be used to protect high-risk workers. InAmerican Cyan-
amid Co., 356 the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion faced the question of whether the employer's policy, which 
excluded from certain employment all fertile women aged sixteen to 
fifty, constituted a "hazard" under section S(a)(l) of OSHA.357 Five 
women employed in the lead pigments department submitted to sur-
gical sterilization in order to retain their positions.358 A majority of 
the Commission held that "Congress did not intend the Act to apply 
353. 452 U.S. at 537-38. In United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981), the D.C. Circuit held that "a program of earnings 
protection for removed workers lies within OSHA's statutory power." 647 F.2d at 1236-37. 
The court then held that MRP is a legitimate exercise of that power. 647 F.2d at 1237-38. 
354. Section 6(e), 29 U.S.C. § 655(e) (1976), requires the Secretary of Labor to publish a 
statement of reasons in the Federal Register to explain the basis for, among other things, 
agency rulemaking activity. 
355. 452 U.S. at 537-38. OSHA's reason for promulgating the MRP and RR provisions, 
which the Court termed ''post hoc rationalization," 452 U.S. at 539, was that employees are 
reluctant to participate in medical surveillance programs or to disclose symptoms of disease if 
they fear being discharged or transferred to a lower-paying job. 452 U.S. at 539. The D.C. 
Circuit held that MRP under the lead standard was reasonable based on this consideration and 
that this rationale was sufficiently articulated in the statement of reasons. United Steelworkers 
v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); see 
Note, The Validity of Medical Removal Protection in OSHA~ Lead Standard, 59 TEX. L. REV. 
1461 (1981). 
The case is mainly noted for its holding that§ 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976), does 
not require or permit the Secretary to engage in cost-benefit analysis in promulgating stan-
dards dealing with toxic substances or harmful physical agents, but it would be a mistake to 
dismiss this aspect of the decision as merely the Court's response to a procedural blunder by 
the Secretary. According to the Court, "the Act in no way authorizes OSHA to repair general 
unfairness to employees that is unrelated to achievement of health and safety goals .... " 452 
U.S. at 540. Therefore, any wide-ranging attempt by OSHA to improve employment terms 
and opportunities for high-risk workers may fall outside OSHA's authority. 
It is not clear whether the Court deliberately chose not to limit this statement to occupa-
tional "health and safety goals." Were this choice of words deliberate, it would have major 
implications for other types of OSHA cases. It is unlikely, however, that this dictum would be 
construed as authorizing OSHA to remedy employee safety and health problems that are not 
"directly" or "indirectly" related to their employment. 
356. 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1596, 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) ~ 25,338 (1981), petition for 
review filed, No. 81-1687 (D.C. Cir. June 22, 1981). 
357. Section 5(a)(l) (1976), provides: 
Sec. S(a) Each employer-
(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which 
are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious 
physical harm to his employees. 
See generally M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW ch. 6 (2d ed. 1983). 
358. An employment discrimination case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976), as amended by the 1978 Pregnancy Amendments, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(k) (Supp. III 1979), is still pending. Christman v. American Cyanamid Co., No. 80-
0024 (N.D. W. Va., filed Jan. 30, 1980); see notes 539-65 infra and accompanying text. 
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to every conceivable aspect of employer-employee relations and that 
due to its unique characteristics this condition of employment is not 
a hazard within the meaning of the general duty clause."359 "Haz-
ard" was defined to mean processes and materials which cause in-
jury and disease by operating directly upon employees as they 
engage in work or work-related activities.360 
Section 8(c)(3)361 directs the Secretary to issue regulations requir-
ing employers "to maintain accurate records of employee exposures 
to potentially toxic materials or harmful physical agents which are 
required to be monitored or measured under section 6." In 1980 
OSHA promulgated its final rule granting employees a right of ac-
cess to exposure and medical records. The primary purpose of this 
important regulation is "to enable workers to play a meaningful role 
in their own health management."362 Although the access regulation 
is being challenged in court,363 and has also been criticized for, 
among other reasons, encroaching upon employee privacy, trade 
359. 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1599, 1981 O.S.H. DEc. (CCH) at 31,430 (footnote omitted); 
if. Union Carbide Corp., 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) ~ 25,751 (1981) (AU) (affirming§ 5(a)(I) 
violation based on employer's assigning a sensitized employee to an area with exposure to the 
sensitizing chemical). 
360. In dissent, Commissioner Cottine charged that the sterilizations resulted from a con-
dition of employment imposed by the employer, and therefore should be considered a hazard 
subject to the "general duty clause" - § 5(a)(I). Moreover, he cautioned that "the exclusion 
of fertile women from certain employment invites employers to exclude other highly suscepti-
ble groups from employment when the effect varies among the exposed classes of individuals." 
9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1605, 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) at 31,436. 
361. 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(3) (1976). 
362. 45 Fed. Reg. 35,213 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20 (1982)). Workers' "right 
to know" laws, requiring employers to inform employees of exposure to toxic and carcinogenic 
substances, have been enacted in at least nine states. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 6408 (Deering 
1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 82-251 (effective July I, 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, 
§§ 1701-1707 (West Supp. 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, §§ 142A-142B (Michie/Law. Co-
op. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 408.101 l(c) (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. LAB, LAW§§ 875-
883 (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE§ 49.17.220 (1981); W. VA. CODE§ 21-3-18 (1981); Wts. 
STAT. ANN.§§ 101.58-101.599 (West Supp. 1982); see also West Virginia Mfrs. Assn. v. West 
Virginia, 542 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) (upholding constitutionality of West Virginia 
"right to know" law). 
363. See Louisiana Chem. Assn. v. Bingham, 657 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1981). On July 13, 
1982, OSHA proposed revisions of the access to exposure and medical records standard. 47 
Fed. Reg. 30,420 (1982) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20). The following six proposals 
would "relax" some of the requirements of the standard: I) to be covered by the standard, an 
employee must have direct, rather than incidental, exposure to toxic substances; 2) exposure 
records would be defined to include only environmental and biological monitoring results and 
material safety data sheets, but not purchase orders or other records showing the identity of a 
substance; 3) the standard would apply only to 3,492 substances in the NIOSH Registry of 
Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances (RTECS) that meet certain toxicity standards, rather 
than all 39,000 substances in the RTECS; 4) medical records would have to be retained for the 
duration of employment plus five years, or for 30 years after the beginning of employment, 
whichever is longer, rather than duration of employment plus 30 years; 5) x-rays would be 
allowed to be stored on microfilm; and 6) employers would be permitted to seek monetary 
damages for breaches of trade secret confidentiality agreements. 
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secrets and corporate medical practice, 364 one can see how a more 
far-reaching medical record standard could protect high-risk 
workers. 
The present standard allows employees to see their medical 
records. Mere access, however, may not h~lp some employees. For 
example, an employee's medical file may contain the diagnosis of a 
disease, such as epilepsy or heart disease, which subsequent exami-
nation by the employee's own physicians proves to be inaccurate. 
Nevertheless, the employee's medical file may contain only the ini-
tial erroneous diagnosis. Few legal safeguards prevent dissemina-
tion of employee medical files both within and without a 
company.365 Consequently, the employee may receive adverse treat-
ment in insurance, employment opportunity, credit and other mat-
ters based on the contents of his or her medical file. 
The obvious solution is to give employees the right to amend 
their files. The next step would be to prohibit employers from dis-
criminating on the basis of erroneous information after it had been 
corrected.366 Finally, if an employer may not discriminate based on 
erroneous medical data, discrimination based on unreliable medical 
data could be prohibited.367 This would, however, be tantamount to 
permitting all employees to contest the reasonablen~ss of any medi-
cally related company decision, raising complex scientific questions 
of expert opinion, laboratory procedures and diagnoses. A new pro-
cedural system would be needed to adjudicate these claims.368 Prac-
364. See Rose, Conflicting Views on the Issue of Accessibility, OccuP. HEALTH & SAFETY, 
Jan. 1981, at 33; Controversy in Medicine: Access lo Employee Health Records, 241 J. A.M.A. 
777 (1979). 
365. See notes 609-22 infra and accompanying text. 
366. An antidiscrimination provision could be promulgated pursuant to§ l l(c), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 660(c) (1976), or it could be based solely on the "revised" theoretical access regulation. 
Unionized employees would probably be protected from wrongful discharge through the 
grievance arbitration process. See Wol.kinson, Arbitration and the Employment Rights of the 
Physically Disadvantaged, 36 ARB. J., Mar. 1981 at 23; Part III-D infra. As of 1976, however, 
only 24.8% of nonagricultural employees were unionized. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1979, at 427, and 
nonunionized employees can be, in almost all cases, terminated at will. See notes 645-59 infra 
and accompanying text. 
367. See notes 176-78 supra and accompanying text. 
368. A new procedural system would be needed to consider these claims. The Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Commission, already backlogged, see Rothstein, OSHA After 
Ten Years: A Review and Some Proposed Reforms, 34 VAND. L. REv. 71, I 15-18 (1981), is not 
equipped to handle these cases. Any arbitration system would need to be part of a sweeping 
new program for protecting at-will employees from wrongful discharge. See generally Peck, 
Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. I 
(1979) (discussing need for legislation to protect "at-will" employees from unjust discharge); 
Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time far A Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 
481 (1976) (discussing the feasibility of protecting employees from unjust disciplinary action 
through arbitration). 
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tical and political considerations suggest that new worker rights in 
this area are unlikely to be achieved via the access regulation. 
The Act's antidiscrimination clause offers an alternative ap-
proach. Section 1 l(c)(l)369 provides, in pertinent part: "No person 
shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee 
. . . because of the exercise of such employee on behalf of himself or 
others of any right afforded by this Act." Because this is the only 
'job security" section of the Act, it deserves attention as a possible 
means of protecting high-risk workers. This provision and OSHA's 
regulations implementing it370 have been broadly construed by the 
courts.371 Moreover, section ll(c)(2)372 authorizes the Secretary to 
bring an action on behalf of any discriminatee in United States dis-
trict court to restrain violations of section l l(c)(l) and to obtain all 
appropriate relief, including reinstatement and back pay.373 
OSHA regulations374 provide that disciplinary measures taken by 
an employer solely in response to an employee's refusal to comply 
with safety and health regulations is not considered discrimination 
in violation of section ll(c). An argument could be made that sec-
tion ll(c) prohibits the discharge of an employee for violating the 
Act, when, in fact, the employee has not violated the Act. Similarly, 
this would prohibit the discharge of an employee when the employer 
erroneously claims that an employee's employment violates the 
Act.375 Because OSHA regulations define "employee" to include job 
applicants,376 applicants could argue that refusal to hire a high-risk 
worker in the erroneous belief that hiring that individual would vio-
late the Act would violate section ll(c). 
Even if OSHA wanted to ~xtend its antidiscrimination protec-
369. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(l} (1976). 
370. 29 C.F.R. Part 1977 (1982). 
371. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. I, 8-13 (1980) (upholding validity of 
29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1974), prohibiting discrimination against employee who walks off 
the job because of good faith belief that performing assigned work would involve a real danger 
of death or serious physical injury, where the employee was unable to obtain correction of the 
condition by the employer, and there was insufficient time to eliminate the danger through 
resort to regular statutory enforcement channels). See generally M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 
357, at§ 208. 
372. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (1976). 
373. Individuals may not proceed on their own, even if the Secretary refuses to bring an 
action on their behalf. Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256, 263-64 (6th Cir. 1980). 
374. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.22 (1982). 
375. For example, an employee might be discharged because the employer erroneously 
considers the employee likely to manifest symptoms indicative of unlawfully high exposure 
levels. The employer action could even be taken after a periodic biological monitoring of the 
employee, as mandated by the OSHA standard, indicated an "abnormal" reading. 
376. See 29 C.F.R. § 1977.S(b) (1982) ("For purposes of section I l(c}, even an applicant 
for employment could be considered an employee."). 
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tions to the limit of its authority, such a strategy offers little hope. 
The agency is badly overworked377 and under-funded.378 Recent 
budget cuts at OSHA379 make it even less likely that new and com-
plex antidiscrimination protections could be enforced. 
3. NIOSH 
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NI-
OSH), established by section 22 of the Act,380 acts as OSHA's "re-
search arm." Based on its expertise and express statutory authority 
NIOSH could conduct extensive research on medical screening for 
susceptibility to occupational illness. NIOSH could analyze the sci-
entific basis for determining the risk of exposure to individuals, cer-
tify approved screening procedures and develop criteria for 
evaluating test and examination results. NIOSH, however, has no 
enforcement authority. Measures to protect individuals from arbi-
trary or unfair treatment must eventually be developed by OSHA or 
other agencies. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act was enacted to protect 
American workers. Congress intended that in eliminating workplace 
hazards all factors be considered, including psychological factors,381 
motivational and behavioral factors,382 and medical factors.383 
OSHA's regulation of workplace hazards has almost totally over-
looked the important role of occupational medical practices384 and, 
in particular, medical screening procedures. 
Based on section 6(b)(7) and section 20(a)(5), OSHA and NIOSH 
have statutory authority to implement the following 
recommendations: 
(1) research and identify those substances likely to cause adverse reac-
tions in sensitive employees; 
377. In fiscal year 1980, OSHA received over 3,500 discrimination complaints, which were 
handled by a staff of only 59. During the same year, the case backlog grew from 1,559 to over 
2,100. More importantly, 446 cases found to be meritorious could not be filed in district court 
because of inadequate resources. Rothstein, supra note 368, at 132-33. 
378. Id. at 133. 
379. See 11 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 419-20 (1981) (detailing staff reductions). 
380. 29 u.s.c. § 671 (1976). 
381. § 2(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 65l(b)(5) (1976); § 20(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(l) (1976). 
382. § 20(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 65l(b)(6) (1976); § 20(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(5) (1976). 
383. § 2(b)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 65l(b)(6) (1976); § 20(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(5) (1976). 
384. The lead standard's prohibition of prophylactic chelation, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(j)(4) 
(1982), is a notable exception to OSHA's history of noninvolvement with regulating occupa-
tional medical practices. See generally United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1237 
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). 
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(2) research and identify those individuals most likely to be sensitive 
to various substances found in the workplace; 
(3) research an.d certify those testing and screening procedures that 
have proven medical validity and confirmed predictive value;385 
(4) research and delineate the necessary guidelines for evaluating the 
results of approved testing and screening procedures;386 
(5) research and develop medical criteria for using testing and screen-
ing data in reaching overall medical conclusions, giving due con-
sideration to the effects of all relevant information, including 
personal history, multiple factor interaction and synergistic effects; 
(6) investigate what protective policies, such as medical removal pro-
. tection and rate retention, are reasonably necessary or appropriate 
to protect the safety and health of high-risk workers; and 
(7) develop detailed guidelines for the permissible personnel action 
that may be taken as a result of employee medical examinations. 
Until OSHA and NIOSH take the initiative to regulate medical 
screening, employees must seek relief from discrimination under 
other statutes. 
B. The Rehabilitation Act and State Fair Employment Laws 
1. Background 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973387 was the first comprehensive 
federal effort to bring handicapped individuals within the main-
stream of American life. 388 The Act sought, among other things, to 
extend "the guarantee of equal opportunity" to the handicapped.389 
Sections 503390 and 504391 bear directly on the employment rights of 
the handicapped.392 
385. Some degree of certification is already done. For example, under the lead standard 
all blood-level analyses must be conducted by a laboratory licensed or approved by the Cen• 
ters for Disease Control. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025G)(2)(c)(ili) (1982). NIOSH also has been in• 
volved in testing and certifying respirators. See l EMPL. S. & H. GUIDE (CCH) ~ 1,046A 
(1981) (list of respirators approved by NIOSH and MSHA). 
386. Id. 
387. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
388. Most of the earlier laws were post-war acts to aid returning members of the armed 
services, such as the vocational Rehabilitation Acts, Pub. L. No. 66-236, 41 Stat. 735 (1920), 
the La Follette Barden Act, Pub. L. No. 78-113, 57 Stat. 374 (1943), the Vocational Rehabilita• 
tion Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-565, 68 Stat. 652 (1954) (current version at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 31-42 (1976)), and the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 
U.S.C. § 2012 (1976). Other laws attempted to aid the needy handicapped by providing jobs 
considered to be suitable for the handicapped, as illustrated by the Randolph-Sheppard Act of 
1936, 20 U.S.C. §§ 107-107f(l976), which licensed qualified blind persons to operate vending 
stands in government buildings. 
389. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. III 1979). 
390. 29 u.s.c. § 793 (1976). 
391. 29 u.s.c. § 794 (1976). 
392. § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1976), protects federal government employees against discrim• 
ination on the basis of handicap. See Shirey v. Devine, 670 F.2d 1188, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1982); 
Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 301-03 (5th Cir. 1981). In addition, largely 
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Section 503 provides that any contract in excess of $2500 entered 
into with any federal department or agency shall contain a provision 
requiring that the contracting party take affirmative action to employ 
and promote qualified handicapped individuals. 393 The term "hand-
icapped individual" is defined as "any person who (A) has a physical 
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such 
person's major life activities, (B) has a record of such an impairment, 
or (C) is regarded as having such an impairment."394 Based on this 
broad statutory definition, and on the definition contained in the im-
plementing regulations,395 as many as forty million to sixty-eight 
as a result of the federal initiative, 41 states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws 
prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of handicap. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; 
ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(I) (1981); COLO. REY. STAT. § 24-34-801 (1982); CONN. GEN. 
STAT.§§ 1-lf, 46(a)-60 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN.§ 6-1705 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 413.08(3) 
(1979); GA. CODE ANN.§§ 66-501 to -506 (Supp. 1982); HAWAII REY. STAT.§§ 378-1(7), 378-2, 
378-9 (1976 & Supp. 1980); Ill. Human Rights Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-102(A), 1-
103(1), 2-102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); IND. CODE§§ 22-9-11 to 22-9-13 (1980); IOWA CODE 
ANN. §§ 601A.2(1 I), .6(1) (1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1002(j), 44-1009(a)(I) (1981); KY. 
REV. STAT. §§ 207.130(2), .150(1) (1982); LA. REY. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-2251 to -2256 (West 
1982); ME. REY. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4553.7-A, 4572 (West 1979); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 49B, 
§§ 49B-15(g), 16 (1957 & Rep!. vol. 1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24K (Michie/Law. Co-
op. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.1103, 37.1202 (1979); MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01(25), .03(2) 
(1980); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-6-15 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-102, 49-2-101(13), -
101(16), 49-2-303 (1981); NEB. REY. STAT. §§ 48-1102(8), -1104, -1108(1) (1978); NEY. REY. 
STAT. §§ 613.330, .350(1), .350(2) (1979); N.H. REY. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:3(13), -A:8 (Supp. 
1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 10:5-4.1, -5(q) (West Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 28-10-9 to 
28-10-12 (1978); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 292(21), 296(1) (McKinney 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 128-15.3 (1981); OHIO REY. CODE ANN.§§ 4112.01(13), .02(A) (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
25, §§ 1301.4, 1302-10 (1981); OR. REY. STAT.§§ 659.400(2), .425 {1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
43, §§ 954(p), 955 (Purdon Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-6(H), 28-5-7 (1979); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 3-6A-15 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 8-50-103 (1980); TEX. HUM. RES. 
CODE ANN. §121.003 (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34.35-6 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE§ 40.1-28.7 (1981); WASH. REY. CODE§ 49.60.180 
(1981); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-2 (Michie Supp. 1982); WIS. STAT. §§ 11 l.32(5)(a), (t) (1979-
1980). 
Unlike the federal law, which only applies to federal contractors and recipients of federal 
funds, state laws prohibiting employment discrimination against the handicapped actually 
have a wider coverage and usually only exempt small employers. Therefore, state law is much 
more important in handicap cases than in other kinds of discrimination cases. See generally 
Leap, State Regulation and Fair Employment of the Handicapped, 5 EMPL. REL. L.J. 382 (1979-
80). 
393. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1976). By regulation, any contractor holding a contract of $50,000 
or more and having 50 or more employees must file a written affirmative action program with 
the OFCCP within 120 days of co=encement of the contract. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.5 (1982). 
In addition, § 402 of the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 
U.S.C. § 2012 (1976), provides that persons with federal contracts of $10,000 or more must 
take affirmative action to hire qualified disabled veterans. 
394. 29 u.s.c. § 706(6) (1976). 
395. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 & app. A (1982) further defines "handicapped individual" as 
follows: 
APPENDIX A - GUIDELINES ON THE APPLICATION OF THE DEFINITION 
"HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUAL" 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, defines a handicapped individual for the 
purposes of the program as any person who has a physical or mental impairment which 
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million handicapped persons are covered by the statute.396 
Responsibility for enforcing section 503 is vested in the Office of 
Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) in the Depart-
ment of Labor.397 Individuals who believe they have been discrimi-
nated against may only pursue their administrative remedies 
through the OFCCP; most courts have held that section 503 creates 
no express or implied private right of action.398 
Section 504 provides that no otherwise qualified handicapped in-
dividual shall, solely by reason of handicap, be excluded from the 
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, has a record of such 
impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. 
"Life activities" may be considered to include co=unication, ambulation, selfcare, 
socialization, education, vocational training, employment, transportation, adapting to 
housing, etc. For the purpose of section 503 of the Act, primary attention is given to those 
life activities that affect employability. 
The phrase "substantially limits" means the degree that the impairment affects em-
ployability. A handicapped individual who is likely to experience difficulty in securing, 
retaining or advancing in employment would be considered substantially limited, 
''Has a record of such an impairment" means that an individual may be completely 
recovered from a previous physical or mental impairment. It is included because the 
attitude of employers, supervisors, and coworkers toward that previous impairment may 
result in an individual experiencing difficulty in securing, retaining, or advancing in em-
ployment. The mentally restored and those who, for example, have had heart attacks or 
cancer often experience such difficulty. Also, this part of the definition would include 
individuals who may have been erroneously classified and may experience discrimination 
based on this misclassification. This group may include persons such as those who have 
been misclassified as mentally retarded or mentally restored. 
"Is regarded as havin$ such an impairment" refers to those individuals who are per-
ceived as having a handicap, whether an impairment exists or not, but who, because of 
attitudes or for any other reason, are regarded as handicapped by employers or supervi-
sors who have an effect on the individual's securing, retaining or advancing in 
employment. 
396. Uncertainty in the Figures, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1977, § 4, at 8, col. 1, cited in Wolff, 
Protecting the Disabled Minority: Rights and Remedies under Section .503 and .504 of the Re/1a-
bilitation Act of 1973, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 25, 30 (1978). 
397. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1976); 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.2, § 60-741 (1982). See generally Lovell, 
New Directions for OFCCP, 32 LAB. L.J. 763 (1981). 
398. All eight circuits that have considered the issue have held that the administrative 
remedies are exclusive. Beam v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drylock Co., 679 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 
1982); Davis v. United Airlines, Inc., 622 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S, Ct. 2045 
(1982); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1979). cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 
(1980); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 
629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981); Fisher 
v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 178 (1982); Coleman v. 
Darden, 595 F.2d 533 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979). At least six district court 
cases, however, have held that there is an implied private right of action under§ 503. Davis v. 
Modine Mfg. Co., 526 F.Supp. 943 (D. Kan. 1981); California Paralyzed Veterans Assn. v. 
FCC, 496 F. Supp. 125 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Clarke v. FELEC Servs., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 165 (D, 
Alaska 1980); Hart v. Alameda County, 485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Chaplin v. Consoli• 
dated Edison Co., 483 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 
428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977); cf. Manuel v. International Harvester Co., 23 Fair Empt. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1477 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (no private right of action under§ 503, but right to sue 
as third party beneficiary of employer's contract with the government which contained the 
§ 503 affirmative action obligation). See generally Note, Implying a Cause of Action Under 
Section .503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 19 MICH. L. REV. 1093 (1981). 
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participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrim-
ination under any program or activity receiving federal .financial 
assistance.399 Section 504, unlike section 503, applies to all federal 
programs, regardless of the amount of .financial assistance re-
ceived.400 Three million firms - about half the businesses in the 
country - may be covered by the Act.401 Section 504 incorporates 
the same broad statutory definition of handicap as section 503,402 
further expanded by regulations implementing section 504.403 Other 
regulations,404 require that procedures for enforcement of section 
504 by each federal agency must be the same as those used to imple-
ment Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.405 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet specifically addressed 
the issue,406 many courts hold that section 504 impliedly confers a 
private right of action on behalf of otherwise qualified individuals 
399. 29 u.s.c. § 794 (1976). 
400. Under HEW's model regulations, recipients with fewer than 15 employees are exempt 
from some administrative responsibilities. 45 C.F.R. § 84.7-84.9 (1982). 
401. "Hire the Handicapped'~· Now More Than Just a Slogan, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 
15, 1977, at 6B, cited in Wolff, supra note 396, at 26 n.9. 
402. See text at note 394 supra. 
403. 41 C.F.R. § 104.3(i) (1982) provides: 
G) "Handicapped person." (I) "Handicapped person" means any person who (i) has 
a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activi-
ties, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impair-
ment. 
(2) As used in paragraph (i)(l) of this section, the phrase: 
(i) "Physical or mental impairment" means (A) any physiological disorder or condi-
tion, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following 
body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including 
speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; heroic and lym-
phatic; skin; and endocrine; or (B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental 
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning 
disabilities. 
(ii) "Major life activities" means functions such as caring for one's self, performing 
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 
(iii) "Has a record of such an impairment" means has a history of, or has been mis-
classified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities. 
(iv) "Is regarded as having an impairment" means (A) has a physical or mental im-
pairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated by a 
recipient as constituting such a limitation; (B) has a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward 
such impairment; or (C) has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (i)(2)(i) of this 
section but is treated by a recipient as having such an impairment. 
See also 45 C.F.R. § 85.31 (1982). 
404. 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 (1982). 
405. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, or 
national origin in any program receiving federal financial assistance). The procedural regula-
tions are codified at 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.6-100.10, 101.1-101.131 (1982). 
406. See University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981); Southeastern Community 
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,404 n.5 (1979). 
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injured by discriminatory practices of federal recipients.407 Further, 
grievants need not exhaust administrative remedies before bringing 
the private action.408 Some courts hold, however, that handicapped 
persons cannot bring private claims for employment discrimination 
under section 504 unless a primary objective of the federal financial 
assistance is to provide employment.409 
Unlike section 503, which statutorily mandates affirmative action 
for the handicapped, section 504 only prohibits discrimination 
against otherwise qualified individuals. The guideline regulations 
implementing section 504 provide for some affirmative action re-
quirements. 410 In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 411 how-
ever, the Supreme Court cast doubt on the extent to which 
affirmative action may be imposed.412 
407. Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981); Kling v. County 
of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980); Baker v. Bell, 630 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded as moot, 
451 U.S. 390 (1981); NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979); Davis v. 
Southeastern Co=unity College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), revd on other grounds, 442 
U.S. 397 (1979); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Fedn, v. 
Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); 
Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977). 
The courts have based their decisions on three main reasons. First, they have applied the 
four factors of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), which are used as indicators of a congres-
sional intent to make a remedy available to a special class of litigants. Second, language 
analogous to§ 504 is found both in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d 
(1976), and in Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). 
These sections have been held to create a private right of action. See Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-703 (1979). Third, the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, 
and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955, ad-
ded § SOS, 29 U.S.C. § 794a (Supp. III 1979), which provides that in actions brought under 
§ 504 the same remedies are available as in actions brought under Titles VI and VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In addition, the prevailing party, other than the United States, may 
be awarded reasonable attorney fees. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (Supp. III 1979). 
408. E.g., Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1380-82 (10th Cir. 1981); 
Swan v. Stoneman, 635 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1980); Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876, 
899 (9th Cir. 1980). 
409. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 677 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Cabrini Medical Center, 639 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1981); Trageser v. Libbie Rehab. Center, 590 
F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979); Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis 
Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980); Sabol v. Board of Educ,, 
510 F. Supp. 892 (D.NJ. 1981); cf. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912, 1926-27 
(1982) (termination of federal funding for violation of Title IX of Education Amendments of 
1972 must be "program specific"). Contra Jones v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 
681 F.2d 1376 (11th Cir. 1982),petitionforcert . .filed, SI U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) 
(No. 82-1159). See generally Note, Implied Rights of Action Under the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 68 GEO. LJ. 1229 (1980). 
410. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1982) (requiring "reasonable accommodation" to the limitations of 
the handicap). 
411. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). 
412. According to the Court, section 504 does not require a recipient to make "substantial 
modifications" to its programs in order to allow handicapped individuals to participate. 442 
U.S. at 405. If the regulations attempt to do so "they would do more than clarify the meaning 
of 504 . . . they would constitute an unauthorized extension of the obligations imposed by the 
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2. The High-Risk Employee 
a. Medical examinations. Regulations promulgated to imple-
ment section 504 prohibit employers receiving federal assistance 
from asking applicants if they are handicapped or asking about the 
nature and severity of a known handicap unless: (1) all applicants 
must submit to a preemployment physical; and (2) the examination 
reveals information relevant to the applicant's ability to perform job-
related functions.413 Under the section 503 regulations a federal 
contractor may require a preemployment medical examination of a 
handicapped applicant even if it does not require an examination of 
everyone.414 Nevertheless, if the employer's job qualification re-
quirements "tend to screen out qualified handicapped individuals, 
the requirements shall be related to the specific job or jobs for which 
the individual is being considered and shall be consistent with busi-
ness necessity and the safe performance of the job."415 
At first glance, the section 504 regulation might appear to provide 
greater protection to the handicapped. This is not the case. An em-
ployer's decision to conduct a preemployment medical examination 
usually is based upon the nature of the enterprise.416 Employers us-
ing medical examinations undoubtedly prefer to give them to all em-
ployees; the hazards that necessitate preemployment medical 
examinations often act upon medical conditions that are detectable 
only through a comprehensive examination. In addition, the regula-
tion does not mandate that all medical examinations involve identi-
cal procedures.417 
statute." 442 U.S. at 410. The Court seemed to hold that an otherwise qualified handicapped 
person may not be discriminated against because of his or her handicap. Nevertheless, it 
adopted a definition of "otherwise qualified person" as one who is able to meet all of the 
program's requirements in spite of his or her handicap, rather than a person who is able to 
meet all of the program's requirements apart from his or her handicap. See 442 U.S. at 406. 
See generally Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: Rehabilitating Section 504 After South-
eastern, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 171 (1980); Note, Accommodating the Handicapped· The Meaning 
of Discrimination Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881 (1980); · 
Note, Protections for the Handicapped in Federally Financed Programs and Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1053 (1981). For a further discussion of reason-
able accommodation, see notes 463-68 infra and accompanying text 
413. 28 C.F.R. § 41.55 (1982) incorporates the preemployment inquiry regulations of HHS, 
45 C.F.R. § 84.14 (1982). See Doe v. Syracuse School Dist., 508 F. Supp. 333 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(asking applicant whether he had ever experienced a nervous breakdown violated 45 C.F.R. 
§ 84.14). 
414. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6 (1982). 
415. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(2) (1982). 
416. See note 251 supra and accompanying text 
417. Thus, nothing would preclude an employer from requiring all employees to submit to 
some medical examination, but requiring more complete examinations of handicapped appli-
cants. See note 251 supra and accompanying text. 
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By contrast, the section 503 regulation provides additional sub-
stantive protections to handicapped applicants. Any procedure tend-
ing to screen out "qualified"418 handicapped individuals must be 
'job-related" and "consistent with business necessity and the safe 
performance of the job."419 The job-relatedness provision in the sec-
tion 504 regulation requires only that the medical information be 
"relevant" to the applicant's ability to perform the job. The medical 
procedure need not have a high predictive value or be within ac-
cepted medical practice. The section 503 regulation, however, con-
nects 'job-relatedness" to the employment discrimination law 
concept of "business necessity." As defined by the Fourth Circuit in 
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp. : 420 
The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business pur-
pose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient opera-
tion of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently 
compelling to override any [adverse] impact; the challenged practice 
must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; 
and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or prac-
tices which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or 
accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential [adverse] impact.421 
Thus, under the section 503 regulation, the specific medical exami-
nation and screening procedures used must have: (1) a scientifically 
valid basis, (2) a high predictive value, and (3) must be the most 
accurate and least onerous alternative. 
Despite the subtle differences between the section 503 and 504 
regulations, both limit the use of baseless and discriminatory preem-
ployment examinations. This protection, however, only applies to 
"handicapped" individuals. 
b. Are high-risk individuals "handicapped"? The statute defines 
"handicapped individual" as any person who has a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of such per-
son's major life activities, has a record of such impairment, or is re-
garded as having such an impairment.422 High-risk individuals are 
not presently impaired, but they may become impaired in the future. 
In OFCCP v. E.E. Black, Ltd., 423 the employer required a car-
418. For a further discussion of what constitutes a "qualified" or "otherwise qualified" 
applicant, see notes 430-70 infra and accompanying text. 
419. See note 415 supra. 
420. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed under Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). 
421. 444 F.2d at 798 (footnotes omitted). See generally Note, Business Necessity under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974). 
422. See notes 394-95, 402-03 supra and accompanying text. 
423. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1624 (U.S. Dept. of Labor 1979). 
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penter's apprentice to submit to a preemployment medical examina-
tion, including a low-back x-ray, which revealed a lower back 
anomaly known as ·sacrolization of the transitional vertebra. Al-
though medical professionals dispute its disabling long-term effects, 
the employer conceded that the condition did not effect the appli-
cant's current capability to perform the duties of a carpenter's ap-
prentice. Nevertheless, relying on its medical officer's conclusions, 
the company denied him employment. The apprentice filed a com-
plaint with the OFCCP under section 503. 
The Labor Department ruled that the company's use of preem-
ployment medical examinations tended to disqualify handicapped 
applicants despite their current capability to perform the job. The 
Labor Department refused to limit "impairment," as used in the def-
initional section of the Act, to permanent disabilities such as blind-
ness or deafness. Instead, the term impairment was held to include 
"any condition which diminishes, weakens, restricts or otherwise 
damages an individual's health or physical or mental activity"424 re-
sulting in a current bar to employment that the individual is now 
capable of performing. 
On judicial review, the United States District Court agreed with 
the Labor Department that the Rehabilitation Act's coverage was 
extensive, but held the Labor Department interpretation overly 
broad.425 According to the court, Section 706(7)(B) of Title 29 of the 
United States Code contains critical language that restricts the Act's 
coverage to handicapped individuals who are "substantially limited" 
in pursuit of a major life activity.426 Thus, to come within the pur-
view of the Act an individual must have been rejected for a position 
for which he or she was qualified because of an impairment or per-
ceived impairment that constitutes, for the individual, a substantial 
handicap to employment.427 
Based on this definition, the court still concluded that the appli-
424. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1631 (footnote omitted). 
425. E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099 (D. Hawaii 1980). The court 
granted partial summary judgment to the Labor Department on two points: (1) the definition 
of "handicapped individual" contained in the Act and regulations is constitutional, and (2) the 
apprentice was a "qualified handicapped individual" under the Act and regulations. On all 
other issues, summary judgment was denied. 497 F. Supp. at 1104. In a subsequent decision, 
the case was remanded to the Department of Labor, E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Donovan, 26 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1183 (D. Hawaii 1981), and was settled in 1982. 
426. 497 F. Supp. at 1099. 
427. 497 F. Supp. at 1099. The court discussed several factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether an impairment substantially limits employability, including the number and 
types of jobs from which the individual is disqualified, the location or accessibility of similar 
opportunities, and the individual's·ownjob expectations and training. 497 F. Supp. at 1100-01. 
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cant was protected by the Act. First, the applicant's back condition 
was found to be an impairment or, at least, was regarded as such by 
the employer.428 Second, the impairment constituted a substantial 
handicap to employment because the applicant would have been dis-
qualified from all or substantially all apprenticeship programs in 
carpentry.429 
c. May increased risk be considered in employment decisions? 
Even if high-risk individuals are handicapped, the Act only protects 
otherwise qualffeed handicapped individuals. The Labor Depart-
ment's decision in Black conceded that employers could exclude 
handicapped individuals from jobs on the basis of legitimate job re-
quirements, but held that preemployment medical examinations 
could explore only current capability to perform.430 The district 
court termed this interpretation "clearly contrary to law."431 The 
court did not formulate a legal standard for when possible future 
injury warrants denying employment. 
Two basic principles emerge from the Black case: (1) that a job 
requirement that screens out qualified handicapped individuals on 
the basis of possible future injury may be lawful;432 (2) that the em-
ployer must justify the denial of employment, 433 regardless of 
whether the issue is framed as whether the employee is "otherwise 
qualified," or whether the employer has made out a "business neces-
sity" defense to the OFCCP's prima facie case.434 
428. 497 F. Supp. at 1102. 
429. 497 F. Supp. at 1102. The court rejected the employer's contention that Congress did 
not intend to protect job applicants denied employment based on risk of future injury. 497 F. 
Supp at 1103. 
430. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1634. 
431. 497 F. Supp. at 1104. The court posed the situation where, ifa particular person were 
given a job, he would have a 90% chance of suffering a heart attack within one month, "A job 
requirement that screened out such an individual would be consistent both with business ne-
cessity and the safe performance of the job. Yet, it could be argued that the individual had a 
current capacity to perform the job, and thus was a qualified handicapped individual." 497 F, 
Supp. at 1104. 
432. This comports with cases decided under state handicap discrimination laws. Chicago, 
N.W. R.R. v. Labor & Indus. Review Commn., 98 Wis. 2d 592,608,297 N.W.2d 819, 826 
(1980). But cf. Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 
14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 344 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976) (employer could not refuse to hire an 
individual suffering from acute lymphocytic leukemia because individual had present ability 
to perform job). For a further discussion of state law, see notes 455-61 infra and accompany-
ing text. 
433. See 491 F. Supp. at 1103. 
434. State antidiscrimination law may become increasingly important in protecting the 
employment rights of high-risk individuals. A recent amendment to the New Jersey state em-
ployment discrimination law specifically prohibits employment discrimination based on an 
individual's "atypical hereditary cellular or blood trait." Act of June 22, 1981, ch. 185, 1981 
NJ. Sess. Law Serv. 535, 538 (West) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN, § 10:5-5(y) (West Supp, 
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d. What must the employer show to justffy a refusal to hire a high-
risk individual? In Black, the employer sought to avoid increased 
insurance or workers' compensation costs435 and to comply with its 
OSHA obligations.436 Certainly, employers could offer other eco-
nomic reasons.437 
The legality of the screening procedure, however, should not de-
pend upon the employer's asserted motivation.438 Courts should fo-
cus on the necessity for the screening, the scientific validity of the 
procedure and the legitimacy of the resulting employment decision-
making. To sustain a "business necessity" defense for using medical 
procedures which screen out qualified handicapped individuals the 
employer should be required to prove that: 
(1) The examination, test, or procedure upon which the employment 
decision was based is job-related. 
(2) The examination, test or procedure has a high predictive value and 
is the best test that is feasible to use. 
(3) The examination, test, or procedure indicates that the applicant has 
a strong likelihood of developing a serious injury or illness in the 
not-too-distant future and that the applicant's likelihood of injury 
or illness represents a significant variation from the general worker 
population. 
(4) The disqualification or other adverse personnel action was based 
on an individualized determination of fitness. 
(5) No reasonable accommodation will permit the handicapped indi-
vidual to perform the necessary job functions. 
1982)). This is defined to include sickle cell trait, hemoglobin C trait, thalassemia trait, tay-
sachs trait, or cystic fibrosis trait. Thus, New Jersey has become the first jurisdiction to ex-
pressly proscribe the use of multiple forms of biochemical screening. Florida, Louisiana, and 
North Carolina prohibit discrimination in employment based on sickle cell trait. FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 448.075 (West Supp. 1981); Act of July 22, 1982, Act No. 644, 1982 LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 23:1001-:1004 (West Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.l (1981). 
435. 497 F. Supp. at 1095. 
436. 497 F. Supp. at 1095. 
437. Several reasons seem plausible. High-risk workers may have a higher turnover rate, 
facing the employer with increased costs of hiring and training. Absenteeism and sick leave 
may be higher for sensitive workers. The employer may face higher medical costs if more 
frequent biological monitoring or medical exams prove necessary for high-risk employees. 
The employers' contributions to medical insurance may increase. The potential for civil liabil-
ity may deter some employers. See notes 661-697 i'!fra and accompanying text. Finally, the 
employer might suffer a loss of goodwill. For example, a child born with birth defects caused 
by the parent's occupational exposure could generate substantial adverse publicity. 
438. The Assistant Secretary of Labor in Black ruled that higher insurance or workers' 
compensation costs were irrelevant to the employability of the applicant. See 19 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1635. Without addressing the cost issue per se, the district court held that 
an applicant's risk of future injury could be considered by the employer. 497 F. Supp. at 1103-
04. Thus, although recognizing that the applicant's present and future ability to perform the 
job may be a relevant consideration, the court refused to consider the adverse economic conse-
quences of failing to have a healthy, capable workforce. 
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(i) Job-relatedness. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,439 the 
Supreme Court, quoting the applicable regulation,440 held that "dis-
criminatory tests are impermissible unless shown, by professionally 
acceptable methods, to be 'predictive of or significantly correlated 
with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are 
relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being 
evaluated.' "441 
Although the job-relatedness criterion limits an employer's dis-
cretion in hiring decisions, some courts allow employers a great deal 
of latitude within which to operate. In National Railroad Passenger 
Cop. (AMTRAK) v. Commonwealth ,442 for example, the court 
found no violation where Amtrak denied employment to an appli-
cant with a glass eye. The Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission 
had concluded that plaintiff could perform "all of the . . . tasks re-
quired of trackmen . . . .''443 The court reversed the Commission, 
finding instead that, in one of the duties to which plaintiff could be 
assigned, his reduced field of vision might endanger his cowork-
ers.444 Similarly, in Strathie v. Department of Transportation, 445 the 
court virtually ignored evidence that drivers with hearing aids had 
substantially bett~r safety records than people with normal hear-
ing,446 because "a situation might arise in which [plaintiff's] handi-
cap would prevent him from performing the position [ of school bus 
driver] adequately."447 
The job-relatedness criterion may retain some usefulness. For 
example, a respiratory examination which reveals that an individual 
suffers from asthma should not justify a refusal to hire the individual 
as a typist.448 Few cases, however, will be so simple. Thus, job-re-
latedness and traditional test validation analysis are of limited value 
439. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
440. 29 C.F.R. 1607 (1982). 
441. 422 U.S. at 431 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § l607.4(c)). 
442. 452 A.2d 301 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982). 
443. 452 A.2d at 305 (Williams, J., dissenting) (quoting the Commission findings). 
444. 452 A.2d at 304. 
445. 547 F. Supp. 1367 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
446. 547 F. Supp. at 1375. 
447. 547 F. Supp. at 1382. 
448. q. Treadwell v. Alexander, 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 32,560 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (no 
violation of§ 501 to refuse to hire employee with heart and nervous conditions for "arduous" 
job of park technician); High v. Power Flame Div., Inc., 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 32,866 
(Kan. Dist. Ct. 1982) (no violation for employer to refuse to hire individual who had prior 
back injury and surgery for a strenuous job); Boynton Cab. Co. v. Department of Indus., 
Labor & Human Relations, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 841 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978) (em-
ployer did not discriminate by refusing to hire as a taxi driver an individual lacking a right 
hand and forearm). 
May 1983] Occupational Illness 1447 
in medical testing. Even in a relatively uncomplicated case such as 
Black, the key issues concerned the applicant's likelihood of having 
back problems and the validity of the x-rays given the applicant. Al-
though not resolving the ultimate issue, the job-relatedness concept 
framed the issue in Black. The employer had to prove that an im-
portant part of the job required lifting heavy objects and that indi-
viduals with back problems would not be able to perform the job. 
Thus, to the extent that the x-rays sought to determine the condition 
of the applicant's back, the procedure was job-related.449 
(ii) Predictive value. The statistical significance of a test's sensi-
tivity, specificity, and predictive value450 and the limitations on the 
accuracy of a medical examination, test, or procedure have been ex-
plored. To justify such procedures, the employer must demonstrate 
their validity as scientifically accepted measures that accurately pre-
dict an applicant's present or future job-related functions. In addi-
tion, the employer must show that no other feasible medical 
procedure451 could more accurately make such an assessment. Thus, 
in Rogers v. Campbell Foundry Co., 452 a New Jersey court held that 
an employer could not refuse to hire an applicant whose chest x-ray 
showed a prominent hilar shadow on the lung. Credible medical 
evidence indicated that this condition resulted from a normal calcifi-
cation process and would not predispose the applicant to silicosis or 
pneumoconiosis. 
(iii) Substantial risk of imminent harm. This difficult determina-
tion includes five elements. First, the test or procedure must yield 
unequivocal results. An employer should have a difficult time 
screening out "borderline" high-risk workers. If the test results are 
unclear, retesting, reexamination and further medical consultation 
should be sought. 
Second, the potential injury or illness must be substantial. An 
employer cannot screen out individuals whose only heightened risk 
involves sneezing, tearing, a mild rash or the like.453 Ironically, the 
Rehabilitation Act may not afford these individuals any protection 
because they are not "impaired" - substantially limited in pursuit 
449. The Assistant Secretary of Labor found the "healthy back" requirement to be job-
related. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1634. 
450. See notes 285-88 supra and accompanying text. 
451. Feasibility may involve time, expense or other factors. 
452. 185 NJ. Super. 109, 447 A.2d 589 (App. Div. 1982). 
453. Applir.ants should, however, be advised of such risks. 
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of a major life activity.454 Nevertheless, prudence suggests that the 
severity of any resultant injury or illness be considered in any 
screening program. 
Third, an applicant must face a high probability of developing an 
injury or illness. This is known as absolute risk. For example, the 
overall population of healthy workers may contract a specific occu-
pational disease at a rate of 1 in 10,000. Medical studies may show 
that individuals with a deficiency in a given enzyme have an inci-
dence rate of 1 in 1,000. Although an individual with t~is enzyme 
deficiency faces a ten times greater risk of disease, an employer 
would not be justified in refusing to hire that individual because the 
absolute risk is so low.455 
Fourth, the adverse effects on the health of the individual at risk 
must be manifested in the reasonably foreseeable future. Illnesses 
with long latency periods should be disregarded in medical screen-
ing, unless there is an overwhelming likelihood of the individual 
contracting an extremely serious disease, such as cancer.456 For ex-
ample, an individual aged twenty-five should not be denied employ-
ment because of a heightened risk of developing arthritis at age sixty. 
Fifth, the applicant's test result must represent a significant varia-
454. If an employer refuses to hire such individuals because of such trivial risks, the indi-
viduals may come under the statute because they are "regarded as having such an impair• 
ment" by the employer. 29 U.S.C. § 706(6)(c) (1976). But see notes 426-27 supra and 
accompanying text. 
455. Several states apply this rule under their antidiscrimination laws. In Wisconsin em• 
ployers must show a "reasonable probability" of future hazards. Chicago & N.W, R.R. v. 
Labor & Indus. Review Commn., 98 Wis. 2d 592,608,297 N.W.2d 819,826 (1980), The court 
offered no statistical definition of "reasonable probability", but found a 10-30% chance that a 
welder might have a epileptic seizure a mere possibility, and therefore held the employer's 
action illegal. 98 Wis. 2d at 609-10, 297 N.W.2d at 826-27; see also Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. De-
partment oflndus., Labor & Hum. Relations, 90 Wis. 2d 408,280 N.W.2d 142 (1979). But see 
Lewis v. Rammele Engr., Inc., 314 N.W.2d l (Minn. 1981) (safety concerns justified em• 
ployer's refusal to hire epileptic machinist). 
In Oregon an employer must show a "high probability" of future risk. Montgomery Ward 
& Co. v. Bureau of Labor, 280 Or. 163, 570 P.2d 76 (1977). In Montgomery Ward the court 
held that a subendocardial infarction six years earlier followed by sporadic angina did not 
warrant refusing to hire the plaintiff as a heavy appliance salesperson. In California, a mere 
possibility of future risk - such as a congenital, but not disabling, back condition - did not 
justify an employer's discharge of a truck driver. Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment 
Practices Commn., 121 Cal. App. 3d 791, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1981). 
Where occupational exposure will aggravate a preexisting condition, employers' exclusion• 
ary practices fare somewhat better. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. State Div. of 
Human Rights, 63 A.D.2d 170, 406 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1978). Also, where an employee's defect 
could endanger others, courts uphold exclusion, see McGarity & Schroeder, Risk-oriented Em-
ployment Screening, 59 TEX. L. REV. 999, 1038-49 (1981), especially m cases involving com-
mon carriers. See, e.g., Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir, 1976): 
Strathie v. Department of Transportation, 547 F. Supp. 1367 (E.D. Pa. 1982): National R.R. 
Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK) v. Commonwealth, 452 A.2d 301 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982). 
456. The employer should inform the applicant of all risks, no matter how remote, The 
employer may not, however, make relatively distant health decisions for the applicant. 
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tion from the general population. This is known as "relative risk." 
This issue arose in Bentivegna v. United States Department of La-
bor .451 The City of Los Angeles employed "controlled" diabetics, 
but fired plaintiff because he could not demonstrate sufficiently low 
blood sugar levels. The City justified this policy on the ground that 
diabetics were more susceptible to injuries on the job. The City 
could not demonstrate, however, that uncontrolled diabetics were 
more susceptible to injury than controlled diabetics. The relative 
risk did not warrant the discriminatory policy. 
(iv) Individualized determinations. The exclusion of entire 
groups of individuals with certain disabilities from job consideration 
may constitute illegal discrimination under handicap discrimination 
laws458 and the fourteenth amendment.459 This accords with the 
well-established principle of employment discrimination law that 
"[i]ndividual risks, like individual performances, may not be pre-
dicted by recourse to [proscribed] classifications .... "460 Thus, 
employers must evaluate each individual's fitness for the job.461 
457. 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982). 
458. See notes 387-412 supra and accompanying text. 
459. Successful actions have been brought by handicapped individuals under 42 U.S.C 
§ 1983 (Supp. III 1979) against persons who, under color of state law, have acted to deny the 
handicapped plaintiffs equal protection and due process rights guaranteed under the four-
teenth amendment. See, e.g., Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981) (teacher's job denied due to applicant's blindness); Hutchings v. Erie 
City & County Library Bd. of Directors, 516 F. Supp. 1265 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (librarian suffering 
from dormant multiple sclerosis fired); Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 
1977) (applicant denied police employment due to history of epilepsy). 
460. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 (1978) 
(invalidating, as violative of Title VII, retirement, disability, and death-benefit programs for 
employees predicated on sex-based mortality tables); see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 
321 (1977) (minimum height and weight requirements for corrections officers constituted sex 
discrimination); Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 966 (1977) (dismissal of 52-year-old test pilot judged unfit based on general popula-
tion studies constituted age discrimination); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 
(9th Cir. 1971) (company's policy banning women from lifting heavy objects held to violate 
Title VII). 
461. For example, in Connecticut a school for the blind could not automatically refuse to 
hire a teacher's aide with impaired vision. Connecticut Inst. for the Blind v. Connecticut 
Commn. on Human Rights & Opportunities, 176 Conn. 88,405 A.2d 618 (1978). In Wiscon-
sin, failure to meet vision standards for interstate trucking did not justify discharge of an intra-
state trucker. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Indus. Review Commn., 95 Wis. 2d 395, 
290 N.W.2d 551 (Ct. App. 1980) (employer failed to show that disability interfered with ability 
to performjob},qffd byanelJtllll/ydividedcourt, 101 Wis. 2d 169,303 N.W.2d 668,cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 884 (1981); accord Coleman v. Casey County Bd. of Educ., 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
(CCH) ~ 32,158 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (otherwise qualified person who had a leg amputated could 
not be denied job as a school bus driver); Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R. v. Department of 
Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974) (asthmatic railroad 
employee unlawfully discharged); Fraser Shipyards, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor & 
Human Relations, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1809 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976) (shipyard unlaw-
fully refused to hire diabetic welder). In Colorado, hospitals may not exclude all epileptics 
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(v) Reasonable accommodation. Employers must accommodate 
the handicapped if doing so does not involve undue burdens.462 The 
degree of accommodation required remains unsettled. 463 In Soutlt-
eastern Community College v . .Davis,464 the Supreme Court held that 
section 504 did not require a recipient of federal funds to make ma-
jor modifications of its program to accommodate the handi-
capped.465 Nevertheless, the Act prohibits "surmountable barrier" 
discrimination. 466 
The section 503 regulations require employers to make "reason-
able accommodation," but the term is not otherwise defined.467 Rea-
sonable accommodation probably includes making facilities 
accessible, restructuring jobs, modifying work schedules, acquiring 
or modifying equipment or devices, adjusting or modifying exami-
nations appropriately, providing readers and interpreters, and other 
similar actions. With regard to safety hazards, the extent of neces-
sary accommodation is unclear.468 Reasonable accommodation to 
health hazards may present even more complications. Accommoda-
tion may focus on administrative practices, such as shift rotation and 
other "administrative controls" that divide maximum exposure time, 
more frequent monitoring and medical surveillance, and the added 
use of personal protective equipment. Employers probably will not 
from patient care positions. Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity, 43 Colo. App. 446, 614 P.2d 891 
(1979). Illinois law forbids per se judgments about the mentally handicapped. Chambers v. 
Illinois Fair Empl. Practices Commn., 96 Ill. App. 3d 884, 422 N.E.2d 130 (1981). 
462. Southeastern Co=unity College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1979), The burden 
of proving that the physical criteria of the job are ''.job-related" rests with the employer. 
Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292,308 (5th Cir. l981);see Pushkin v. Regents 
of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1386-87 (10th Cir. 1981). 
The employer has greater knowledge of the essentials of the job than does the handi-
capped applicant. The employer can look to its own experience, or, if that is not helpful, 
to that of other employers who have provided jobs to individuals with handicaps similar 
to those of the applicant in question. Furthermore, the employer may be able to obtain 
advice concerning possible acco=odations from private and govenment sources. 
Prewill, 662 F.2d at 308. 
463. See Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: 17te Meaning of Discrimination Under 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 881-82 (1980). 
464. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). 
465. See 442 U.S. at 410. A similar analysis applies to § 501 and § 503; see Prewitt v. 
United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1981). 
466. Prewill, 662 F.2d at 307-08 & n.21. 
461. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-74l.6(d) (1982). 
468. For example, ifan otherwise qualified handicapped individual is not capable of lifting 
the 200-pound bags of cement used by the employer, will the employer be required to use 50-
pound bags? Will the employer be required to designate an employee to perform all the re-
quired heavy lifting, while assigning the handicapped employee some less strenuous duties? 
Cf. Holland v. Boeing Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37 (Wash. 1978) (transferring 
employee with cerebral palsy to position requiring more manual dexterity was not reasonable 
acco=odation). 
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be required to reduce exposure levels beneath OSHA PEL's to ac-
commodate sensitive handicapped employees. 
3. Some Limits of the Law 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and its state law analogs can help 
employees redress employment discrimination based upon increased 
risk of occupational illness. At least three factors, however, may pre-
vent the Act from adequately remedying the situation. First, a myr-
iad of unresolved legal issues relative to jurisdiction, coverage, 
private rights of action and administrative enforcement authority 
may impede plaintiffs. Second, "handicapped individual," "im-
paired" and "otherwise qualified" are not yet clearly defined.469 
Ironically, because a handicapped individual must have an impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, the 
Rehabilitation Act may not prohibit the most arbitrary, illogical, and 
baseless forms of discrimination - that based on an individual's 
slight medical or genetic imperfection. This irony is understandable: 
the Rehabilitation Act is not a broad antidiscrimination law, nor was 
it intended to be. It was designed to prevent discrimination against 
the severely handicapped.47° Finally, the administrative agencies 
and courts may be unwilling or unable to wade through voluminous 
medical evidence to second-guess the decisions of company medical 
469. In addition to the federal courts, state courts and agencies have identified a number of 
handicaps. See Vickers v. Veterans Ad.min., 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (hypersensi-
tivity to tobacco smoke); American Natl. Ins. Co. v. Fair Empl. & Housing Commn., 32 Cal. 
3d 603, 651 P.2d 1151, 186 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1982) (high blood pressure); Shelby Township Fire 
Dept. v. Shields, 115 Mich. App. 98, 320 N.W.2d 306 (1982) (pseudofolliculitis barbae); Gold-
smith v. New York Psychoanalytic Inst., 73 A.D.2d 16, 426 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1980) (Hodgkins 
disease); Dairy Equip. Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 95 Wis. 2d 
319, 290 N.W.2d 330 (1980) (one kidney); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Department of 
Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1811 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976) 
(alcoholism); Journal Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 18 Fair Empt. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1655 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976) (deviated septum); J.C. Penney Co. v. Department 
of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1109 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 
1976) (rheumatoid arthritis). 
Some handicaps have not been protected under applicable laws: Greene v. Union Pac. 
R.R., 548 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (borderline hypertension and morbid obesity); Lyons 
v. Heritage House Restaurants, Inc., 89 ID. 2d 163,432 N.E.2d 39, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 
(1978) (transplanted kidney); Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 
248 (1979) (glaucoma); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, _ Pa. Commw. _, 448 
A.2d 701 (1982) (obesity); Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 116 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976) 
(''whiplash"). Moreover, some handicaps are specifically excluded from coverage by state stat-
ute. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2253(2) (West 1982) (excluding from definition of 
"handicapped" chronic alcoholism, drug addiction, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss 
of body systems). 
410. See S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 97, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 2076, 2092. 
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personnel. 471 
Because of these obstacles, handicapped plaintiffs may be more 
successful in alleging violations of Title VII and other equal employ-
ment laws in instances where the discrimination has a disparate im-
pact on another statutorily protected classification.472 
C. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964413 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,474 prohib-
its discrimination in the hiring, discharge, compensation, or other 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of an indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.475 The Act ap-
plies to employers, labor unions, and employment agencies.476 In an 
effort to encourage voluntary compliance with the Act, Congress re-
quired grievants to pursue administrative remedies before resorting 
to litigation.477 
1. .Disparate Impact 
a. Prima facie case. Most employment discrimination based on 
a perceived predisposition to occupational illness involves "disparate 
impact" rather than "disparate treatment" discrimination.478 Em-
471. In Black, the district court conceded that it "had difficulty sifting through the medical 
evidence contained in the administrative record." 497 F. Supp. at 1104. 
472. See Part III-C iefra. 
473. Because age may also affect susceptibility to occupational illness, see notes 57-60 
supra, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. II 1978) may 
protect some workers from some forms of medical testing discrimination. Because the legal 
analysis of claims of employment discrimination brought under the ADEA closely resembles 
that of claims brought under Title VII, the ADEA receives no independent consideration here, 
For a more thorough analysis of ADEA in this context, see M. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL 
SCREENING OF WORKERS§ 10.6 (forthcoming 1983). On the relationship between ADEA and 
Title VII, see, e.g., McCuen v. Home Ins. Co., 633 F.2d I ISO (5th Cir. 1981) (prima facie case 
and burden of proof as in Title VII cases); Note, The Cost of Growing Old· Business Necessil)' 
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565 (1979) (discussing statutory 
defenses). ; 
474. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. II 1978). 
475. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). 
476. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to -2(c) (1976). 
477. Aggrieved individuals must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S,C. § 2000e-
5(e). After a period of up to 180 days for investigation and conciliation by the EEOC, the 
charging party may file an action in district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(f), In states with their 
own fair employment laws, the appropriate state agency must be given 60 days to resolve the 
complaint before procedures are begun with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(e). Prevailing 
plaintiffs are entitled to back pay, reinstatement, other equitable relief, and attorney fees. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-S(g), -S(k}. 
478. Disparate treatment occurs when, for example, an employer imposes burdens on 
blacks that it does not impose on whites. An employer who subjects all persons to the same 
medical test, and disqualifies all persons who fail to ''pass" the test, treats all persons equally, 
If, however, more blacks than whites "fail" the test, see notes 61-85 supra and accompanying 
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ployers seem unlikely to refuse to hire or promote all members of 
one racial group because members of that group are considered 
prone to occupational illness. Employers are more likely to use neu-
tral medical criteria or screening tests that have a disparate impact 
on a particular class of persons because of race, color, religion, 479 or 
national origin. 
In the landmark case of Griggs v. .Duke Power Co., 480 the 
Supreme Court held that Title VII prohibits not only overt discrimi-
nation, but also practices that, although fair in form, discriminate in 
operation.481 In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 482 the Court clari-
fied Griggs, holding that a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by 
showing that "the tests in question select applicants for hire or pro-
motion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool 
of applicants."483 Courts have not yet resolved how substantially or 
significantly different the comparative test results must be in order to 
support a finding of "disparate impact."484 According to the EEOC, 
"[a] selection rate for any race, sex or ethnic group which is less than 
four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the 
highest rate will generally be regarded . . . as evidence of adverse 
impact."485 Most Supreme Court and lower court decisions, how-
ever, have considered disparate impact on an ad hoc basis.486 
Some genetic markers present clear cases of prima facie disparate 
text, the test has a disparate impact on blacks. Disparate impact constitutes illegal discrimina-
tion unless the test is job-related or serves some necessary business purpose. See International 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (discussing the difference 
between disparate treatment and disparate impact). 
479. In this section, "religion" will be used in its ethnic sense rather than its theological 
sense. Religious beliefs, except as they may affect diet, dress, lifestyle and other behavioral 
factors, do not influence an individual's susceptibility to occupational illness. See, e.g., 1982 
EEOC Dec. 82-1, EEOC DEC. (CCH) ~ 6817 (1982) (employer's no beard rule and hard hat 
requirements did not constitute religious discrimination against Sikh employee where OSHA 
required the use of hard hats and respirators). In its ethnic sense, however, religion may corre-
late to genetic susceptibility. For example, Mediterranean Jews are much more likely to have 
a G-6-PD deficiency than either European Jews or Mediterranean non-Jews (e.g., Greeks). 
See notes 487-88 infra and accompanying text. 
480. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
481. 401 U.S. at 431. 
482. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
483. 422 U.S. at 425. 
484. Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n.17 (1977). 
485. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (1982). This formula of course is not binding on the courts. See 
Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 630 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 1980). See generally D. 
BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 330-42 (1980); Furnish,A Path 
Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C. L. REV. 419 (1982). 
486. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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impact discrimination. For example, one study of G-6-PD deficient 
individuals revealed the following population frequencies for this 
trait:487 
Americans (white) ............................................ 0.1% 
Americans (black males) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16% 
British . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 % 
Chinese. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5% 
European Jews............................................... 1% 
Filipinos ................................................... 12-13% 
Greek ....................................................... 1-2% 
Indians (Asian) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3% 
Mediterranean Jews.......................................... 11% 
Scandinavians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8% 
These percentages demonstrate that the use of the G-6-PD screening 
would have a disparate impact on various groups based on race, sex 
and national origin. To illustrate, if 1000 British and 1000 Filipinos 
were screened, only one Briton but 120-130 Filipinos would appear 
G-6-PD deficient.488 For Title VII purposes, the use of G-6-PD 
would establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Other neutral 
employment criteria designed to screen out poor health risks also 
may have a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, or 
national origin. 
An employer could, of course, refuse to hire anyone with G-6-PD 
deficiency, but still hire Filipinos in proportion to their numbers in 
the relevant labor force.489 The absence of overall discrimination, 
however, does not help those individuals denied employment oppor-
tunities on the basis of a test with a discriminatory impact. Because 
Title VII protects every individual's right to employment opportuni-
ties, this "bottom line" result does not affect a plaintiff's prima facie 
case.490 
b. Business necessity and job-relatedness. Once a plaintiff estab-
lishes disparate impact, the burden shifts to the employer to justify 
the practice.491 In Griggs, the Supreme Court indicated that "[t]he 
touchstone [of employer defenses] is business necessity. If an em-
487. F. BEUTLER, HEMOLYTIC ANEMIA IN DISORDERS OF RED CELL METABOLISM (1978). 
488. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SPECIAL REPORT: 
SICKLE CELL DISEASE (1976). 
489. Because the policy would disqualify only 13% of Filipinos, a large number of Filipi-
nos would remain eligible for employment. In the above example, unless the employer needed 
to hire well over 1700 people, it could take equal numbers of Britons and Filipinos. 
490. Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2534 (1982); see also City of Los Angeles Dept, 
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978). 
491. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
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ployment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be 
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is 
prohibited. "492 
Two intertwined defenses emerged from Griggs: "business neces-
sity" and ''job-relatedness."493 "Business necessity" focuses on 
"whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such 
that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the 
business."494 Once the employer demonstrates that its employment 
practice is a business necessity, courts balance all the relevant factors 
to determine whether the necessity sufficiently outweighs the dis-
crimination.495 "Job-relatedness" essentially involves a comparison 
of legitimate job requirements with the employer's method for 
determining fitness. The employer must demonstrate, "by profes-
sionally acceptable methods,"496 that the criterion used is "predictive 
of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behav-
ior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candi-
dates are being evaluated."497 The plaintiff may rebut either defense 
492. 401 U.S. at 431. 
493. Griggs used the terms in the same sentence and did not differentiate between the two. 
Some subsequent decisions have attempted to distinguish the two defenses. "Job-relatedness" 
applies only to criteria used to determine whether an applicant or employee can perform the 
job. For example, the requirement of a high school diploma, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424, an em-
ployer's height and weight requirements, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), and 
passing scores on standardized tests, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976), would be eval-
uated under •~ob-relatedness." "Business necessity" applies to other employment practices. 
For example, an employer would attempt to use business necessity to justify not hiring some-
one who has been convicted of a crime, Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 
1975), not hiring someone whose wages were subject to garnishment, Wallace v. Debron Corp., 
494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974), or using a seniority system that had a racially discriminatory 
impact. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
The distinction between the two defenses becomes virtually obscured in the context of 
genetic and biological screening. An employer's justification for using these procedures neces-
sarily involves elements of both defenses. See, e.g., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 546 F. 
Supp. 259 (N.D. Ala. 1982): 
It is clear that the firing of a pregnant employee was not necessary to the safe and efficient 
provision of medical services by the hospital to its patients. The fact that the plantiffwas 
pregnant in no way undermined her ability to take x-rays of patients. 
In other words, there was no business necessity because the requirement was not job-related. 
494. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 
1006 (1971). See text accompanying note 421 supra. See generally Note, Business Necessity 
Under Title VII oj'the Civil Rights Act oj' 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 
(1974). 
495. According to one court, Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 35, 42 (E.D. Va. 
1976), balancing involves a consideration of the nature of the business involved, the business 
practice at issue, and the degree of discriminatory impact. Where the job requires a high 
degree of skill and responsibility, however, the courts may be more likely to permit an em-
ployer to use narrow selection criteria. See, e.g., Spurlock v. United. Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 
216, 219 (10th Cir. 1972). 
496. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 431. 
497. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 431 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)). 
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by demonstrating that "other tests or selection devices, without a 
similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's 
legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship.' "498 
Defendants rarely surmount these obstacles in medical screening 
cases. In EEOC v. Trai/ways, 499 for example, a black employee suf-
fering from pseudo folliculitis barbae, a skin disorder resulting from 
ingrown hairs when the person is clean shaven, challenged his em-
ployer's "no beard" policy. The plaintiff made out a prima facie 
case by demonstrating that the disorder affects twenty-five percent of 
black males, but less than one percent of white males. The employer 
could not make out a business necessity defense.500 
In Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospita!,501 the court seemed un-
persuaded by the suggestion that business necessity included "the 
avoidance of possible future liability to the fetus. Such an unwar-
ranted extension would shift the focus of the business necessity de-
fense from a focus of concern for the safety of hospital patients to a 
focus of concern for hospital finances."502 In Zuniga v. Kleberg 
County Hospital, so3 the Fifth Circuit used different reasoning,504 but 
nonetheless found that the availability of a less discriminatory alter-
native defeated the employer's business necessity defense.505 
Defendants can prevail. In Smith v. Olin Chemical Corp. ,506 the 
employer discharged plaintiff from his position of manual laborer 
after an x-ray revealed bone degeneration of the spine with a prog-
nosis of possible further degeneration. The employee alleged that 
sickle cell anemia caused his condition and, therefore, the em-
; ployer's policy had a disparate impact on blacks. The district court 
granted summary judgment for the defendant and the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed. Despite the disparate impact of the employer's policy, the 
court considered the manifest job-relatedness so apparent that it did 
not even require the employer to present a business necessity de-
498. 422 U.S. at 42S. 
499. S30 F. Supp. S4 (D. Colo. 1981). 
S00. Accord, Shelby Township Fire Dept. v. Shields, 98 Mich. App. 11S, 320 N.W.2d 306 
(1982) (no beard rule, as applied to plaintiff with pseudofolliculitis barbae, violates state hand-
icap discrimination law). But see EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, 63S F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980); 
Smith v. Delta Air Lines, 486 F.2d S12 (5th Cir. 1973); EEOC v. Sambo's Ga., Inc., S30 F, 
Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (neither case involved a medical condition). 
SOI. S46 F. Supp. 2S9 (N.D. Ala. 1982). 
S02. S46 F. Supp. at 264. 
S03. 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982). 
S04. 692 F.2d at 992 n.10. 
SOS. 692 F.2d at 992-94. Because the Hayes court also found a less discriminatory alterna-
tive, S46 F. Supp. at 264, its discussion of business necessity technically was dictum. 
S06. SSS F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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fense. In one EEOC decision,507 however, the employer's policy of 
rejecting all applicants on the basis of sickle cell anemia was held to 
violate Title VII. 
The paucity of cases renders prediction about the success of de-
fenses venturesome. Nonetheless, courts seem likely to require em-
ployers to prove the following: (1) there is a valid basis for excluding 
workers who are presently capable of performing the required work 
but who may become physically unable or impaired at some point in 
the future; (2) it is essential to the business that employees not suffer 
or be suffering from an occupational illness; (3) there is a high corre-
lation between a specific genetic, cytogenetic, or biological trait and 
the individual's increased risk of disease; (4) the specific screening 
procedure used to determine the presence of the trait has a high pre-
dictive value; and (5) no other medical or employment procedure 
can achieve the desired goal with less of a discriminatory impact. 
2. .Disparate Treatment 
a. Prima facie case. In the context of medical screening, dispa-
rate treatment most frequently affects women. A woman's actual or 
believed predisposition to occupational illness causes employers to 
react in several ways. Some employers may impose conditions on 
women that they do not impose on men. Second, an employer might 
conclude that women in general are more susceptible to occupational 
illness when exposed to certain toxic substances, such as lead and 
benzene. Third, an employer might believe that the combined effects 
of workplace exposure and another factor uniquely affecting a sub-
class of women, such as those women taking oral contraceptives, pre-
disposes the subclass to occupational illness. 508 
The first model represents the "classic" stereotypical disparate 
treatment discrimination509 reasoning that Title VII seeks to pro-
hibit. In Wroblewski v. Lexington Gardens, Inc., 510 a medical ques-
tionnaire inquired into the urogenital health of women, but 
contained no similar inquiries of men.511 This difference - imposing 
a burden on women not imposed upon men - violated the state 
507. EEOC Dec. No. 81-8, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) ~ 6764 (1980). 
508. q: Z. liARsANYI & R. HUTTON, supra note 52, at 16 (women with blood type A who 
take oral contraceptives are five times more susceptible to blood clots). 
509. See note 478 supra. 
510. 188 Conn. 44, 448 A.2d 801 (1982). 
511. The employer claimed that it elicited the information from men at a medical exami-
nation of a type which women found offensive. 188 Conn. at _, 448 A.2d at 806. The record 
revealed, however, that the employer did not always insist upon such information from men. 
188 Conn. at_, 448 A.2d at 806. 
1458 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 81:1379 
employment discrimination law. Similarly, in Rosenfeld v. Southern 
Pac!fic Co., 512 the employer refused to consider a woman for a posi-
tion because it believed the arduous nature of the work rendered 
women unsuited for the job. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding 
of a Title VII violation.5 13 
The second approach also involves disparate treatment, in that 
all women are excluded from employment, but di.ff ers in that the 
employer's decision may be based on some scientific evidence. In 
the occupational health area, definitive scientific conclusions often 
lag well behind the first available data. The danger is that employers 
may use scant data to justify sweeping exclusionary policies.514 
In City of Los Angeles v. Manhart,515 the Supreme Court held 
that employers may not require female employees to make larger 
contributions to a pension fund than male employees. Even though, 
as a class, women live longer than men, not all of the women will 
live longer than all of the men in the class. Therefore, as applied to 
individuals (whose life span obviously cannot be calculated prospec-
tively), the use of sex-based mortality tables violated Title VII.516 
Based on Manhart, sex-based studies of injury and illness rates517 
cannot justify disparate treatment_. 
The third illustration involves "sex plus" discrimination, in 
which "the employer does not discriminate against the class of men 
or women as a whole, but rather disparately treats a subclass of men 
or women."518 Disparate treatment of a subclass of one sex can be 
unlawful sex discrimination.519 Thus, "no marriage" rules for wo-
men but not men violate Title Vll.520 These same principles would 
512. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971). 
513. 444 F.2d at 1225. 
514. There is ''very little scientific data" which supports the lead and benzene example. 
Conibear, Women as a High Risk Population, SOCIETY FOR OCCUPATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
HEALTH, 1976 PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE ON WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE 169; see 
note 89 supra and accompanying text. 
515. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
516. "The statute's focus on the individual is unambiguous. It precludes treatment of indi-
viduals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class . • • • Even a true 
generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom 
the generalization does not apply." 435 U.S. at 708. 
517. See, e.g., Root & Daley, Are Women Safer Workers? A New Look at the /Jato, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1980, at 3. 
518. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 403 (2d ed. 1983), 
519. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam). 
520. See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
991 (1971); Vuyanich v. Republic Natl. Bank, 409 F. Supp. 1083 (N.D. Tex. 1976); cf. Jacobs v. 
Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977) (demotion of 
unwed pregnant woman where male unwed father would not have been demoted held to vio-
late Title VII). 
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apply to occupational safety and health related "sex plus" 
discrimination. 521 
b. Bona fide occupational qual!fication (BFOQ). Section 703(e) 
of Title VII522 permits employers to differentiate in hiring on the 
basis of religion, sex or national origin "in those certain instances 
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business or enterprise." Both EEOC's Interpretive Guide-
lines523 and judicial decisions524 make it clear that the defense is 
available only where members of one sex are unable to perform the 
duties essential to the job.525 
In illustrations one and two, any asserted BFOQ defense would 
fail; neither class-based stereotypes526 nor membership in a "higher 
risk" class ( even if proved)527 will justify the failure to hire all indi-
viduals within a protected class. Illustration three, however, raises 
more difficult problems because not all women are excluded from 
521. The most common form of sex-plus discrimination involving health hazards is the 
policy of excluding pregnant or fertile women, although this may be considered facially neu-
tral discrimination. See notes 529-65 i,ifra and accompanying text. 
522. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). 
523. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1982). 
524. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
525. To sustain a BFOQ defense to a charge of sex discrimination, the employer must 
prove that it "had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or 
substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job 
involved." Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969). 
This defense is difficult to sustain. There are two main theories about the amount of proof 
needed to sustain the defense. The majority opinion in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 
U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam), adopted the Fifth Circuit's interpretation from Weeks. Justice 
Marshall, in his concurrence in Phillips, argued that the BFOQ defense is limited "to job situa-
tions that require specific physical characteristics necessarily possessed by only one sex." 400 
U.S. at 545-46. The EEOC has followed Justice Marshall's position. See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1604.2(a) (1982). Under either theory, however, the defense is difficult to prove. See gener-
ally Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qual!ftcation, 55 
TEX. L. REV. 1025 (1977). The BFOQ defense has succeeded primarily when hiring a member 
of a particular sex was essential to maintaining security and order, to protect legitimate privacy 
interests, and because of the need for sex authenticity. See, eg., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 
U.S. 321, 332-37 (1977) (potential disruption of prison security justified exclusion of female 
guards from "contact" positions in maximum security prisons); Brooks v. ACF Indus., 537 F. 
Supp. 1122 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) (upholding exclusion of women from job of male bathhouse 
janitor); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978) (upholding 
exclusion of male nurse from small nursing home with female patients whose privacy would be 
infringed), qffd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979); Button v. Rockefeller, 76 Misc. 2d 701, 
351 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1973) (authenticity requirement justified hiring of only women for position 
of undercover policewoman). The EEOC's example of authenticity is actor or actress. See 29 
C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1982). 
526. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2{a)(l)(ii) (1982). 
527. It is not clear whether the BFOQ defense applies where an individual is presently 
capable of performing the job, but may not be able to perform in the future. See Williams, 
supra note 308, at 68 I & n.230. 
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hiring. Nevertheless, to maintain a BFOQ defense to sex-plus dis-
crimination, the employer would probably need to prove the follow-
ing: (1) there is a valid scientific basis for the conclusion; (2) because 
the sex differentiation must be essentia!,528 there must be no other 
available means (such as personal protective equipment, medical 
surveillance or administrative controls) to provide a safe work envi-
ronment; and (3) the employer is in compliance with OSHA 
standards. 
3. Pregnancy and Fertility 
Pregnant women pose two related health concerns when exposed 
to toxic substances in the workplace: danger to the woman at a time 
of possibly increased susceptibility529 and danger to the fetus.530 Al-
though pregnancy-related employment decisions invariably consider 
both concerns, the danger to the fetus has received primary 
attention. 531 
In 1978 Title VII was amended to prohibit discrimination in em-
ployment based on pregnancy, childbirth or related medical condi-
tions. 532 Thus, any treatment of pregnant women must accord with 
the treatment of other persons. Because an employee's heightened 
risk of illness justifies excluding an employee from the workplace, a 
pregnant woman could be excluded, but only by applying the same 
standards.533 Exclusions of pregnant women to protect feta/ health 
528. We begin with the proposition that the use of the word "necessary" in section 
703(e) requires that we aeply a business necessity test, not a business convenience test. 
That is to say, discrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the business 
operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively. 
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis in original). 
529. See note 104 supra and accompanying text. 
530. See notes 105-21 supra and accompanying text. 
531. There are two main reasons for employer interest in fetal health: (1) the moral obliga-
tion of the employer to protect the next generation from injury; and (2) the fear of civil liabil-
ity. See Williams, supra note 308, at 644. 
532. The amendment provides in pertinent part: 
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to, 
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and 
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated 
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe 
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to 
work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit 
otherwise. 
Pub. L. No. 95-555, § I, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. II 1973)). 
533. See Smith v. Olin Chem. Corp., 555 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1977). Compare Harriss v. 
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980), and Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc,, 
29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 32,905 (E.D. Tex. 1982) (passenger safety justifies exclusion of 
pregnant flight attendants), with MacLennan v. American Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 466, 472 
(E.D. Va. 1977) ("[T]he incantation of a safety rationale is not an abracadabra to which this 
Court must defer judgment."). 
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would seem to warrant a similar approach. Substantial scientific evi-
dence that a pregnant woman is being exposed to a known teratogen, 
that continued exposure will present a substantial danger to the fe-
tus, and that exposure levels of the mother cannot be reduced to ac-
ceptable levels through feasible means should enable an employer to 
exclude the woman from further exposure. 
These requirements place significant burdens on employers. In 
Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital,534 the employer fired a pregnant 
x-ray technician. Because the employer could have protected the fe-
tus by the less discriminatory means of rearranging plaintiffs duties, 
the employer could not maintain a BFOQ or business necessity de-
fense. 535 In Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hospital, 536 the employer 
failed to grant a pregnant x-ray technician a leave of absence.537 
Both cases indicate how seriously courts take sex discrimination, 
even when faced with a serious threat to the fetus. Although Title 
VII does not explicitly require employers to provide alternative op-
portunities for pregnant employees, the failure to consider such less 
discriminatory measures undermines the employer's defenses.538 
Provision of alternative opportunities may not solve the problem, 
however. Exposure to embryofetotoxins and teratogens poses grave 
health risks to the fetus throughout the term of the mother's preg-
nancy, including, and often especially, during the period of organo-
genesis, which occurs between the second and eighth week of 
gestation.539 Because most women do not become aware of their 
534. 546 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Ala. 1982). 
535. 546 F. Supp. at 264; see notes 501-05 supra and accompanying text. The court sug-
gested that a BFOQ defense does not apply because the issue of fetal health is unrelated to the 
woman's ability to perform the job, the only permissible use of the BFOQ defense. 546 F. 
Supp. at 263; cf. Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 371 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: 
Tlte .Dilemma of the Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 IOWA 
L. REV. 63, 92-101 (1980); see alro Williams, supra note 308, at 681 & n.230. Furthermore, the 
business necessity defense does not apply to disparate impact discrimination. See note 478 
supra. Business necessity is a judicially created defense and can be expanded by the judiciary 
where appropriate. Certainly, the vital public policy interests in fetal health and equal em-
ployment opportunity require a less rigid approach, although not a less demanding standard. 
See Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 991-92 (5th Cir. 1982). 
536. 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982). 
537. 692 F.2d at 988. 
538. See Fancher v. Nimmo, 549 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (apparent Title VII viola-
tion by employer who removed pregnant woman employee exposed to radiation, to have her 
return to work under conditions differing from other employees returning to work after ab-
sences due to reasons other than pregnancy); see also Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 
(1977); Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1981) (reassigning preg-
nant employee to duties which would risk harm to herself and her fetus constituted construc-
tive discharge). 
539. See notes 110-15 supra and accompanying text. 
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pregnancy until well into this period of fetal development, the dam-
age to the fetus may be done before the woman can be removed from 
exposure. 
Many employers have attempted to resolve this problem by sim-
ply refusing to hire fertile women. Such exclusionary policies could 
affect as many as twenty million jobs in this country.540 As many as 
100,000 jobs already are closed to women because they involve re-
productive hazards.541 Although few plaintiffs have challenged these 
policies, 542 the crucial, complex, and controversial nature of these 
issues has stirred debate in OSHA, 543 EEOC544 and legal 
literature. 545 
Four arguments can be raised to challenge the validity and legal-
ity of exclusionary practices. First, what some employers euphemis-
tically call a "fetal protection program" is, in ·reality, nothing more 
than a "liability prevention program." Employers genuinely inter-
ested in the health of the offspring would ban pregnant women from 
smoking at work and would counsel pregnant women on the need to 
avoid taking drugs, to limit alcohol intake, and to maintain proper 
diet, rest and prenatal medical care.546 Only where there is the possi-
540. Interpretive Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproductive Hazards, 
45 Fed. Reg. 7514, 7514 (proposed Feb. I, 1980), withdrawn, 46 Fed. Reg. 3916 (1981). 
541. Wash. Post, Nov. 3, 1979, § A, at 6, col. 5, cited in Williams, supra note 308, at 647 
n.30. 
542. See Doerr v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 484 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (dismissed for 
failure to obtain right to sue letter from EEOC); Christman v. American Cyanamid Co., No. 
80-0024 (N.D. W. Va. filed Jan. 30, 1980). Four other cases have been settled. See Williams, 
supra note 308, at 642 n. I I. 
543. See American Cyanamid Co., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1596, 1981 O.S.H. DEc. (CCH) 
~ 25,338 (1981),petitionfor review filed, No. 81-1687 (D.C. Cir. June 22, 1981) (vacating gen-
eral duty clause citation issued because employer had policy of excluding women aged 16 to 50 
who had not been surgically sterilized from working in lead pigments department); notes 356-
60 supra and accompanying text. 
544. On February I, 1980, the Department of Labor and the EEOC published Proposed 
Interpretive Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproductive Hazards, 45 Fed. 
Reg. 7514 (1980). Although withdrawn on January 13, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 3916 (1981), the 
Proposed Guidelines indicated that the exclusion of pregnant women might be acceptable, but 
not the exclusion of all women of childbearing capacity. 
545. See generally Crowell & Copus, Sefety and Equality at Odds: OSHA and Title VII 
Clash Over Health Hazards in the Workplace, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 567 (1978); Finneran, Title 
VII and Restrictions on Employment of Fertile Women, 31 LAB. L.J. 223 (1980); Furnish, supra 
note 535; Howard, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: Implications for the Employment 
Rights of Women, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1981); Williams, supra note 308; Note, Employment 
Rights of Women in the Toxic Workplace, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1113 (1977); Note, Exclusionary 
Employment Practices in Hazardous Industries: Protection or Discrimination?, 5 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 97 (1978); Note, Birth Defects Caused by Parental Exposure to Workplace Hazards: 
the Interface of Title VII with OSHA and Tort Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 237 (1979), 
546. See WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, COMMENT ON 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND REPRODUCTIVE 
HAZARDS 18 (1980). 
May 1983) Occupational Illness 1463 
bility of employer liability, however, have any actions been taken. 
But this argument, undoubtedly true in some instances, has only a 
rhetorical value: the lack of genuine humanitarian motivation does 
not, in itself, establish that the practice is illegal. 
Second, employers apply exclusionary practices selectively to wo-
men working in traditional male jobs. No employer has yet ordered 
that all female nurses of childbearing capacity be excluded from 
working in operating rooms, where there is exposure to anesthetic 
gases, which are teratogenic. 547 This argument is also largely rhetor-
ical. It may be accurate social commentary to say that many em-
ployers are eager to exclude women, except when they are needed, 
but this hardly supports any legal theories. 
Third, it can be more forcefully argued that prohibiting all wo-
men of childbearing capacity is overinclusive. Employer practices 
generally do not consider the woman's age, marital status, sexual ac-
tivity, contraception or the fertility of the woman's husband or part-
ner. There is, in effect, a conclusive presumption that a woman 
biologically capable of conception may, in fact, become pregnant 
and carry the child to term. 54s 
The most compelling legal argument is that excluding women of 
childbearing capacity is underinclusive. The same substances that 
pose teratogenic hazards usually are mutagenic as well, and pose se-
rious health threats to the offspring of the male workers. 549 Some 
substances actually pose greater danger to male reproductive systems 
than female reproductive systems.550 Nevertheless, only women have 
been excluded from employment. 551 
547. See UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, COMMENT ON INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES 
ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS 5 (1980) [hereinafter cited 
as UNITED STEELWORKERS COMMENT);seealso Genetic Screening Hearings,supra note 136, at 
13-14 (testimony of Joan Bertin); id at 34-36 (testimony of Jeanne Stellman); A. HRICKO & M. 
BRUNT, supra note 100, at ch. 10. 
548. See Genetic Screening Hearings, supra note 136, at 32-33 (testimony of Jeanne 
Stellman); UNITED STEELWORKERS COMMENT, supra note 547, at 4; Letter to the Editor from 
Mary-Win O'Brien, 22 J. OccuP. MED. 510 (1980). These policies also tend to exert economic 
coercion on fertile women to become sterilized in order to retain their jobs. See Genetic 
Screenings Hearings, supra note 136, at 7011 (testimony of Joan Bertin). 
549. See note 121 supra and accompanying text. 
550. See notes 97, 101-03 supra and accompanying text. 
551. One would be tempted to ask why, in light of all the evidence establishing relation-
ships between paternal exposures and birth defects, the employer would choose to implement a 
one-sex exclusionary policy. Aside from the theory that this is merely a blatant form of sex 
discrimination, see Petchesky, Workers' Reproductive Hazards and the Politics of Protection: 
An Introduction, 5 FEMINIST STUDIES 233 (1979), at least four possible reasons may be sug-
gested. First, the employer may be ignorant of the scientific evidence and is proceeding under 
the stereotypical notion that birth defects are attributable only to maternal exposures. Second, 
perhaps the employer believes that only the employee-mother of a deformed child would asso-
ciate the birth defect with the workplace exposure and would sue the employer or, if two 
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From a legal standpoint, reproductive policies of employers must 
be gender neutral. The burden of justifying any sex-specific prac-
tices rests on the employer. An employer seeking to exclude women 
of childbearing capacity should, at least, be required to prove: ( 1) 
that there is exposure to embryofetotoxic or teratogenic substances; 
and (2) that the substances do not pose reproductive hazards to male 
employees. 552 
Employers may face even heavier burdens. In Wright v. Olin 
Corp., 553 the Fourth Circuit scrutinized the employer's "fetal vulner-
ability" program.554 Technically, the court merely remanded the 
case for consideration of the employer's business necessity de-
fense.555 The opinion, however, offers very specific guidance to the 
trial court concerning what factors to consider. 
The employer must prove, as part of its affirmative defense, that 
exposure of women to the hazards of these jobs presents unique, sig-
nificant dangers to fetuses.556 In addition, the employer must 
demonstrate that the program effectively prevents these dangers.557 
similar suits were brought, the child of an exposed mother would be more likely to recover 
than the child of an exposed father. Third, an employer may reason that it cannot remove all 
of its employees from hazardous exposures and women are more at risk than men. Fourth, 
controls to reduce exposure to below spermatogenic effect levels may be technologically 
achievable, whereas controls to reduce exposures to below teratogenic and embryofetotoxic 
levels may not be achievable. See Genetic Screening Hearings, supra note 136, at 70 (testimony 
of Bruce Karrh). 
552. For a discussion of other approaches to the problems, see Furnish, supra note 535, at 
115-18; Williams, supra note 308, at 665-68. 
553. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). The court refused to reach several issues of sex dis• 
crimination on jurisdictional grounds because the EEOC failed to make a finding of reason• 
able cause. 697 F.2d at 1176-78. But cf. Note, Judicial Responses to the EEOC's Failure lo 
Al/empt Conciliation, 81 MICH, L. REV. 433, 447-52 (1982) (suggesting that the conciliation 
requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit by the EEOC). The court, however, 
properly exercised jurisdiction over the issues raised by the individual plaintiffs which encom-
passed the challenge to the fetal vulnerability program. 
554. Olin Corp. classified jobs as either restricted, controlled or uncontrolled. Fertile wo-
men could not hold restricted jobs. Women could hold controlled jobs only after acknowledg-
ing the risk in writing. Pregnant women could hold such jobs only by permission, granted on a 
case-by-case basis. Women could freely hold uncontrolled positions. See 697 F.2d at 1182. 
The trial court analyzed this program under the disparate treatment paradigm, finding the 
discrimination justified by factors other than sex. EEOC v. Olin Corp., 24 Fair Empl. Prac, 
Cas. (BNA) 1646, 1659 (W.D.N.C. 1980), qjfd in part, vacated and remanded in part sub nom. 
Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). Because plaintiffs failed to prove the 
program was a pretext for intentional sex discrimination, the trial court held for defendants, 
See 697 F.2d at 1186-87. 
555. The Fourth Circuit treated the case under the disparate impact paradigm. 697 F.2d at 
1186. Thus, the burden fell upon the employer to prove that the fetal vulnerability program 
served a necessary business purpose. 697 F.2d at 1187. 
556. 697 F.2d at 1190. If the dangers are not unique to the exposure of women - i.e, if 
exposing men to the conditions poses similar risks to fetuses - then fatal vulnerability cannot 
explain the discriminatory impact upon women. 
557. 697 F.2d at 1190. 
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These contentions require objective scientific evidence, probably in-
cluding expert testimony.558 Plaintiffs may, of course, refute the de-
fense by demonstrating that less discriminatory alternatives could 
protect fetuses. 559 
Two troubling policy issues flow from this legal standard. First, 
requiring the employer to prove that a substance is teratogenic but 
not hazardous to the offspring of male employees in effect places the 
burden of medical uncertainty on the fetus.560 Second, without other 
coordinate efforts to improve reproductive health in the workplace, 
prohibiting the exclusion of women merely equalizes, or arguably 
widens, the risks.561 
New efforts are needed to minimize the dangers of reproductive 
hazards in the workplace, efforts that include a larger role for the 
affected employees. The following recommendations move six steps 
closer to that goal:562 
(1) all employees subject to possible reproductive hazards must be in-
formed in writing of the specific substances involved; 
(2) employers must ~dvise employees in writing of the possible short-
term and long-term effects of exposure and provide them with 
available literature on the substances and the nature of the 
hazards; 
(3) no employer may condition employment on the employee being 
sterilized; 
(4) employers must make pregnancy and fertility testing available; 
(5) medical removal protection must be provided for employees at-
tempting to become parents, especially pregnant employees;563 and 
(6) employers must make ongoing efforts to reduce exposure levels 
through improved control technologies, substitution of substances 
and better personal protective equipment.564 
558. 697 F.2d at 1190. A good faith belief that dangers exist does not establish business 
necessity, but the employer need not await scientific consensus before acting. 697 F.2d at 
1190-91. "It suffices to show that within [the scientific] community there is so considerable a 
body of opinion that significant risk exists ... that an informed employer could not respon-
sibly fail to act on the assumption that this opinion might be the accurate one." 697 F.2d at 
1191. 
559. Unless the showing establishes that the employer overreacted to a degree that indi-
cates intentional discrinlination, the employees' remedy will be measured by the alternative 
policy rather than the employment conditions available for men. 697 F.2d at 1192. 
560. Cf. Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 690 (1980) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (plurality's holding in "benzene case" placed the burden of medical 
uncertainty on the worker). 
561. See Howard, supra note 545, at 835-36. 
562. Few of these recommendations involve Title VII, per se, but are included in the Title 
VII section for purposes of continuity. The most likely federal statutory basis for implement-
ing these recommendations is OSHA. 
563. See Appendix C to OSHA Lead Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1982) (recom-
mending medical removal of employees attempting to parent a child). 
564. Even these recommendations cannot totally eliminate the possibility that a woman 
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The Connecticut Reproductive Hazards Act565 is the first state 
law to address many of these issues. Among other things, it requires 
employers to notify employees working with reproductive hazards, 
prohibits conditioning employment on sterilization and requires em-
ployers to make reasonable efforts to transfer a pregnant employee 
to a temporary job and to take other reasonable measures to protect 
the reproductive health of employees. 
4. Employee Refusals To Take Medical Tests 
Title VII may provide an applicant or employee with the right to 
refuse to take medical tests. Section 704(a)566 provides that an em-
ployer may not retaliate against an employee or applicant "because 
he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice 
by this title . . . ." Most of the cases brought under this section in-
volve alleged employer retaliation after the filing of a charge with 
the EEOC.567 Nevertheless, some cases involve employee "opposi-
tion" to illegal practices of the employer.568 
No court has ever decided whether section 704(a) protects an em-
ployee who refuses to submit to a test that he or she believes is dis-
criminatory. The one case in which the issue arose was decided on 
would become pregnant and not discover she was pregnant until after some teratogenic effect 
had occurred. Certainly, OSHA cannot be expected to provide adequate protection for the 
fetus. See Furnish,supra note 535, at 70-74. Although it is extremely unpleasant to couch the 
issue in such Draconian terms, the question may become whether society is willing to accept 
some risks of deformed children from maternal exposure to teratogens as the price for equal 
employment opportunities for hundreds of thousands of women. Society has been willing to 
accept the risks of mutagenesis from male exposures, which may be even worse because the 
effects of mutagenesis may carry well beyond a single generation. Society has been willing to 
accept the risks of teratogenesis from other maternal exposures such as cigarette smoking, 
alcohol, and drugs. Indeed, the federal government has recently limited eligibility for its pre-
natal nutrition program. See 1 C.F.R. § 246 (1982); 46 Fed. Reg. 31,035 (1981). Finally, soci-
ety has been willing to subsidize the tobacco industry, while cigarette smoking causes 200,000 
excess deaths a year, and is willing to accept 20,000 excess deaths from auto accidents each 
year because restraint systems are thought to be too expensive. See Dinman, Occupation 
Health and the Reality of Risk-An Eternal lJilemma of Tragic Choices, 22 J. OCCUP. MED. 
153 (1980); Sapolsky, The Political Obstacles to the Control of Cigarelle Smoking in the United 
Stales, 5 J. HEALTH POL. POLY. & L. 277 (1980). 
565. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(7) to (a)(IO) (West Supp. 1982). 
566. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3{a) (1976). 
561. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969). 
568. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Index Journal Co., 647 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1981) (opposition to 
a discriminatory job assignment); Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 
1971) (refusal to alter minority applicant's test scores to deny applicant employment). When 
an employee's opposition takes the form of disruptive activity, the courts will balance the 
competing interests of protecting persons who oppose discrimination with the employer's right 
to control its personnel. See Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, Inc., 
545 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1976). 
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other grounds.569 An employee, however, need not be correct in be-
lieving that a practice (or test) is discriminatory; a good faith belief 
suffices. 570 Based on these considerations an applicant or employee 
might validly refuse to submit to medical testing. If so, any retalia-
tion by the employer would violate Title VIL 
D. National Labor Relations Act and Collective Bargaining 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)57 I is another statute 
that may affect a company's medical practices. Workplace safety 
and health issues are mandatory subjects of good faith bargaining,572 
and health and safety provisions have been included in collective 
bargaining agreements for many years. 573 Moreover, such contracts 
often include arbitration clauses for resolving all employment dis-
putes. Although arbitration typically has upheld employment deci-
sions based on occupational health risks, 574 unilateral changes in 
work rules have been deemed violative of the collective bargaining 
agreement.575 Conceivably, collective bargaining could result in lim-
569. Munoz v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 563 F.2d 205 (5th 
Cir. 1977) (written examination). 
510. See, e.g., Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130 (5th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Moneiro v. Poole Silver Co., 615 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 
1980). 
571. 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-168 (1976). 
572. NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1967); San Isabel Elec. Servs., Inc., 
225 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1976). Sections 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), and 8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(5}, (b)(3), (d) (1976), taken together, require the employer and union to bargain in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. 
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958). 
573. See A. FREEDMAN, INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO HEALTH R!SK 46-50 (1981). According 
to one study, 82% of union contracts contained occupational safety and health clauses. Bu-
REAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 107 (9th ed. 1979). The 
subjects most often covered were safety equipment, first aid, medical examinations, accident 
investigation, employee obligations, hazardous work, and safety committees. Id. 
514. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 677 (3d ed. 1973); 
Wolkinson,Arbitration and the Employment Rights of the Physically Disadvantaged, 36 ARB. J., 
Mar. 1981, at 23, 24. In Olin Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 291 (1979) (Knudson, Arb.), the 
arbitrator upheld a company policy that excluded from job classifications where there was 
exposure to lead all female employees capable of child bearing. See also Stauffer Chem. Co., 
70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1276 (1982) (Bailey, Arb.) (pregnant employee who took sick leave to 
avoid toxic exposure entitled to sickness and accident benefits); Schmeller Aluminum Foundry 
Co., 78-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) ~ 8183 (1978) (Dyke, Arb.) (upholding intermittent trans-
fers, at same basic pay rate, to reduce employee's exposure to silicosis hazard). 
575. In Johns Manville Sales Corp. v. International Assn. of Machinists, 621 F.2d 756 (5th 
Cir. 1980), the employer adopted a work rule prohibiting smoking in the plant because of the 
increased health risks that smoking poses to employees working with asbestos. The arbitrator 
upheld a union charge that the new rule amounted to a unilateral change in working condi-
tions without bargaining with the union. The company challenged the arbitrator's decision as 
contrary to public policy, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to set aside 
the arbitration ruling. According to the court, the arbitration decision did not contravene pub-
lic policy: "If smoking in such plants should be prohibited even at the cost of employee dis-
charge, there are governmental agencies with authority to promulgate such a rule with the 
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itations on medical examinations576 (including an individual's right 
to refuse to be subjected to medical evaluation),577 changes in em-
ployee selection procedures based on susceptibility to occupational 
illness, and improvements in workplace hazard detection and 
abatement. 578 
These possibilities are unlikely to result in widespread employee 
protection for several reasons. First, only twenty percent of Ameri-
can workers belong to unions. 579 Second, employee selection is a 
prerogative prized by management and tangential to the union's pri-
mary mission of representing those employees already hired.580 
force oflaw." 621 F.2d at 759-60. The employer could not introduce such a rule in the middle 
of a contract's term without bargaining with the union. 
576. Currently, union influence generally affects only the conditions under which examina-
tions will be conducted. See OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LA-
BOR, WORKPLACE HEALTH AND SAFETY: A GUIDE TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 24-26 (1980) 
(hereinafter cited as GUIDE TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING]; see also Perkel & Frumin, Collec-
tive Bargaining: Another Approach to Job Sqfety and Health, in PROTECTING PEOPLE .\T 
WORK 247-59 (1980). 
577. The following provision has been suggested, but there is no evidence that it has ever 
been included. 
If an employee refuses any medical examination or biological monitoring process, the 
employer shall inform the employee of the possible health consequences involved. In no 
circumstances shall an employee be required to sign a release statement or any language 
purporting to release the employer from any liability under any law as a result of refusal 
to take the medical examinations or refusal to be involved in any biological monitoring 
activity. The employee should not be disciplined in any way. 
GUIDE TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note 576, at 26. 
A concerted refusal to undergo meµical examination done in good faith and that was 
neither disruptive nor "disloyal" would probably be considered protected activity under 
§ 8(a)(l), of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1976). q: NLRB v. Local 1229, !BEW (Jeffer-
son Standard Broadcasting Co.), 346 U.S. 464 (1953) (employees' distribution of defamatory 
handbills was sufficient disloyalty to constitute "cause" for dismissal despite fact that handbills 
were designed to put economic pressure on employer during labor dispute). By refusing to 
comply with a lawful condition of employment, however, the employees would be refusing to 
perform work because of a dispute about working conditions. Therefore, their legal status 
would be that of economic strikers who may not be discharged for union activities, but who 
can be permanently replaced. See NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
578. Some typical items in collective bargaining agreements provide for employee safety 
and health training, labor-management safety and health committees, increased environmen-
tal monitoring, the right of employees to refuse hazardous work, and protections against retali-
ation for employees who engage in safety and health activities. See GUIDE TO COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING, supra note 576. 
579. In 1980, of a total labor force of 106,500,000, there were 21,784,000 union members. 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 1980, at 394 (total labor force); id. at 429 (union membership). 
580. Applicants for employment frequently are not union members or, if they are, they are 
not presently within the bargaining unit. Therefore, employee selection is not likely to be 
viewed as an important concern by union negotiators. · But applicants are considered "employ-
ees" under the NLRA, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941), and employee 
selection therefore would be a mandatory subject of bargaining. q: Allied Chem. Workers v. 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971) (retirees are not employees and therefore the 
benefits of retirees are not a mandatory subject of bargaining). Nevertheless, unions are much 
more likely to use their economic leverage on issues directly affecting present unit employees. 
This fact is important to the employability of applicants whose increased risk is based on prior 
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Third, neither employees581 nor management582 have shown much 
interest in collective bargaining on safety and health matters. In a 
time of high unemployment, unions are likely to give priority to de-
mands for wages, hours, and job security over demands for safer 
conditions or fairer hiring practices. Given the NLRA's focus on 
labor-management relations rather than occupational health risks, 
collective bargaining will probably play only a limited role in the 
evolution of standards governing the employment of susceptible 
individuals. 583 
E. Privacy Issues 
Many employers require applicants and employees to complete 
detailed medical questionnaires as a condition of their employ-
ment. 584 Applicants and employees who refuse to complete the 
questionnaires often may be discharged or not hired;585 individuals 
who falsify the questionnaires are not hired, or are discharged upon 
discovery of falsification. 586 
Employers undertaking to screen out high-risk individuals may 
be tempted to expand the range of "medical" questions. Thus, em-
ployers might theorize that a complete picture of an individual's 
nonoccupational environmental influences only emerges from de-
tailed information about an individual's diet, hobbies, sexual activ-
ity, smoking, drinking and lifestyle.587 Extensive inquiries of this sort 
exposure at another workplace. See notes 202-08 supra and accompanying text. 
581. According to a 1977 study at the University of Michigan, "a little more safety and 
health" ranked well behind other job improvements, such as increased retirement benefits, 
more medical insurance, more paid vacation, shorter workweek, greater chance for promotion, 
and greater job security, as employment conditions for which workers would be willing to 
forego a 10% pay raise. Frenkel, Priest & Ashford, Occupational Sqfety and Health: A Report 
on Worker Perceptions, 103 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1980, at 11, 12. Moreover, occupa-
tional safety and health programs supported directly by unions have been minimal, with 
"small staffs and low funding" the norm. HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, SURVEY OF OCCUPA-
TIONAL HEALTH EFFORTS OF FIFTEEN MAJOR LABOR UNIONS (1976). 
582. "Generally speaking, union efforts at the bargaining table to impose more stringent 
controls over safety and health have been beaten back as cost conscious companies continue to 
guard zealously their 'managerial prerogatives' over these subject areas against erosion from 
any source." Cohen, The Occupational Sqfety and Health Act: A Labor Lawyer's Overview, 33 
OHIO ST. L.J. 788, 789 (1972). 
583. For a more extensive discussion of occupational health issues under the NLRA, see 
M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 473, ch. 11 (forthcoming 1983). 
584. See notes 237-47 supra and accompanying text. 
585. See note 239 supra and accompanying text. 
586. See, e.g., Interpace Corp., 54 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 534 (1970) (Myers, Arb.); PPG Indus., 
53 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 597 (1969) (Diff, Arb.). 
587. From a scientific standpoint, this information may be of only marginal value, at best. 
See notes 141-84 supra and accompanying text. Nevertheless, this fact does not necessarily 
mean that such information will not be sought, obtained, used, disseminated, and retained. 
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may needlessly intrude into the privacy of employees.588 
Constitutional and administrative constraints limit the amount of 
information public sector employers can demand,589 but private sec-
tor employees have few, if any, rights in this area. In Cort v. Bristol 
Myers Co. , 590 the court ruled that employees could not assert unlaw-
ful invasion of privacy after their employer fired them for refusing to 
complete an intrusive medical questionnaire.591 Because "plaintiffs 
declined to provide any information they regarded as confidential or 
personal, [t]he defendant's attempted invasion of privacy, if it was 
one, failed."592 
If courts remain reluctant to protect privacy interests in this area, 
statutory remedies may be necessary. In 1976, Maryland enacted the 
first law that limits the permissible scope of employer inquiry.593 
The statute provides for injunctive relief and damages.594 There are 
no reported cases, however, involving the law. 
The most intrusive employer medical procedure is the require-
ment that all applicants or employees submit to a medical examina-
tion. The increasing use of occupational medical screening creates a 
growing likelihood that applicants or employees would refuse to 
take such examinations on religious, ethical, medical, privacy or 
other grounds. Yet there is no constitutional or common law right to 
588. See generally INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE CORPORATION, part V (A. Westin & s. 
Salisbury eds. 1980). 
589. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (school teachers need not disclose organi-
zations to which they belong); Shuman v. Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449, 461 (E.D. Pa. 1979) 
(inquiry into policy officer's private sexual activities violated right of privacy); American Fed. 
of Govt. Employees v. Schlesinger, 443 F. Supp. 431 (D.D.C. 1978) (employees need not dis-
close associations of themselves and members of their family); see also Memorandum of Alan 
K. Campbell, Director of Office of Personnel Management (May 12, 1980) (advising federal 
agencies not to inquire about conduct of applicants and employees that is unrelated to the job, 
based on Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(IO) (Supp. II 1978)); cf. Doe v. 
General Servs. Admin., 544 F. Supp. 530 (D. Md. 1982). 
590. 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982). 
591. A pharmaceutical company required three long-time sales employees to complete a 
"biographical summary," which sought information about business experience, education, 
family, home ownership, physical data, activities, and aims. In the medical history section, 
they were asked about serious illnesses, operations, accidents, nervous disorders, smoking and 
drinking habits, off-the-job problems, principal worries, medication being taken, age and 
health of parents, and other questions. The employees considered this information personal 
and irrelevant and either refused to answer these questions or did so in a flippant manner. The 
employees were discharged, ostensibly for poor performance. The employees then brought 
actions for unlawful invasion of privacy and wrongful discharge. With respect to the invasion 
of privacy claim, the court ruled that because they did not complete the questionnaires, there 
was no invasion of privacy. 
592. 385 Mass. at......, 431 N.E.2d at 910. 
593. MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95A. (Michie rep!. vol. 1979). 
594. MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95A(e). 
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refuse an examination or test. 595 Unless the test procedure violates a 
specific statute, regulation, or collective bargaining agreement, the 
employee must submit or suffer the consequences. 596 
The employer's medical records raise different concerns. While 
OSHA requires that employees (but not job applicants) be given ac-
cess to their medical records, if they request, with the exception of 
seven health standards, 597 it does not establish an affirmative duty to 
disclose the results of medical examinations to employees. The 
OSHA access regulation may cause companies to reassess their poli-
cies, but generally employees still are not informed of the results of 
medical examinations and tests.598 
The possibility of civil liability presents the main legal obstacle to 
withholding medical information. A company and the physician 
may be liable for breaching the duty to inform the applicant or 
worker of any illness, occupational or nonoccupational, that medical 
personnel detected or should have detected.599 This principle should 
apply to all types of medical procedures, including biochemical ge-
netic screening and cytogenetic monitoring. 
Employees often are not informed about other health risks. Em-
595. In Garguil v. Tompkins, 525 F. Supp. 795 (N.D.N.Y. 1981), a female school teacher 
was dismissed for insubordination and incompetency after refusing to take a medical exam 
following an extended leave of absence. The teacher asserted that being examined by the 
school board's male physician ''violated her sense of privacy and was anathema to her private 
creed." In upholding her dismissal, the district court held that there was no constitutional 
right to refuse a medical examination because the physician was male. See also Welshhon v. 
Sivyer Steel Corp., 93 Lab. Cas. (CCH) (8th Cir. 1982) (upholding discharge under collective 
bargaining agreement where employee refused to have annual chest x-ray because of fear that 
radiation exposure is hazardous); Williams Pipe Line Co., 82-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 
~ 8227 (1982) (Moore, Arb.) (upholding discharge of employee who refused medical exam). 
596. OSHA's coke oven emissions standard contains a requirement that the employer must 
inform any employee who refuses a required medical examination of the possible health con-
sequences and must obtain a signed statement from the employee indicating that the employee 
understands the risks involved in such a refusal. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029(j)(l)(iii) (1982). It is 
not clear, however, whether this provision would prevent the employer from disciplining an 
employee who refused a medical examination. 
597. Vinyl chloride, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017(k)(4); inorganic arsenic, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1910.1018(n)(6)(D); lead, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(j)(3)(v); coke oven emissions, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1910.1029G)(5)(iii); cotton dust, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043(h)(5)(i); DBCP, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1910.1044(m)(5)(i); acrylonitrile, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1045(n)(6)(iii) (1982). 
598. "OSHA concludes on the basis of the record and its own experience that denial of 
direct, unrestricted access to exposure and medical information is commonplace, if not the 
universal practice of industry." OSHA Access to Employee Exposure and Medical Records 
Standard, 45 Fed. Reg. 35,225 (1980). For a summary of testimony of occupational physicians 
on this issue, see id. at 35,223-24. See also A. FREEDMAN, INDUSTRY REsPONSE TO HEALTH 
R1sK 17-21 (1981) (citing study of Linowes that 83% of "Fortune 500" companies responding 
to a survey denied workers access to their medical records). 
599. See note 690 infra; see also MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 19A (Michie Law. Co-op. 
1976) (when employer requires employee to take examination, employee must be furnished 
with a copy of the medical report). 
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ployers have a common law duty to apprise employees of latent dan-
gers, including the health hazards associated with toxic chemicals. 600 
In reality, however, employers rarely inform employees about the 
identities, properties and health risks of the toxic materials with 
which they work.601 
Statutory requirements supplement this common law duty. 
OSHA once proposed a sweeping Hazards Identification Stan-
dard, 602 but has replaced this with a more flexible, less extensive 
Hazard Communication Standard proposal. 603 At least nine states 
have enacted "workers' right to know" laws.604 These statutes typi-
cally require the employer to post notices or other information re-
garding the identity and health hazards of substances in the 
workplace. 605 
As of 1980 employees have a right to see their medical records 
pursuant to OSHA's Access to Employee Exposure and Medical 
Records Standard.606 This comprehensive regulation607 was promul-
600. See note 667 infra. A company may also be liable in tort for failing to disclose that 
employees are working with a hazardous product (e.g., asbestos). See note 697 Infra and ac-
companying text. Physicians may be liable for failing to disclose the health risks of specific 
employment. See Halligan, The Standard of J)isc/osure by Physicians to Patients: Competing 
Models of Informed Consent, 41 LA. L. Rev. 9, 25-35 (1980) (discussing tort action for deceit). 
601. See generally Note, Occupational Health Risks and tlte Worker's Rig/ti lo Know, 90 
YALE L.J. 1792 (1981). 
602. OSHA, Proposed Hazards Identification Standard, 46 Fed. Reg. 4412-53 (1981), wlllt• 
drawn, 46 Fed. Reg. 12,020 (1981). 
603. 47 Fed. Reg. 12,092 (1982). 
604. CAL. LAB. CODE§ 6408 (Deering 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 31-40c (1981); ME. REV, 
STAT, ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1701-1707 (West Supp. 1982); MICH, COMP. LAWS § 408.1011 (1979) 
(MICH. STAT, ANN. § 17.50 (l l)(c) (Callaghan Cum. Supp. 1981-82)); N.Y. LAB, LAW art, 28, 
§§ 875-883 (McKinney Supp. 1982); Or. Gen. Occup. Health Regs. 22-015 (1981); WASH. REV, 
CoDE § 49.17.220(3) (1981); W. VA. CODE§ 21-3-18 (1981); 1981 Wis. Legis. Serv. ch. 364, at 
1822 (West); see also LA. Rev. STAT, ANN. tit. 23, § 1126 (West Supp. 1981) (right of access to 
exposure records only). 
605. The California statute, for example, provides: 
All employers shall provide information in the following ways, as prescribed by author-
ized regulations: • 
(a) Posting of information regarding protections and obligations of employees under 
occupational safety and health laws. 
(b) Posting prominently each citation issued under Section 6317, or a copy or copies 
thereof, at or near each place a violation referred to in the notice of violation occurred, 
(c) The opportunity for employees or their representatives to observe monitoring or 
measuring of employee exposure to hazards conducted pursuant to standards promul-
gated under Section 142.3. 
(d) Allow access by employees or their representatives to accurate records of em-
ployee exposures to potentially toxic materials or harmful physical agents. 
(e) Notification of any employee who has been or is being exposed to toxic materials 
or harmful physical agents in concentrations or at levels exceeding those prescribed by an 
applicable standard, order, or special order, and informing any employee so exposed of 
corrective action being taken. 
CAL. LAB. CODE§ 6408 (Deering 1976). 
606. 45 Fed. Reg. 35,2°12-303 (1980), codtfted at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20 (1982). 
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gated to facilitate worker participation in personal health manage-
ment, worker discovery of, and efforts to control, occupational 
health hazards, physician ability to diagnose and treat occupational 
disease, and employee awareness and improved work practices.608 
Employers have even freer access to medical information regard-
ing their employees. The Code of Ethics for Physicians Providing 
Occupational Medical Services provides that "employers are entitled 
to counsel about the medical fitness of an individual in relation to 
work but are not entitled to diagnoses or details of a specific na-
ture."609 In practice, however, management has much more exten-
sive access to employee medical records.610 Unfortunately, there are 
few legal restrictions on such disclosures. As a practical matter, the 
employee may never know of such disclosures. In addition, as a con-
dition of employment, employees often sign blanket waivers author-
izing the company to use medical and personnel records as it deems 
necessary. Moreover, liability for wrongful disclosure stems from a 
breach of the physician's duty of confidentiality. Many courts hold, 
however, that there is no physician-patient relationship where the 
company provides the physician.611 
607. For a detailed description of the provisions of the standard, see notes 361-62 supra 
and accompanying text. 
608. 45 Fed. Reg. at 35,219-22. Besides OSHA's Access Standard, which only applies to 
toxic substances, there are few legal requirements that employers give employees the right of 
access to their medical records. In some states workers have a specific right of access to their 
medical records, usually as part of a broader right to.review their entire personnel record. The 
only other source of an access right is through a collective bargaining agreement. 
609. Physicians should treat as confidential whatever is learned about individuals 
served, releasing information only when required by law or by overriding public health 
considerations, or to other physicians at the request of the individual according to tradi-
tional medical ethical practice; and should recognize that employers are entitled to coun-
sel about the medical fitness of individuals in relation to work, but are not entitled to 
diagnoses or details of a specific nature. 
AMERICAN OCCUPATIONAL MEDICAL ASSOCIATION CODE OF ETHICAL CONDUCT, Principle 7 
(1976). 
610. 45 Fed. Reg. at 35,242-43. See generally The Privacy Commission Recommendations 
on Employee Access in INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE CORPORATION (A. Westin & s. Salisbury 
eds. 1980); Annas, Legal Aspects of Co,ifidentiality in the Occupational Setting, 18 J. OccuP. 
MED. 537 (1976); Reinhart, Federal Protection of Employment Record Privacy, 18 HARV. J. ON 
LEGJS. 207 (1981); Controversy in Medicine: Access to Employee Health Record, 241 J. A.M.A. 
777 (1979). 
611. It has been asserted that because "workers have little genuine expectation of true 
confidentiality as to employment medical records," 45 Fed. Reg. at 35,242, there is an implied 
waiver of confidentiality by the employee's consenting to the examination. Nevertheless, con-
sent to medical examination is often a condition of employment and carries with it none of the 
usual elements of voluntariness on the patient's part. Moreover, the employees are not usually 
informed about the limited scope of examinations or the lack of the traditional confidentiality 
that patients expect from members of the medical profession. Lotspeich v. Chance Vought 
Aircraft, 369 S.W.2d 705, 710 (fex. Civ. App. 1963). The "significant abuses of employee 
medical records," 45 Fed. Reg. at 35,243, are related to a wider problem of the occupational 
physician's conflicting loyalties. It has been suggested that if occupational physicians would 
adhere to professional standards and prohibit the dissemination of specific information to non-
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Common law actions for company disclosure of medical infor-
mation to third parties also must overcome the defense that there is 
no physician-patient relationship between an applicant or employee 
and the company doctor.612 Several state and federal statutes, how-
ever, provide a variety of limited protections against disclosure. The 
Privacy Act of 1974613 controls federal government maintenance of 
information. The Act affords individuals the rights to see and to cor-
rect their files, and prohibits nonconsensual disclosure to third par-
ties. The Fair Credit Reporting Act614 provides that if an applicant 
or employee is rejected on the basis of a credit report, the individual 
has a right to be informed of the report.615 
Two-thirds of the states have statutorily created a physician-pa-
tient testimonial privilege.616 Also, state medical licensing statutes 
may provide the basis for a judicially implied cause of action.617 
The most extensive state regulation of medical information, how-
ever, is California's Confidentiality of Medical Information Act.618 
Under this law, an individual whose records have been disclosed 
may recover compensatory damages, punitive damages up to $3,000, 
medical personnel, this would alleviate the conflict of interest problem. See Collings, Medical 
Con.ftdenlialityin the Work Environment, 20 J. OccuP. MED. 461 (1978); Roberts, The Question 
o/ Ethical Standards in Occupational Medical Practice, 14 J. OccuP. MED. 632 (1972); Taber• 
shaw, Whose "Agent" Is the Occupational Physician?, 30 ARCH. ENVTL. HEALTH 412 (1975), 
The essence of the problem, however, is not the distribution of specific, raw medical data, such 
as test results, x-rays, and clinical findings; it is the physician's loyalty to pass along to manage• 
ment bottom line medical judgments. In the nonoccupational setting, the physician accumu-
lates the medical evidence, informs the patient of the possible courses of action, and often 
makes a recommendation. The ultimate decision, however, rests with the patient. In the occu-
pational setting, by contrast, once the medical evidence has been obtained the patient may be 
informed of the results and possible courses of action, but rarely will the patient have the 
option of deciding employability, work loads, and the like. These decisions are made by the 
physician or by management acting on the physician's recommendations. See generally 
Bundy, How J)o We Assure Thal the Worker's Health Is the Occupational Physician's Primary 
Concern?, 18 J. OccuP. MED. 671 (1976); Dinman, The Loyaltyo/lhe Occupational Physician, 
54 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 729 (1978). 
612. See Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249 (fenn. 1965). Bui cf. Hammonds v. Aetna 
Cas. & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (patient has cause of action against 
party that induced a physician to divulge confidential information under false pretenses). See 
also Drake v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (invasion of 
privacy for employee's personal physician to divulge to her employer that she was pregnant). 
613. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976); see Note, Liability Waiting lo Strike: Violation of an Em-
ployee's Privacy Through Disclosure of Records, 14 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 385 (1981) (discussing 
proposed legislation to extend the Privacy Act of 1974 to the private sector). 
614. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a-168Jt (1976). 
615. See Comment, Employee Privacy Rights: A Proposal, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 164 
(1978). 
616. See generally Note, Privacy in Personal Medical Information: A Diagnosis, 33 U. FLA, 
L. REV. 394 (1981). 
617. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201,400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
618. CAL. C1v. CODE § 56 (Deering Supp. 1982). 
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attorney fees up to $1,000 and costs of litigation.619 Violations are 
also punishable as misdemeanors.620 
Employers must produce employee medical records for the gov-
ernment. Although employers have been permitted to assert the pri-
vacy interests of their employees, this defense has not defeated 
government-sought subpoenas for employee medical records.621 The 
Access to Exposure and Medical Records Standard gives OSHA the 
right to obtain employee medical records, but limits the disclosure of 
this information and provides safeguards to ensure confidentiality.622 
F. Workers, Compensation 
Employers exclude high-risk individuals from the workforce be-
cause these individuals are believed to be more likely to suffer from 
an occupational injury or illness, resulting in the employer's ex-
pense. One obvious source of increased costs is workers' compensa-
tion insurance rates. If high-risk employees are not entitled to 
workers' compensation when they suffer from the condition to which 
they were predisposed, this source of costs disappears. 623 
Most courts refuse to deny a claimant compensation because of a 
preexisting allergy, weakness, disease or susceptibility.624 Neverthe-
less, compensation depends upon medical evidence that the worker's 
619. CAL. C1v. CODE§ 56.35. 
620. CAL. C1v. CODE § 56.36. 
621. See M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 357, at§ 54. See generally Co=ent, OSHA Records 
and Privacy: Competing Interests in the Workplace, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 953 (1978). 
The courts have held that employee privacy interests and the interest of the National Insti-
tute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), see note 380 supra and accompanying text, 
are not mutually exclusive, General Motors Corp. v. Director of NIOSH, 636 F.2d 163, 166 
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 877 (1981), and that, with "proper security administra-
tion," the records should be accessible with minimal incursions on employee privacy. See 
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980) (conditioning disclo-
sure of personally-identifiable records on employees being provided with notice and an oppor-
tunity to object to disclosure of specific information). 
The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission has adopted a similar position 
with respect to discovery of medical records in the course ofan adjudicatory proceeding. West 
Point Pepperell, Inc., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1784, 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) ~ 25,356 (1981). 
622. See notes 361-62 supra and accompanying text. 
623. If workers' compensation is the employee's exclusive remedy, see text following note 
665 infra, the employer may suffer little detriment from hiring sensitive workers. If, however, 
removing predisposed workers from the workers' compensation act eliminates this bar to other 
causes of action, see notes 666-68 infra and accompanying text, employers may be worse off 
than before. Workers' compensation claims generally are limited by statute; jury awards are 
not. 
624. lB A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION§§ 41.62, 41.63 (1982 & 
Supp.) (and cases cited therein); see, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. 
Fishel, 649 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1982) (Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation 
Act); Peoria Motors, Inc. v. Industrial Commn., _ Ill. 2d. __, 422 N.E.2d 144 (1982). 
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condition was caused by workplace exposures. 625 In a minority of 
jurisdictions occupational diseases are not compensable if the claim-
ant's individual allergy contributed to the result.626 
When the increased risk arises from nonoccupational factors 
such as diet, smoking, and drinking,627 the same rules apply. Gener-
ally, claimants are entitled to full compensation if they suffer from 
an occupational illness that arose from their employment and the 
disease is not an "ordinary disease of life."628 In cases involving 
claimants whose cigarette smoking contributed to their occupational 
illness, some courts have awarded full compensation,629 while others 
have apportioned the claimant's award.63° Compensation has been 
denied entirely where the illness was found to be related solely to 
nonoccupational factors.631 Federal compensation acts use a similar 
approach. In General .Dynamics Corp. v. Sacchetti,632 an asbestos 
worker smoked moderately until ten years before his death. The 
widow was entitled to death benefits under the Longshoremen's and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA).633 The Second Cir-
cuit held that although prior smoking may have increased the risk of 
fibrotic changes from asbestos exposure, it was not a "prior perma-
nent partial disability'' that would limit liability under section 8(f) of 
the LHWCA.634 
Prior occupational exposures to toxic substances cause courts 
more difficulty. The willingness of employers to hire individuals 
with prior occupational exposures may depend on how the workers' 
compensation law of a particular state provides for the compensation 
of individuals with "successive disabilities." Some states apply the 
625. See, e.g., Thompson v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 51 Or. App. 395, 625 P,2d 
1348 (1980). 
626. See l A. LARSON, supra note 624, § 41.61. 
627. See Part I-B-2 supra. 
628. See lB A. LARSON, supra note 624, §§ 41.32, 41.33. 
629. See, e.g., Pullman Kellogg v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd., 26 Cal. 3d 450,605 P.2d 
422, 161 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1980); McAllister v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 69 Cal. 2d 408, 
445 P.2d 313, 71 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1968). 
630. See, e.g,, Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981) (smoking 
and cotton dust). 
631. Marion v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 192 Neb, 457,222 N.W.2d 366 (1974) 
(gout and hypertension caused by alcohol consumption rather than lead exposure); Clark v. 
Burlington Indus., 49 N.C. App. 269, 271 S.E.2d 101 (1980) (respiratory illness caused by 
smoking rather than byssinosis). 
632. 681 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1982). 
633. 33 u.s.c. §§ 901-945 (1976). 
634. 681 F.2d at 40; cf. Note, Deducting the Cos/ of Smoking Cesnlion Programs under 
lnlemal Revenue Code Section 213, 81 MICH. L. REV. 237 (1982) (IRS applies similar distinc-
tion between existing illnesses and increased risk), 
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full responsibility rule, which imposes liability for the entire result-
ing disability on the present employer.635 This rule has been criti-
cized for placing an unfair burden on the last employer.636 Faced 
with this rule, employers are unwilling to hire any employees 
thought to be impaired or predisposed to illness for fear that they 
will be liable for any successive injuries. 637 
Another approach, apportionment statutes, divides the compen-
sation liability between the present employer and another party.638 
The "other party" may be a prior employer or its compensation car-
rier, a second injury fund, or the employee, if the final disability re-
sulted from a prior personal disability.639 Generally, "disability" 
does not include a prior nondisabling defect, disease or latent condi-
tion.640 Several cases hold that a preexisting asymptomatic back will 
not lead to the apportionment of compensation for a subsequent 
work-related back injury.641 This same reasoning would appear to 
apply to all types of increased risks. 
Under the third approach, the second injury fund, the present 
employer is liable for the amount of disability attributable to the 
present employment, and the fund pays the difference to compensate 
the employee fully.642 Many of the state special injury funds restrict 
their applicability to instances where the employer knew of the prior 
injury,643 or require that the prior injury was "disabling" or "perma-
nent," the disability involved the loss of a member or eye, or the 
second injury added to or had some causal relationship with the 
prior disability.644 
G. Common Law Actions 
Common law actions - primarily tort actions - may affect the 
635. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 624, § 59.10. 
636. Under this rule, the last employer must make full compensation for an employee's 
injury or illness even when the employer is only partially responsible. See id. § 59.00. 
637. See id. § 59.3l(a). 
638. See id. §§ 59.00, 59.20. 
639. Id. § 59.20. 
640. Id. § 59.22. 
641. See, e.g., Brammer v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd., 108 Cal. App. 3d 806, 166 Cal. 
Rptr. 769 (1980); Dade County School Bd. v. Walker, 379 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1980); Bolton v. Catalytic Constr. Co., 309 So. 2d 167 (Miss. 1975). 
642. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 624, § 59.3l(a). 
643. Id. § 59.33(b). Because the policy of these laws is to encourage the hiring of handi-
capped workers, if the prior injury were not known, the policy of the act would not apply 
because the employee would not have been disadvantaged in seeking employment. Id. at 10-
467. This rule, however, encourages employers to engage in increased medical screening of 
applicants. 
644. Id.§ 59.31-.32. 
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employment rights of high risk individuals in two ways. First, some 
actions may permit recovery for an employer's adverse personnel ac-
tion because of the individual's biochemical, genetic or medical con-
dition. Second, damage actions alleging that occupational exposure 
caused an injury or illness may succeed. 
At common law, absent a statutory prohibition, an employer had 
virtually unfettered control in selecting its employees. The employer 
could hire or refuse to hire any person for any reason or no reason at 
all.645 Once hired, the employee could be fired "at will" for any rea-
son or no reason at all.646 These rights included the right to fire or 
refuse to hire an individual because the employer believed that the 
individual was physically incapable of performing the job.647 For 
example, in Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc. ,648 the court 
held that Pennsylvania's employment-at-will doctrine permitted an 
employer to discharge a diabetic employee on the basis of a negative 
medical report.649 Although the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Act650 arguably prohibited the employer's conduct,651 the court re-
fused to create a common law cause of action in addition to the stat-
utory remedy. 652 
In recent years the "at will" doctrine has been eroded considera-
bly. Numerous commentators applaud this development and argue 
for an even more unequivocal repudiation of the rule.653 Although 
645. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-75 (1908) (union membership); see also 
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. I, 13-14 (1915) (union membership; employer's "liberty of con-
tract" a constitutional right). 
646. Odell v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 201 F.2d 123, 128 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 
941 (1953); Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977); Forrer v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967). For a discussion of the current viability 
of the employment-at-will doctrine, see The Individual in the Workplace: The Al-Will Issue, 16 
U. MICH. J.L. REF. (forthcoming 1983). 
647. See Dillon v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 43 Md. App. 161, 163-64, 403 A.2d 406, 407-
08 (Ct. Spec. App. 1979); see also W. VA. CODE§ 21-3-17 (1981) (employer may not require 
payment of fees for medical examination as a condition of employment); Pearson v. Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439, 441 (7th Cir. 1964). 
648. 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982). 
649. The report did not seem as negative as the court apparently assumed. See 692 F.2d at 
913. 
650. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-963 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1982). 
651. The act prohibits discrimination against the handicapped. PA. STAT, ANN, tit. 43, 
§ 953 (Supp. 1982). 
652. As a federal court sitting in diversity, the Third Circuit was somewhat reluctant to 
create new law for Pennsylvania. See 697 F.2d at 918. 
653. See generally Blades, Employment Al Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abu-
sive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 CoLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Peck, llnjusl Discharges 
From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. I (1979); Summers, 
Individual Protection Against llnjusl Dismissal· Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); 
Note, Protecting Al Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty To Terminate Only 
in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816 (1980). 
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some courts rely on contract theories, 654 more courts recognize the 
existence of a tort action for wrongful discharge. 655 These cases ate 
grounded on a new "public policy exception" to the "at will" doc-
trine. 656 The exception applies to a variety of situations where the 
employer retaliates against employees in bad faith or for reprehensi-
ble reasons.657 
The decline of the "at will" doctrine is extremely important to 
nonunion, private sector workers in the United States, for the only 
other limits on their employers' decisionmaking are the federal, state 
and local employment discrimination laws, which proscribe discrim-
ination based on specific class membership. Removing an employer's 
ability to terminate an employee "at will," however, only offers pro-
tection against abusive or groundless discharges. In effect, it puts 
employees on the same legal footing as if they were employed for a 
fixed term. At common law, an employer may lawfully terminate an 
employment contract for good cause, such as physical inability to 
continue performance. This applies both to a present inability to 
perform658 and a physical predisposition to injury.659 The issue of 
654. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 
(1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). 
655. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210,536 P.2d 512 (1975); Harless v. First Natl. Bank, 
246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). 
656. Some states, by statute, prohibit retaliation after reporting safety and health violations 
of state or federal law. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 379 (West Supp. 1981); LA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 1074.l (West Supp. 1981). A minority of courts has used the theory that 
wrongful discharge amounts to the intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Al-
corn v. Anbro Engr., Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498-99, 468 P.2d 216, 218, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 (1970); 
Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976). 
657. These reasons include retaliation for: filing a worker's compensation claim, Frampton 
v. Central Ind. Gas. Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Svento v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. 
App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978), 
serving on jury duty, Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 
(1978), failure to give false testimony at a legislative hearing, Petermann v. Teamsters Local 
396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), refusal to alter pollution control reports, 
Trombetta v. Detroit, T. & I. R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978), attempting to 
obtain the employer's compliance with consumer credit laws, Harless v. First Natl. Bank, 246 
S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978), refusal to continue participation in anticompetitive scheme, Perry v. 
Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982), spuming a supervisor's sexual 
advances, Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), and refusal to 
violate medical ethics in drug testing, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 164 N.J. Super. 
335,399 A.2d 1023 (App. Div. 1979). An employee's compliance with OSHA also gives rise to 
a cause of action for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception. Cloutier v. Great 
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 923, 436 A.2d I 140, 1144-45 (1981). Compare Cancellier v. 
Federated Dept. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982) (age discrimination supports tort 
action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing), with Bruffett v. Warner 
Communications, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (handicap discrimination does not 
support tort action for wrongful discharge), ajfd., 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982). See generally 
Murg & Scharman, Employment al Will· JJo Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C. L. REV. 
329 (1982); Note, JJejining Public Policy Torts in At-Will JJismissal, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153 
(1981). 
658. See Munhollon v. Pennsylvania R.R., 180 F. Supp. 669, 673-74 (N.D. Ohio 1960); 
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"good cause" therefore requires analyses of "job-relatedness," "pre-
dictability" and other concepts discussed earlier in the context of Ti-
tle VII and the Rehabilitation Act. Consequently, sensitive 
employees may find themselves inadequately protected even after 
the demise of the at-will doctrine. 
It should be emphasized that the previous discussion only ad-
dresses the issue of wrongful discharge. The good cause standard 
does not apply to employer hiring decisions or promotion, transfer, 
work assignment, or other related matters. 
Another theory upon which an action might be brought involves 
an action against a physician for negligence where the wrongful di-
agnosis of a job applicant resulted in the denial of employment. In 
Armstrong v. Morgan,660 an employee was required to have a physi-
cal examination upon being promoted. The physician's report indi-
cated that the employee was in very poor health and, as a result, the 
employee lost his job. According to the Texas Court of Civil Ap-
peals, a negligence action against the physician stated a valid 
claim.661 This theory might allow a number of other possible ac-
tions, such as actions against laboratories that negligently performed 
screening tests, actions against the manufacturers of testing equip-
ment and actions against prior employers or other entities that negli-
gently supplied inaccurate information about the health of the 
individual. 
Such a cause of action is not universally recognized. In Williams 
v. St. Joe Minerals Corp. ,662 plaintiff sued the company physician for 
negligently diagnosing a nonexistent hernia condition, thus prevent-
ing plaintiff from being reinstated by the employer. Because plaintiff 
had not pursued the grievance procedure in the collective bargaining 
agreement, which covered such disputes, the court granted summary 
judgment to defendant.663 The court implied that plaintiff could 
have resorted to the courts had he unsuccessfully pursued arbitration 
first.664 The scope of review in such a case, however, might be so 
Citizens Home Ins. Co. v. Glisson, 191 Va. 582, 585-90, 61 S.E.2d 859, 861-62 (1950); cf. Pear-
son v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1964). 
659. Cameron v. J.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 47 Tenn. App. 671, 342 S.W.2d 65 (1960). 
660. 545 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). 
661. "Dr. Morgan owed Appellant Armstrong a duty not to injure him physically or other-
wise. If Dr. Morgan negligently performed the examination and as a result gave an inaccurate 
report of the state of appellant's health, and appellant was injured as a proximate result 
thereof, actionable negligence would be shown." Armstrong, 545 S.W.2d at 47 (citation omit-
ted). But see Beadling v. Sirotta, 41 NJ. 555, 197 A.2d 8157 (1964) (rejecting similar theory). 
662. 639 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. App. 1982). 
663. 639 S.W.2d at 195-96. 
664. 639 S.W.2d at 195. 
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limited as to preclude any substantive ruling on the malpractice 
claim.665 
Where employees sustain work-related injuries or illnesses their 
primary vehicle for redress is through workers' compensation. Al-
though recourse to the compensation system is, theoretically, the 
"exclusive remedy," recent cases have recognized several exceptions. 
Compensation is the exclusive remedy, for example, only if the em-
ployer is covered by the state workers' compensation law. The state 
workers' compensation statutes vary in their coverage; some classes 
of employees are not subject to state law.666 In these situations, the 
employees may pursue common law remedies.667 In an action based 
on common law negligence, however, the common law defenses of 
contributory (or comparative) negligence, assumption of risk, and 
the fellow servant rule usually would be available to employers.668 
The "exclusive remedy" rule generally applies only to actions for 
damages. Employees may seek injunctive and declaratory relief. In 
Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 669 an employee who was 
allergic to cigarette smoke sought an injunction requiring the em-
ployer to prohibit smoking in general working areas. The court held 
that the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act did not bar the 
action for an injunction, and that the plaintiff had a common law 
right to a healthful work environment.670 The court ordered the em-
ployer to restrict smoking to non-work areas.671 
In a minority of jurisdictions, employees may sue the employer if 
the employer has breached a duty independent of those imposed on 
665. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 595 (1960). 
Other obstacles to suing a physician are discussed at notes 679-82 infra. 
666. Some commonly excluded classifications are agricultural employees, domestic ser-
vants, railroad workers, and employees of small employers or charitable organizations. 
667. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS§ 80, at 526 (4th ed. 1971). 
668. See id. at 526-30. 
669. 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (Ch. Div. 1976). 
670. Cf. Smith v. Western Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App. 1982) (OSHA did not pre-
empt sensitive employee's action for injunction to obtain smoke-free workplace; employee 
need not await severe and permanent injuries before suing). 
671. Although Shimp involved a sensitive employee, it may not hold great promise for 
sensitive or high-risk employees generally. Even under similar facts, other courts may not 
adopt the reasoning of this single case. In Federal Employees for Non-Smokers' Rights v. 
United States, 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978),qffd., 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 926 (1979), a virtually identical case brought by federal employees was dismissed. But see 
Smith v. Western Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App. 1982); Hentze! v. Singer Co., 3 EMPL. S. 
& H. GUIDE (CCH) f 26,354 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1982). Furthermore, Shimp involved a 
hazard, cigarette smoking, that OSHA does not regulate. If a specific OSHA standard already 
exists, the action might be preempted by federal law. Finally, the hazard in Shimp did not 
result from a work process and could be remedied rather easily. The courts may not be in-
clined to issue broad injuctions requiring the reduction of exposures in the workplace to the 
level where the most sensitive individual is risk free. 
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it by virtue of being an employer.672 In these situations the employer 
is said to be acting in a "dual capacity." Dual capacity liability 
arises in two main torts: products liability, and medical malpractice. 
Although the dual capacity doctrine has been asserted more fre-
quently in recent cases, it is still not widely accepted. 673 
In a small minority of jurisdictions, an injured employee may 
maintain an action against his or her employer based on injuries or 
illnesses caused by a product manufactured by the employer if the 
product was manufactured for sale to the public.674 For example, in 
Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 675 a route salesman was severely in-
jured in a fire which occurred as he was delivering a flammable gas 
to a customer. The injured employee brought an action against his 
employer on a theory of strict products liability. The Supreme Court 
of California held that, based on the dual capacity doctrine, the state 
workers' compensation law did not preclude the action. 
An employee's ability to maintain a medical malpractice action 
against the company, the physician, or both depends on two consid-
erations: the employment status of the physician and the intended 
beneficiary of the medical services provided. In general, if the physi-
cian is an employee of the company, the statutory coemployee im-
munity will apply.676 This means that the physician will not be 
liable for medical malpractice. 677 Whether a physician who is an 
independent contractor may be sued depends on the nature of the 
services provided.678 Where the service is for the benefit of the em-
ployee, a physician-patient relationship exists and the physician may 
be sued. Where the only benefit is for the employer, however, no 
672. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 624, § 72.81. 
673. See, e.g., Kohrv. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Billy 
v. Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152, 412 N.E.2d 934, 432 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1980); 
Cohn v. Spinks Indus., 602 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). See generally Note, Dual Ca-
pacity Doctrine: Third-Party Liability of Employer-Manufacturer in Products Liability Litiga-
tion, 12 IND. L. REV. 553 (1979). 
674. See Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977); 
Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d 279,361 N.E.2d 492 (1976). 
675. 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1981). 
676. See, e.g., Proctor v. Ford Motor Co., 36 Ohio St. 3,302 N.W.2d 580 (1973); Jones v. 
Bouza, 7 Mich. App. 561, 152 N.W.2d 393 (1967),affd., 381 Mich. 299, 160 N.W.2d 881 (1968). 
But cf. McDaniel v. Sage, - Ind. App.-, 419 N.E.2d 1322 (1981) (action against company 
nurse for negligent injection not barred by workers' compensation). 
677. In the few states that do not grant immunity to coemployees, however, the physician 
could be sued. See, e.g., Grantham v. Denke, 359 So. 2d 785 (Ala. 1978); Halenar v. Superior 
Court, 109 Ariz. 27, 504 P.2d 928 (1972). 
678. The distinction between company physicians and independent contractors may be 
fading. See Ross v. Shubert, 388 N.E.2d 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (company physician held to 
be independent contractor). 
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action may lie.679 
Employer liability for malpractice may be based on vicarious lia-
bility for its physician-employee680 or the breach of an independent 
duty because of negligent practices and procedures used by the com-
pany medical department.681 Under either theory, courts must de-
termine for whose benefit the examination or treatment was 
performed. If performed for the employer's benefit, there is no phy-
sician-patient relationship and thus either no duty is owed to the em-
ployee682 or a lessened duty is owed. 683 If performed for the 
employee's benefit, then a duty exists.684 Even without a physician-
patient relationship, however, liability may be based on the "good 
Samaritan" rules adopted by many states. 685 
The foregoing discussion indicates the confusion, inconsistency 
and lack of logic surrounding actions based on malpractice by com-
pany physicians. There is no justification, for example, for the artifi-
cial distinctions founded on the status of the physician and the 
purpose of the medical care.686 Against this backdrop, the dual ca-
pacity doctrine complicates matters even further. 
In the leading case of .Duprey v. Shane, 687 a nurse employed by a 
chiropractor was injured in the course of her employment and then 
was negligently treated by her chiropractor-employer. The Califor-
679. For example, in Rogers v. Horvath, 65 Mich. App. 644, 237 N.W.2d 595 (1975), the 
employer hired a physician to examine the plaintiff to determine whether the employee's peti-
tion for a continuation of workers' compensation benefits had merit. The court held that be-
cause the examination was not performed for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment, no 
physician-patient relationship existed and the special duty of a doctor to the patient did not 
arise. Accord Keene v. Wiggins, 69 Cal. App. 3d 308, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1977). 
680. See, e.g., Betesh v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1974); Wojcik v. Alumi-
num Co. of Am., 18 Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
681. See, e.g., James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Coffee v. Mc-
Donell-Douglas Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 551, 503 P.2d 1366, 105 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1972). See generally 
Blum, Corporate Liability for In-house Medical Malpractice, 22 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433 (1978). 
682. See, e.g., Riste v. General Elec. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 680, 289 P.2d 338 (1955). 
683. See Battistella v. Society of the N.Y. Hosp., 9 A.D.2d 75, 191 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1959) 
(dictum). 
684. See Betesh v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 238, 246-47 (D.D.C. 1974). 
685. This means that even though there was no duty to provide medical services, having 
voluntarily chosen to do so, the employer assumed a legal duty to act with reasonable care. 
See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229, 232-33 (6th Cir. 1956). 
686. In fact, many occupational physicians have various "hybrid" employment relation-
ships and most medical services rendered in the workplace are performed for the benefit of 
both the employer and the employee. Therefore, to determine if there is a physician-patient 
relationship other factors also need to be considered, including whether there is an ongoing 
medical relationship between the parties or merely a single examination, what the reasonable 
expectations of the physician and patient as to the nature of the examination are, whether any 
diagnosis or treatment is contemplated by the examination, and the nature of the employee's 
consent to the examination. 
687. 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952). 
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nia Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could maintain a cause of 
action because the defendant-employer's negligent treatment oc-
curred when the employer was acting in his second capacity, as a 
chiropractor. Some jurisdictions have construed Duprey to be lim-
ited to situations where the employer's negligence aggravated a com-
pensable injury or illness, the employer was not required to render 
medical treatment, or the injury or illness for which treatment 
was initially sought was noncompensable under workers' 
compensation. 688 
An important extension of Duprey involves the failure of the 
company physician to detect or to inform the employee of illness 
after an examination performed for the employer's benefit. In Bed-
narski v. General Motors Corp.,689 the court permitted a wrongful 
death action based on the company doctor's failure to diagnose or to 
inform the plaintiffs decedent that he had lung cancer, despite per-
forming a series of physical examinations and x-rays for the em-
ployer's benefit. Only if the injury was noncompensable, however, 
could the plaintiff recover. 69o 
An employer might also be held liable for negligently failing to 
discover an employee's propensity to contract a compensable, work-
related illness, thereby permitting the employee to be exposed to 
conditions that bring about the disease.691 In such a case, however, 
the plaintiff would be required to prove that a reasonably prudent 
company doctor exercising ordinary skill and judgment would have 
detected the employee's likelihood of contracting an occupational 
disease. It is unlikely, at least at the present time, that an employer 
would be liable where the employee's predisposition was slight or 
could only be detected through sophisticated biochemical or cytoge-
netic procedures. 
In almost all jurisdictions an exception to the exclusive remedy 
rule is recognized for intentional torts. 692 In M andolidas v. Elkins 
688. See, e.g., McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill. 2d 352,423 N,E.2d 876 (1981), 
See generally Note, The Malpractice Liability oJ Company Physicians, 53 IND, L.J. 585 (1978), 
689. 88 Mich. App. 482, 276 N.W.2d 624 (1979); accord Hoover v, Williamson, 236 Md. 
250, 203 A.2d 861 (1964) (silicosis). 
690. Many of these failure-to-diagnose-or-inform cases are based on illnesses unrelated to 
work that were allegedly detectable during preemployment examinations, See, e.g., Betesh v. 
United States, 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1974) (Hodgkins disease); Wojcik v. Aluminum Co, 
of Am., 18 Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (tuberculosis). 
691. See Brown v. Scullin Steel Co., 364 Mo. 225,260 S.W.2d 513 (1953); Riste v. General 
Elec. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 680, 289 P.2d 338 (1955). 
692. See Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 508 F. Supp. 313 (D. Me. 1981), and au• 
thorities cited therein. Where an employer knowingly exposes employees to known hazards, 
the factual question of how substantially certain the result was may determine whether the 
employer's act was intentional or merely negligent. See W. PROSSER, supra note 667, at 31-32, 
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Industries, Inc. ,693 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
greatly expanded the rule and held an employer liable for employee 
injuries resulting from the employer's willful, wanton or reckless 
misconduct. 694 
A more substantial body of law exists to allow recovery for injury 
or illness caused by the fraud or deceit of the employer. For exam-
ple, if employers fraudulently conceal from employees the fact that 
they suffer from lung cancer695 or silicosis,696 the employees may 
bring damage actions for injuries caused by the aggravation of their 
initial condition. Fraudulent concealment of information about haz-
ardous working conditions may also permit an injured employee to 
recover.697 
The "exclusive remedy" provisions of workers' compensation 
laws698 only apply to actions brought by injured employees against 
their employer. Virtually all jurisdictions permit ''third party ac-
Where known susceptible employees are concerned, illness is, arguably, more substantially 
certain to occur. 
693. 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. l918);accord Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chem. Inc., 
69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982); see also Wade v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 693 F.2d 
19 (2d Cir. 1982) (Vermont law applied). 
694. Bur see Jacobsen v. Southeast Distrib., Inc., 413 So. 2d 995 (La. App. 1982) (failure of 
employee's supervisor to supply requested safety equipment is nor an intentional tort). 
695. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. 
Rptr. 858 (1980). 
696. Delamotte v. Unitcast Div. of Midland Ross Corp., 64 Ohio App. 2d 159,411 N.E.2d 
814 (1978). 
691. See In re Johns-Manville Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
698. Employees have attempted to bring private actions for damages based on OSHA. 
Section 4(b)(4) of OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 635(b)(4) (1976), would appear to preclude such actions. 
Nonetheless, plaintiffs assert that an implied right of action exists under the statute and the 
federal common law. Courts unanimously reject both theories. Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co., 
507 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1975); Byrd v. Fieldcrest Mills, 496 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1974) (per 
curiam); Russell v. Bartley, 494 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). 
Even though OSHA does not create any private rights of action, OSHA violations and 
standards may be relevant to actions with a valid common law or statutory basis. The admissi-
bility of either OSHA violations or standards depends on state law. The results have varied. 
The Supreme Court of Alabama held admissible evidence that the defendant had been cited 
by OSHA. Industrial Tile, Inc. v. Stewart, 388 So. 2d 171 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
1081 (1981). More often the plaintiff or defendant will seek to introduce the OSHA regulation 
to establish the applicable standard of care. A majority of jurisdictions deciding the issue have 
held that OSHA standards are admissible and relevant in establishing the standard of care. 
See, e.g., Jordan v. Kelly-Springfield Tire & Rubber Co., 624 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1980) (per 
curiam) (defendant introduced evidence of compliance with OSHA standard); Ceco Corp. v. 
Maloney, 404 A.2d 935 (D.C. 1979) (plaintiff permitted to introduce OSHA standards). A 
minority view is that failure to conform to the OSHA standard is negligence per se. See, e.g. , 
Koll v. Manatt's Transp. Co., 253 N.W.2d 265 (Iowa 1977). Other jurisdictions have helg, on 
the other extreme, that OSHA standards are inadmissible, either by statute, see Spencer v. 
G.A. MacDonald Constr. Co., 63 Cal. App. 3d 836, 134 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1978), or by case law. 
See, e.g., Arvas v. Feather's Jewelers, 92 N.M. 89, 582 P.2d 1302 (1978). See generally M. 
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 357, § 511. 
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tions" against other employers and individuals.699 Individuals or en-
tities, by contract or voluntarily, can assume duties that would not 
otherwise exist. For example, in Caldwell v. Bechtel, Inc., 700 an em-
ployee who contracted silicosis while working on a subway tunnel 
brought an action against the consulting engineering firm, which had 
a contractual obligation to provide safety engineering services. The 
D.C. Circuit held that the contractual authority created a special re-
lationship between the worker and the firm, breach of which gave 
rise to an action for damages.701 
Liability may also fl.ow from the "good Samaritan" rule which 
permits recovery against one who voluntarily assumes a duty and 
then breaches that duty.702 In Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., 703 an employee of Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Goodyear, contracted an unspecified occupational dis-
ease. The employee and his wife then brought an action against 
Goodyear alleging, among other things, that Goodyear undertook to 
provide Kelly with health and safety information and services and 
that Goodyear's failure to do so resulted in the employee's 
disease. 704 
In about half of the jurisdictions to consider the issue,705 the em-
ployer's workers' compensation insurer may be liable to an injured 
employee if the insurer undertakes to conduct a safety and health 
699. Some examples of these kinds of actions are those brought: (1) against coemployers: 
(2) by employees of subcontractors against general contractors: (3) by employees of general 
contractors against subcontractors; (4) against coemployees; and (5) against property owners. 
See generally F. BARON, HANDLING OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CASES ch. 5 (1981); M. ROTH• 
STEIN, supra note 357, § 506. 
700. 631 F.2d 989 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
701. 631 F.2d at 1001-03. See generally Sweet, Sile Architects and Construe/ion Workers: 
Brothers and Keepers or Strangers? 28 EMORY L.J. 291 (1979). 
702. § 324A. Liability to Third Person for Negligent Performance of Undertaking, 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another 
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is 
subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exer-
cise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or 
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the 
undertaking. 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965). 
703. 532 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Md. 1982). 
704. Although acknowledging that an action could be based on § 324A, the court held that 
the plaintiffs failed to allege that Goodyear completely assumed this duty, as required by 
§ 324A(b). 532 F. Supp. at 1355. 
705. See, e.g., Kohrv. Johns-Manville Corp., 534 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1982): Beasley v. 
MacDonald Engg. Co., 287 Ala. 189, 249 So. 2d 844 (1971); Corson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
l IO N.H. 210, 265 A.2d 315 (1970) (per curiam) (permitting action). Contra Matthews v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 470, 238 N.E.2d 348 (1968); Smith v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 410 
Mich. 685, 303 N.W.2d 702 (1981). 
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inspection and negligently fails to discover hazards.706 It may be dif-
ficult, however, to prove that the defendant's breach of duty proxi-
mately caused the plaintiffs injury.707 A similar theory has been 
used in actions brought against the state and federal governments for 
negligence in conducting OSHA or state OSHA inspections.708 
The fastest growing area of third-party litigation is products lia-
bility. The employee alleges that an injury or illness was caused by a 
product manufactured by the defendant and distributed or supplied 
to the employer.709 In the leading case of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper 
Products Corp. ,710 an industrial insulation worker who had con-
tracted asbestosis and mesothelioma sued the manufacturers of the 
insulation materials. The Fifth Circuit held that the defendants 
breached their duty to warn of the foreseeable dangers associated 
with handling asbestos. 
Most products liability actions have been brought against manu-
facturers of products used in the work or production process. The 
same theory could be used for actions against the manufacturers of 
safety or even medical equipment. For example, in Porter v. Ameri-
can Optical Corp. ,711 a successful products liability action was 
brought against the manufacturer of a defectively designed respira-
tor and filter apparatus. The plaintiffs decedent, an employee in a 
gypsum plant, had contracted asbestosis while using the defective 
respirator. 
Reproductive hazards pose a great potential for tort liability. 
Where an employee is exposed to gametotoxins and sterilization re-
sults, the injury to the employee probably would be considered, for 
liability purposes, as any other occupational illness. The unique le-
706, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965). 
707. See Glover v. Silent Hoist & Crane Co., 471 F. Supp. 457 (N.D. Ala. 1979). q: D.C. 
CODE ANN.§ 36-304(c) (1981) (immunizing compensation carrier from liability for negligent 
voluntary inspection). 
708. In actions against the state, and in actions against the federal government under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976), the plaintiff must prove four elements: 
(I) the cause of action must allege the breach of a duty recognized by state law; (2) there must 
have been a breach of the duty; (3) the breach must be the proximate cause of the plaintiffs 
injury; and (4) the governmental defendant must not be exempt from suit under state law or 
the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Blessing v. United 
States, 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Federal Tort Claims Act); Wallace v. State, 557 P.2d 
1120 (Alaska 1976) (state law). 
709. By contrast, in "dual capacity" products liability actions the allegedly defective prod-
uct is manufactured by the injured employee's own employer. See notes 674-75 supra and 
accompanying text. 
710. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). See generally Com-
ment, Asbestos Litigation: The Dust Has Yet to Se/lie, 1 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55 (1978). 
711. 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981). 
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gal issues surround the injury to or death of offspring of an exposed 
parent. 
At common law, no cause of action was recognized for negli-
gently inflicted prenatal injuries.712 Beginning in 1946,713 the earlier 
view was overruled. By 1967 every jurisdiction in the United States 
adopt~d the position that if a child is born alive, it may maintain an 
action for prenatal injuries, and if the the child dies of prenatal inju-
ries after birth, an action will lie for wrongful death.714 
The jurisdictions are very closely divided on the question of 
whether a cause of action will lie for prenatal injuries where the 
child is stillborn. A slight majority of jurisdictions recognize such 
actions,715 but a substantial minority disagree.716 Of those jurisdic-
tions permitting recovery, virtually all of them require that the child 
be "viable" at the time of the injury.717 
712. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, IS (1884) (Holmes, J.). See 
generally Gordon, The Unborn Plaintfjf, 63 MICH. L. REV. 579 (1965); Note, The Impact of 
Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating 10 Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554 (1962). 
713. See Bonrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). 
714. W. PROSSER, supra note 667, at 336-37. 
715. Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Eich v. Gulf Shores, 293 
Ala. 95,300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358,224 A.2d 406 (1966); 
Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., SO Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. 
App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Volle v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982); Green v. Smith, 71 
Ill. 2d SOI, 377 N.E.2d 37 (1978); Britt v. Sears, ISO Ind. App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971); Halve 
v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d I (1962); Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1970); Wascom 
v. American Indem. Corp., 383 So. 2d 1037 (La. App.), cert. granted, 383 So. 2d 256 (La. 1980); 
State ex rel. Oldham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, 
Inc., 368 Mass. 354,331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 
(1971); Pehrson v. Kistner, 301 Minn. 299,222 N.W.2d 334 (1974); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 
269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Poliquin v. Mac-
Donald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 
N.E.2d 106 (1959); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1974); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 
R.I. 177,365 A.2d 748 (1976); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Moen 
v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184 
S.E.2d 428 (1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 
107 (1967). 
716. Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962); Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 
529 P.2d 706 (1974); Justus v. Atchinson, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 
(1977); Duncan v. Flynn, 358 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1978); McKillip v. Zimerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 
(Iowa 1971); State ex rel. Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976); Drabbels v. Skelly 
Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, SO N.W.2d 229 (1951); Grafv. Tagger, 43 N.J. 303,204 A.2d 140 (1964); 
Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Gay v. Thomp-
son, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Markov. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 
A.2d 502 (1966); Durrentt v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963); Laurence v. Cra-
ven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969). 
717. But see Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955) ("quick" child, even 
if nonviable); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976) (viability irrele-
vant). All of the other jurisdictions permitting recovery require viability. Morrison, Torts 
InvoMng the Unborn-A Limited Cosmology, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 131, IS I (1979); Robertson, 
Toward Rational Boundaries of Tori Liability far Injury lo the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Pre• 
conception Injuries and Wrongful L!fe, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 1418. 
"Viable" has been defined as that stage of development, usually after the second trimester, 
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Where the child is born alive, it must be determined whether the 
harm to the child resulted from preconception exposure of the 
mother or father or post-conception exposure of the mother. Post-
conception harms are actionable, regardless of whether the child was 
viable at the time of injury, so long as the child is born alive.718 
Where the injury to the child results from preconception parental 
exposures, however, the law is less clear. In the leading case of Ren-
slow v. Mennonite Hospital,119 the mother was thirteen years old 
when she received a transfusion of incompatible blood. Although 
the hospital knew of the error, it never informed her. Eight years 
later, when the woman had a baby, the child was born with brain 
damage and other defects caused by prenatal damage to her 
hemolitic process. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the child 
had a cause of action against the hospital for injuries resulting from 
the negligent transfusion. 720 Although there are no reported cases 
involving preconception exposure to toxic substances in the work-
place, it is quite possible that such actions might be brought in the 
future.721 
Applying the general principles of recovery for prenatal injuries 
to the occupational setting raises a number of legal and factual is-
sues. 722 First, the right to maintain an action for wrongful death or 
for birth defects may depend on whether the fetus was viable at the 
when the child could survive if separated from the mother. This position was originally ex-
pressed in Allaire v. SL Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
The concept of "viability" has been relied upon by the Supreme Court in ruling on the consti-
tutionality of abortion. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160-65 (1973). 
718. See Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222 (1976), and cases cited therein. 
There is, however, some authority to the contrary. See Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 926 n.l 
(Okla. 1976). 
719. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). 
720. Other courts have permitted recovery for preconception injuries arising from a physi-
cian's negligence in performing a Caesarean section on the mother several years before the 
child's birth, and based on products liability where birth control pills altered the mother's 
chromosomal structure and the women gave birth to twins with Down's syndrome. Bergstreser 
v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1978); Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237 
(10th Cir. 1973). 
721. See Dillon v. S.S. Kresge Co., 35 Mich. App. 603, 192 N.W.2d 661 (1971) (complaint 
alleging prenatal injury when mother was exposed to and contracted rubella due to employer's 
negligence stated a cause of action against employer); cf. Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 
129 (9th Cir. 1981) (action brought under Federal Tort Claims Act by daughter of army officer 
exposed to radiation, alleging that father's exposure had mutagenic effects that caused her to 
be born with birth defects, including permanent brain damage; action barred by Feres doc-
trine, which immunized United States for injuries to members of armed services, Feres v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2269 (1982); In re "Agent Orange" 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 781 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (actions brought by children who 
suffered genetic and somatic injuries because of parental exposure to agent orange; actions 
barred by Feres doctrine). 
722. See generally Note, .Birth Defects Caused hy Parental Exposure to Workplace Hazards: 
The Interface of Title VII w_ith OSHA and Tort Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 237, 253-58 (1979). 
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time of the injury. Because most fetal injuries caused by toxic sub-
stances occur during the early stages of pregnancy,723 this may bar 
recovery. Second, in an action based on negligence, the court must 
accept the theory that a duty is owed to a child even before concep-
tion.724 Furthermore, it is not clear what effect compliance with an 
OSHA standard would have on such an action.725 Under a strict 
liability theory, the plaintiff would have to prove that the activity 
(use of toxic substance) was "abnormally dangerous" or "ultra-
hazardous."726 
A third set of issues surrounds the burden of proof. The frequent 
lack of medical evidence regarding birth defects may make it diffi-
cult to prove that workplace exposure caused the injuries. It may 
also be difficult to prove that the injuries occurred after conception 
because many toxic substances are both mutagenic and 
teratogenic. 727 
Finally, the employer may assert defenses. A parent's contribu-
tory negligence cannot be imputed to the child,728 nor can the child 
be said to have assumed the risk.729 The employer's best argument 
would be that the parent's negligence was a superseding cause of the 
injury, thereby relieving the employer of liability.73° Closely related 
to this is the notion that responsibility had shifted from the employer 
to the parent.731 The raising of defenses relating to proximate cause 
723. See notes 110-15 supra and accompanying text. 
724. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 357-59, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1254-56 
(1977). 
725. Although it has been held that OSHA has the statutory authority to protect the health 
offetuses, see United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1256 n.96 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981), few standards were intended to or are capable of adequately 
protecting fetuses. 
726. See W. PROSSER, supra note 667, at 505-16. One possible theory of liability is sug-
gested by Hughson v. St. Francis Hosp., 92 A.D.2d 131,459 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1983), in which the 
court held that the defendant's failure to inform a mother of the risks, hazards and alternatives 
of obstetric care gives rise to an action by the child for lack of informed consent. Therefore, it 
could be argued that if an employer does not advise a pregnant employee of the risks associ-
ated with continued exposure, then an action would lie for the child. The issue of what hap• 
pens if the mother continues to work in the face of a warning is discussed below. See notes 
728-32 infra. 
727. See note 121 supra and accompanying text. 
728. See W. PROSSER, supra note 667, at 490. 
729. See id. at 447-48; see also Note, Recovery far Prenatal Injuries: The Righi of a Child 
Against Its Mother, lO SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 582 (1976). 
730. See Cowden v. Bear Country, Inc. 382 F. Supp. 1321, 1327 (D.S.D. 1974). This argu-
ment, however, will not succeed where the intervening cause was foreseeable. RESTATEMENT 
{SECOND) OF TORTS § 447 (1965). 
731. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 452(2) comment f (1965), lists five factors used 
in determining whether responsibility has shifted: 
(l) degree of danger and magnitude of the risk of harm; 
(2) character and position of the third person who is to take responsibility; 
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invariably requires an inquiry into public policy,732 which, in this 
area, has yet to be spelled out. 
CONCLUSION: IN SEARCH OF PUBLIC POLICY 
Medical science is still at the beginning stages in attempting to 
understand the concept of varied susceptibility to occupational dis-
ease. It is small wonder, then, that for the most part the law has 
failed to react to this phenomenon. Nevertheless, there is a strong 
potential that new scientific discoveries could be made with a rapid-
ity that would bring a variety of societal problems in their wake with 
which we are not prepared to deal.733 The evidence of current em-
ployer practices indicates that the time is already at hand for fo~u-
lating responsive legal and social policy in this area. 
When an individual's present physical condition, even with rea-
sonable accommodation, precludes the performance of an essential 
job function it is neither illegal nor unfair for the individual to be 
denied that particular job. High-risk persons, however, are generally 
healthy and asymptomatic and currently able to perform the job. If 
they are to be denied employment on some rational basis, it must be 
because of an unacceptable risk of future illness. The first question, 
of course, is unacceptable to whom? The law has limited employer 
prerogatives in employee selection and has even imposed additional 
costs, such as professional test validation, when it considered impor-
tant societal interests at stake. Under what circumstances should the 
law prevent an employer from denying employment to a person con-
sidered to be "at risk"? What are the societal costs of permitting the 
affected individual to decide whether to accept the risk? On the basis 
of what information should such decisions be made? 
To begin addressing any of the preceding questions it is essential 
to define the risk.734 In any given employment setting risk will de-
pend on several factors, including the following: First, who is at risk? 
(3) the third person's knowledge of the danger and the likelihood that he or she will or will 
not exercise proper care; 
( 4) the third party's relation to the plaintiff or to the defendant; and 
(5) the lapse of time and other considerations. 
732. "What we do mean by the word 'proximate' is that, because of convenience, of public 
policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond 
a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 
N.Y. 339, 352, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
733. "Research is progressing at a breathtaking pace; [genetic] markers found in the labo-
ratory just months ago are already being introduced into clinical practice." Z. HARSANYI & R. 
HUTTON, supra note 52, at 29. 
734. See Murray, Warning: Screening Workers for Genetic Risk, 13 HASTINGS CENTER 
REP. No. 2, at 5 (1983). 
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In some situations coworkers or the public could be endangered by 
the sudden onset of illness. In other situations the offspring of ex-
posed workers may be at risk. Second, what is the nature of the risk? 
The severity of the occupational hazard must be considered. Third, 
what is the degree of risk? "High risk" is a term often used to refer 
to persons belonging to a large category whose relative risk is only 
slightly higher than that of another population. 
Quantifying the risk is important, but it does not resolve the 
question of the acceptability of the risk. 735 If the competing societal 
values are healthy workers and equal employment opportunity, 
before there can be a balancing of these interests there must be some 
confidence that the process of selecting healthy workers is accurate 
and that the health of the workers will be maintained during their 
employment. Therefore, even if the risk to sensitive individuals can 
be established, the methods of identifying sensitive individuals must 
be accurate. 
The predictive values of screening tests vary greatly. Tests could 
have low predictive values because the tests are inaccurate in mea-
suring the existence of a particular trait or invalid because there is 
little correlation between the presence of the trait and the incidence 
of occupational illness. If the use of a test with a low predictive 
value results in the adverse treatment of an applicant or employee 
the result is certainly unfair in the normative sense. The question is 
whether this unfairness should be remedied by the law. 
Unfortunately, unfairness has never been the sine qua non for 
the law to intervene in the employment relationship. Undoubtedly, 
there are those who would argue that there is nothing inherently or 
sufficiently outrageous about unfair medical screening to warrant a 
further intrusion into employer prerogatives. After all, discrimina-
tion based on factors such as appearance, political affiliation, or sex-
ual preference are not prohibited in private employment. Under 
what circumstance!;!, then, should unfair medical screening be reme-
died and how? 
Ironically, where test procedures have a high predictive value the 
societal problems become even more complex. While the employer's 
justifications for exclusion are more soundly based, the potential ad-
verse consequences of such screening are also more troubling. It is 
foreseeable that the potential workforce could be screened into two 
classes of individuals. One group would contain disease-resistant 
persons. The other group would contain asymptomatic persons who 
735. See generally w. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RJsK (1976). 
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are unemployable in certain industries because of an atypical heredi-
tary trait, chromosomal anomaly, or epidemiologically derived 
higher risk of occupational illness. If discrimination based on high 
predictive value testing is prohibited, should this apply to all high-
risk individuals, or should it be limited to persons whose increased 
risk is hereditary or innate rather than based on individually control-
lable criteria such as diet, tobacco usage, or prior exposures?736 
By all indications, science will soon have the ability to perform 
increasingly sophisticated screening tests and the implications for so-
ciety will also increase. 
Soon we may find ourself caught in an ever-tightening spiral: finding 
markers for more subtle problems, discovering larger numbers of sus: 
ceptible workers, labeling more and different types of environments as 
hazardous. It is not inconceivable that, through screening, industry 
will become the modem counterpart of Diogenes as it searches for a 
perfect worker.737 
Screening programs are also self-perpetuating in at least two other 
ways. First, because of the hereditary basis of many types of in-
creased risk, future generations of the same families, races, and eth-
nic groups could be screened out. Second, because of the healthy 
worker effect,738 studies of workers exposed to toxic substances could 
produce artifically low morbidity rates. Based on this compounded 
data, threshold limit values could be set at levels where only resistant 
workers will be able to work without adverse effects. .This, in tum, 
could lead to even more screening. Such developments would con-
firm the widely expressed fear that screening programs place the bur-
den of cleaning up the workplace on the worker rather than on the 
companies. 739 
A wide range oflarger ethical and societal questions are inherent 
in any effort to address the legal problems raised by employer 
screening for susceptibility to occupational illness. For example, 
736. See generally Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball· Predicting Behavior with Statisti-
cal Ieference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979). 
737. z. HARsANYI & R. HUTION, supra note 52, at 117-18. 
738. One of the prerequisites for being employable is a relatively good state of health. 
The more physically demanding the job the higher the health requirements. Those who 
are not fit will not be hired, and those already employed will not remain so once their 
health deteriorates below a certain level. This selective process, enforced by preemploy-
ment examinations, periodic checkups and other activities of occupational health services, 
results in lower death rates than in the general population for occupationally active 
groups - provided that no life-shortening hazards occur in the work environment. It has 
become commonplace to call this phenomenon the "healthy worker'' effect. 
Hemberg, Epidemiology in Occupational Health, in DEVELOPMENTS IN OCCUPATIONAL 
MEDICINE 34 (C. Zenz ed. 1980). With more screening this effect will be heightened to be an 
"extra-healthy" worker effect. 
739. See Severo, supra note 265; Severo, supra note 144, at Al, col. 1. 
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what is society's obligation to persons born with lesser "natural en-
dowment"740 and what are the societal costs of screening out high-
risk workers? Indeed, some potential adverse consequences of 
screening programs go well beyond the workplace.741 
Not all screening programs, however, are objectionable. A prop-
erly administered program of screening individuals for increased 
risk of disease may be quite beneficial to society in disease preven-
tion, reproductive planning, and other areas.742 In the workplace set-
ting, screening techniques could be helpful in identifying individuals 
in need of increased protection and in the early detection of occupa-
tional disease. The dangers are that companies will base their poli-
cies on scant or inconclusive data and that procedures will be used 
indiscriminately and with harsh consequences for at-risk 
populations. 
Many of the numerous questions raised in this Article cannot be 
resolved at the present time. The following two questions, however, 
are the most important and must be addressed. First, should the law 
regulate employer practices that screen workers for increased risk of 
occupational illness? Second, how can the law act to prohibit dis-
crimination based on increased risk and still encourage the salutary 
aspects of workplace screening and monitoring programs? 
The legal brief supporting an affirmative answer to the first ques-
tion already has been written in the public policy pronouncements of 
existing laws and judicial decisions. OSHA mandates that work-
places be made safe and healthful so that "no employee will suffer 
material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such 
employee has regular exposure to the hazard . . . for the period of 
his working life."743 Congress intended that employers have the 
final responsibility for ensuring employee safet>' and health by elimi-
740. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 100-04 (1971); see also Schneiderman, Standard 
Selling: Implications of Sensitivity, and a Search for an Ethical Base, 3 ANNALS AM. CoNF. 
GOVTL. INDUS. HYGIENISTS 133 (1982). 
741. Evidence of stigmatization in the United States is seen in job discrimination, in 
proposals to limit admission to the armed forces to noncarriers, and in increases in insur• 
ance premiums. Nine of twelve insurance companies in one sample charged higher rates 
for individuals with sickle trait even though mortality cuives for such individuals do not 
differ significantly from blacks without the trait. 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, GENETIC SCREENING 126 (1975) (footnotes ommited) 
[hereinafter cited as NAS GENETIC SCREENING]. See generally Damme, Controlling Genetic 
Disease Through Law, 15 U.C.D. L. REv. 801 (1982); Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and 
Counseling: The Legal and Ethical Issues, 68 Nw. U. L. REV. 696 (1973). 
742. See, e.g., National Sickle Cell Anemia, Cooley's Anemia, Tay-Sachs and Genetic 
Diseases Act, 42 u.s.c. §§ 300b to 300b-6 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); NAS GENETIC SCREENING, 
supra note 741, at 225-72; Z. HARSANYI & R. HUTTON, supra note 52, at 121. 
743. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976) (emphasis added). 
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nating workplace hazards, not by eliminating high-risk workers.744 
Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act also support the view that 
discrimination based on susceptibility to occupational illness should 
be prohibited. It is well settled that employment practices may not 
be based on stereotypes or presumptions; there must be an individu-
alized determination of present ability to perform the job.745 Even 
accurate class-based statistics cannot justify individual discrimina-
tion.746 In addition, sensitive workers have long been held to be en-
titled to benefits under state workers' compensation laws.747 
Perhaps the most compelling reason for prohibiting employment 
discrimination based on susceptibility to occupational illness is that 
susceptibility is often "an immutable characteristic determined solely 
by the accident of birth."748 The law has traditionally viewed with 
disfavor any differentiation in treatment based on immutable char-
acteristics like race, sex, alienage, and legitimacy. Therefore, a per-
son's genetic or environmentally-induced predisposition to 
occupational illness, which does not affect "present ability" to per-
form the job, should not be permitted to result automatically in an 
adverse employment decision.749 
While there has been much discussion of the relative predictive 
values of screening procedures, as a legal matter predictive value 
may be irrelevant. Low predictive value tests should be illegal be-
cause of their unfairness. High predictive value tests could be illegal , 
on public policy grounds.750 In any event, it is clear that present 
legal protections are woefully inadequate and that new legislation is 
necessary to clarify existing laws and to delineate new responses to 
the novel issues raised by screening for high-risk workers.751 
744. "Final responsibility for compliance with the requirements of this Act remains with 
the employer." S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1910 U.S. CooE CoNG. 
& Ao. NEWS 5177, 5187. 
145. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971). 
146. See City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 
(1978). 
747. See notes 624-26 supra and accompanying text. 
748. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
749. "Present ability" to perform the job, while appealing in its simplicity, may not be the 
most appropriate standard for determining the employment rights of high-risk individuals. A 
person suffering from hemophilia may have the present ability to perform the job of meat 
cutter, but the societal benefits of providing equal employment opportunities may be more 
than offset by the societal costs in the not unlikely event that the employee sustains a cut. 
750. "Tests," of course, refers to mass screening programs and not individually-based diag-
noses. The legality of using high predictive value tests may be related to "risk" and other 
factors discussed earlier. Tests having a disparate racial or ethnic effect are likely to be the first 
legislative targets, regardless of their predictive values. 
751. Although the specifics of ne}\' legislation to protect high-risk individuals is beyond the 
scope of this Article, any new enactment should have two components. First, it must provide a 
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Regarding the second question, how to accommodate nondis-
crimination with the positive aspects of screening, the answer lies in 
greater public participation in the development, evaluation, and ap-
plication of screening procedures. The rights of the persons being 
screened must be given the highest priority.752 Specifically, high-risk 
individuals should be informed about their predisposition to illness 
from workplace exposures, should be given the opportunity to make 
informed choices about their own health management, and should 
be given every possible protection if they decide to work in the face 
of known risks.753 
Variation in individual susceptibility to occupational illness is a 
biological fact of life. New developments in medical science to iden-
tify and quantify these differences must be approached with caution 
and the findings must be used within the context of a well-reasoned 
legal framework. Law and policy must be formulated that will fur-
ther the goal of equal employment opportunity without sacrificing 
worker health. 
mechanism for rulemaking to evaluate the state of the art in medical screening and to promul-
gate necessary regulations. OSHA could be amended to provide these additional protections. 
Second, it must contain substantive rights and procedural means to enforce nondiscrimination. 
Title VII could be amended to prohibit employment discrimination against high-risk workers, 
752. See NAS GENE.TIC SCREENING, supra note 741, at 225-71. 
753. It is not clear, of course, what the legal consequences would be if the worker assumed 
a known workplace risk. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 
1096-100 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (assumption of risk defense available 
in products liability action based on exposure to asbestos); Williams v. E.I. Du Pont De 
Nemours & Co., 235 S.C. 497, 112 S.E.2d 485 (1960) (contributory negligence defense avail-
able where employee, despite physician's advice, continued work and aggravated his ulcer). 
